CHI93FA109

During the 1st officer's initial training, the capt elected to demonstrate 'a more efficient reversing technique' using a touch-and-go. The airplane departed the left side of the runway at the 4,000-FT marker dragging the left wing and lower left reverser bucket. It then continued for 2,000 ft before coming to rest. Evidence indicated that neither thrust reverser was stowed, and that the flaps were at full deployment. Mcdonnell Douglas letter #4 indicates that reverser buckets will not stow with epr above approx 1.2. The dfdr showed no indication that the airplane completely lifted off the ground once the initial landing was made, and it indicated a constant decay of airspeed from the initial touchdown until the airplane stopped. There was a right crosswind at the time of the accident. There was no physical evidence that the nose wheel was in contact with the runway when directional control was lost. The airplane flight manual indicates that increasing amounts of reverse thrust significantly reduces rudder effectiveness.

History of flight

On March 11, 1993, at 2340 central standard time a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31, N978Z, operating as Trans World Airlines Flight 5591, experienced a loss of directional control during an attempted touch and go landing on runway 30R (9,003' X 200' dry/concrete) at Lambert Field, Saint Louis, Missouri. The airplane exited the runway to the left and sustained substantial damage when the left wing impacted the runway and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane was being operated on a CFR 14, Part 91 training flight at the time of the accident. Neither pilot reported any injuries. The flight was operating on a company VFR flight plan and visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated from Saint Louis at 2225.

During a face to face interview the Captain stated that the purpose of the training flight was to allow the First Officer his first actual experience in the airplane. The First Officer had completed the airplane flight simulator training program. The Captain performed the initial takeoff followed by a touch and go landing, followed by a full stop landing. During the taxi back for another takeoff the Captain allowed the First Officer to practice brake application and thrust reverser operation. The First Officer then performed a takeoff followed by a touch and go landing.

The Captain then made the following written statement regarding the accident landing, "The flight proceeded normally until what turned out to be our last touch and go. (The First Officer) was making better than average progress to this point with the exception of his usage of reverse thrust and brakes. I demonstrated the landing after which I immediately went into reverse thrust to show (him) a more efficient reversing technique than the one he had been using. I then stowed the reverse thrust levers and advanced the throttles for takeoff. Soon thereafter we experienced unexplained severe directional control problems. I was applying enough rudder pressure to cause nose tire scrubbing. We were heading toward the left side of the runway at such an angle that I determined I had insufficient room to stop and therefore elected to attempt to takeoff. Either slightly prior to or shortly after rotation I applied additional thrust and glanced toward the EPR gauges to determine by how much I was over boosting the engines. At this time I noticed the left blue reverse light was illuminated. I exclaimed out loud something to the effect that we were experiencing reverse thrust on the left engine. Due to our deteriorating altitude and airspeed situation I decided to close the throttles and land. I do not recall using reverse during rollout and believe we came to a stop using brakes only."

The First Officer made the following written statement, "After several touch and goes in the pattern for Runway Thirty Right, (the Captain), took the controls on down wind to give me a rest. At about 500 feet (he) started to give the controls to me. I stated he should do the landing and I would do the next touch and go. (He) executed a normal landing demonstrating effective use of reverse thrust. Upon completion of the landing demonstration (he) called for flaps fifteen, trim throttles. At that point yaw to the left was very pronounced. (He) then rotated to prevent us from leaving the runway. Once airborne yaw to the left was still very pronounced and (he) noted that the left engine was still in reverse. (The Captain) then returned the aircraft to the ground. The aircraft landed south of Runway 30 Right and then stopped at a center field taxiway."

During a face to face interview with the First Officer, he stated that the yaw to the left occurred about the same time that the Captain called for "flaps fifteen." He said that his attention to the yaw was directed by his observation of the runway lights unusual position as seen through his windscreen. He stated that once his attention was directed outside, he never looked inside again until the airplane came to a stop. He believes that he did retract the flaps from 50 degrees to 15 degrees. Additionally, the First Officer stated that during the attempt to lift off, he is of the impression that the airplane attained an altitude of about 50 feet, prior to the Captain aborting the takeoff and again landing the airplane.

Personnel information

The Captain, born December 26, 1953, was the holder of an airman's certificate number 2067243, with privileges for an airline transport rating. He was type rated in the McDonnell Douglas DC-9 series airplanes, and held a first class medical issued on March 3, 1993, with no limitations. His total pilot experience was 12,255 hours with 7,470 hours time in this type of airplane, at the time of the accident.

The First Officer, born August 3, 1957, was the holder of an airman's certificate number 340542241, with privileges for an airline transport rating. He was in his initial training on the McDonnell Douglas DC-9 type airplane at the time of the accident. He held a first class medical issued January 11, 1993, with no limitations. His total pilot experience was 7,672 hours with one hour in this type of airplane, at the time of the accident.

Aircraft information

The airplane was a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31, N978Z, serial number 47250. The airplane was maintained on a continuous airworthiness program. The most recent inspection was conducted on July 19, 1992. The airplane had a total airframe time of 59,985 hours at the time of the accident.

Meteorological information

A weather observation taken at the accident airport 10 minutes after the accident reported winds as 340 degrees at 7 knots, with visual meteorological conditions.

Communications

A transcript of conversations between the pilot's of N978Z and the Federal Aviation Administration, Saint Louis, Missouri, Air Traffic Control Tower, is included as an addendum to this report.

Flight recorders

The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was transported to the Engineering Services Division of the NTSB and examined on March 17, 1993. A copy of the full factual report is attached as an addendum to this report. No useful data was obtained from the CVR tape and no transcript was prepared. The recording contained thirty one minutes of a repetitive pulsating signal similar to a tape that has been bulk erased. There was no useful data on any of the four channels.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was transported to the Engineering Services Division of the NTSB and examined on March 18, 1993. A copy of the full factual report is attached as an addendum to this report. The accident occurred on runway 30R, which has a magnetic heading of 300.7 degrees. The DFDR data indicated that the accident airplane: Took off at a magnetic heading of approximately 301 degrees; performed three touch and go's over the next 24 minutes, lined up on a magnetic heading of approximately 300 to 305 degrees each time during descent and making continuous right turns after each go-around until lining up again; lined up (for the landing during which the accident occurred) on a magnetic heading of approximately 300 to 304 degrees and touched down at approximately 114 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and 299.7 degrees magnetic heading (experiencing 1.32 G's vertical acceleration at touchdown); decelerated to approximately 103 KIAS in the next five seconds while maintaining approximately 300 degrees magnetic heading; decelerated to approximately 89 KIAS and turned left to approximately 282 degrees magnetic heading in the next eight seconds; began experiencing vertical acceleration fluctuations ranging from 0.16 to 2.40 G's one second later (altitude and airspeed values became anomalous at this point); turned left to approximately 235 degrees magnetic heading in the next seven seconds, and then started to turn right; and came to a stop approximately eleven seconds later at a magnetic heading of approx