ERA20LA177

The flight instructor reported that, about 10 minutes into the instructional flight, the right engine lost power. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and according to radar data turned right 180° toward the departure airport. The airplane descended from about 775 ft to 450 ft during the turn. The flight instructor stated that the right engine was windmilling while in the turn and that he did not secure it until after completing the turn back to the departure airport. The flight instructor stated that after the turn, the airplane was unable to maintain altitude as a result of the left engine not producing full power, so he attempted to land the airplane on a residential street. The airplane impacted powerlines and then a road, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage, wings, and empennage. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation prior to the accident. Therefore, it could not be determined why the right engine lost power and why the left engine appeared to only produce partial power. It is likely the flight instructor’s decision to turn 180° before securing the right engine resulted in a loss of altitude needed to make the return flight back to the airport at a safe altitude above ground obstacles.

Emergency Procedures Detecting a Dead Engine Loss of Thrust Nose of aircraft will yaw in direction of dead engine (with coordinated controls) Feathering Procedures The propellers can be feathered only while the engine is rotating above 800 RPM. Loss of centrifugal force due to slowing RPM will actuate a stop pin that keeps the propeller from feathering each time the engine is stopped on the ground. Single engine performance will decrease if the propeller or the inoperative engine is not feathered. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, Chapter 13: Transition to Multiengine Airplanes, “Multiengine and single-engine airplanes operate differently during an engine failure. In a multiengine airplane, loss of thrust from one engine affects both performance and control. The most obvious problem is the loss of 50 percent of power, which reduces climb performance 80 to 90 percent. In some cases, after an engine failure, the ability to climb or maintain altitude in a light-twin may not exist. After an engine failure, asymmetrical thrust also creates control issues for the pilot. Attention to both these factors is crucial to safe OEI [one engine inoperative] flight.” According to FAA airworthiness records, the airplane was manufactured in 1973. It was powered by two Lycoming IO-360 series, 200-horsepower engines equipped with Hartzell, counter-rotating, constant speed, controllable pitch, full feathering propellers. A review of the right engine logbook revealed that on September 23, 2019, at a Hobbs time of 5,907 hours, the engine was precautionarily shut down while in flight and that a follow-up engine inspection was unable to duplicate the problem that led to the shutdown; the airplane was returned to service. From September 23, 2019, until the last 100-hour inspection on April 3, 2020, the airplane flew 418 hours without issue. On May 12, 2020, about 0858 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-34-200, N887SP, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Pembroke Pines, Florida. The flight instructor was seriously injured, and the commercial pilot receiving instruction was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 141 instructional flight. According to the flight instructor, he and the pilot receiving instruction conducted a preflight inspection of the airplane and found no anomalies. They departed North Perry Airport (HWO), Hollywood, Florida, about 0845, and headed toward the practice area, which was located about 14 miles west of HWO. He stated that about 6 miles from HWO, at about 1,000 ft mean sea level, “the right engine failed,” he took over controls of the airplane and according to radar data turned right to an easterly heading. Prior to the turn, the airplane was about 775 ft msl, and then it descended to 450 ft msl in the turn. The flight instructor stated that the right engine was windmilling while in the turn and that he did not secure the right engine until after completing the turnback to HWO. Then he followed the engine checklist, secured the right engine, and communicated with the HWO control tower of his intentions to return to the airport. After making the turn back to HWO, the flight instructor stated that the left engine “didn’t produce enough power to maintain altitude,” so he lined the airplane up to land on a residential street. While crossing an intersection the airplane struck powerlines, then impacted the road before striking trees and a streetlight and becoming engulfed in fire. The flight instructor was able to evacuate the airplane; however, the pilot receiving instruction was not. Examination of the accident site by an FAA inspector and the airframe manufacture revealed that the airplane came to rest upright on the right side of a road near a commercial building about 3.5 miles from HWO. All major components of the airplane were accounted for at the accident site and a postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, and right wing. The left wing had separated during the impact and was located near the main wreckage. Examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The right engine was discolored from exposure to the postaccident fire. Continuity of the crankshaft from the rear gears to the valve train was observed along with compression and suction on all four cylinders. Each cylinder was examined with a lighted borescope and no anomalies noted. The servo fuel regulator showed sign of thermal damage with no debris observed in the inlet screen. Three of the four fuel injector nozzles were obstructed with debris similar to ash and exhibited thermal damage. The engine driven fuel pump remained attached to the engine and showed signs of thermal damage. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine, were thermally damaged, and could not be rotated. The spark plugs were removed, examined, and exhibited “normal” wear when compared to the Champion Check-A-Plug Chart. The engine ignition harness was destroyed by fire. The oil suction screen was absent of debris and the oil filter media was charred and no metallic debris observed. The left engine was discolored from exposure to the postaccident fire. Continuity of the crankshaft from the rear gears to the valve train was observed along with compression and suction on all four cylinders. Each cylinder was examined with a lighted borescope with no anomalies noted. The servo fuel regulator showed signs of thermal damage with no debris observed in the inlet screen. The fuel injectors were unobstructed. The engine driven fuel pump remained attached to the engine and showed signs of thermal damage. Both magnetos remained attached to the engine, were thermally damaged, and could not be operated. The spark plugs were removed, examined, and exhibited “normal” wear when compared to the Champion Check-A-Plug Chart. The engine ignition harness was destroyed by fire. The oil suction screen wasabsent of debris and the oil filter media was charred and no metallic debris observed.