ERA20LA247

The pilots of a single-engine airplane and a multiengine airplane were both cleared to taxi to the runway within 2 minutes of each other; however, the tower controller did not provide either pilot with information regarding the position or taxi intentions of the other pilot as required. The two airplanes converged at a taxiway intersection, resulting in substantial damage to both. Both pilots reported that they were unaware of the proximity of the other airplane and did not see the other airplane before the collision. A review of airport surveillance video indicated that the pilot of the single-engine airplane was approaching the multiengine airplane from its right, rear quadrant at a higher taxi speed. The video also indicated that the multiengine airplane appeared to be within the single-engine airplane pilot’s field of view before the collision, and if the pilot had been properly scanning for traffic, the collision likely would have been averted. The pilot of the multiengine airplane reported that a blind spot from his right engine and wing obscured the path of the other airplane. It is also likely that, had the controller provided information to each pilot regarding the position and intentions of the other pilot, they would have exercised greater vigilance regarding scanning for traffic.

On July 13, 2020, at 1146 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172S (Skyhawk), N5280D, and a Britten Norman BN-2A-27 (Islander), N200MU, were substantially damaged when they were involved in an accident at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The pilot of the Skyhawk and the pilot of the Islander were not injured. The Skyhawk was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight and the Islander was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi cargo flight. According to recorded voice communications provided by Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport Traffic Control Tower (FXE ATCT), at 1142, the pilot of the Islander requested taxi clearance from the kilo ramp for a visual flight rules (VFR) departure to the east. At 1143, the tower controller instructed the pilot of the Islander to taxi to runway 27 via taxiways bravo, echo, and charlie with authorization to cross runway 31. The pilot of the Islander acknowledged and repeated the clearance. At 1144, the pilot of the Skyhawk requested taxi clearance from the customs ramp for a VFR departure. The tower controller instructed the pilot of the Skyhawk to taxi to runway 27 via taxiways golf and charlie. The pilot of the Skyhawk acknowledged and repeated the clearance. At 1146, the pilot of the Islander reported that there had been a collision with a Cessna at the intersection of taxiways charlie and echo. The pilot of the Skyhawk then reported to tower that we “hit our wings together.” Figure 1 shows a diagram of the taxi routes and collision location. Figure 1: Taxi routes of both aircraft and other pertinent airfield information overlaid on satellite imagery A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector responded to the accident site and documented the damage to both airplanes. The collision occurred at the intersection of taxiways charlie and echo, where taxiway echo converged into charlie at an angle of about 45°. He reported that there was substantial damage to the left wing of the Skyhawk and to the right wing of the Islander. Airport surveillance video that captured the collision revealed that the Skyhawk appeared to be taxiing at a faster speed than the Islander. No radar or automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data were available to confirm taxi speeds. Both pilots reported that they did not see the other airplane before the collision. The pilot of the Islander reported that the Skyhawk approached from behind and to his right, and a blind spot existed due to the location of the right engine nacelle, propeller, spinner, and landing gear. The surveillance video appeared to indicate that the Islander would have been visible within the Skyhawk pilot’s field of view before the collision. Review of the recorded air traffic control tower communications revealed that the controller did not provide either pilot with information regarding the position or taxi intentions of the other pilot, contrary to FAA Order JO 7110.65Y (3-1-6, Traffic Information).