ERA20LA308

During the preflight inspection of the airplane, the flight instructor used the sight gauges inside the airplane to estimate that there was a total of approximately 10 to 11 gallons of fuel on board between the two wing fuel tanks. The flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction departed and conducted maneuvers, simulated losses of engine power, and performed at least eight takeoffs and landings over the course of about 50 minutes. During a simulated loss of engine power in the airport traffic pattern, after descending to 300 ft above the ground, the pilot receiving instruction attempted to perform a go-around. The engine did not respond as expected and they performed a forced landing to a grassy area bordering the runway. During the landing attempt, the airplane impacted a taxiway marker and trees bordering the airport, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The amount of fuel onboard at the time of the accident and its distribution was not determined; however, a postaccident test run of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. During a postaccident interview, the flight instructor estimated that the airplane’s fuel consumption was about 6 gallons per hour (gph). Review of fuel consumption data from the engine and airframe manufacturer showed that the engine could be expected to consume between 6.5 and 7.3 gallons per hour at higher power settings, and that the fuel consumption could be as much as 9.5 gallons per hour when producing full power. These fuel consumption rates did not account for fuel consumed during taxi, run up, and takeoff. Given the quantity of fuel onboard at the time of departure, the duration of the flight, the likely fuel consumption rate of the engine, and that the engine was successfully test run after the accident, it is likely that the loss of engine power was the result of an interruption of fuel flow to the engine; however, whether the fuel supply was completely exhausted or only the fuel in one of the tanks was exhausted could not be determined based on the available information. Had the flight instructor elected to depart with additional fuel, it is likely that the accident would not have occurred.

On September 5, 2020, about 1850 eastern daylight time, an American Aviation AA1, N6107L, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Newnan Coweta County Airport (CCO), Newnan, Georgia. The flight instructor and pilot receiving instruction were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. According to the flight instructor, he used the sight gauges inside the airplane to estimate that there was approximately 10 to 11 gallons of fuel on board before the flight. During preflight inspection, they took fuel samples, and there were no indications of contamination or water in the fuel. This was the instructor’s third flight with the private pilot receiving instruction, who was also a possible buyer of the airplane. They were conducting various maneuvers and simulated loss of engine power procedures, and had conducted about 8 or 9 takeoffs and landings for a total flight time of about 50 minutes. Just before the accident, the pilot and the flight instructor were practicing a simulated loss of engine power from an altitude of about 800 ft while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 32. After reducing the engine power to idle for the simulation, they descended to about 300 ft above ground level, after which the pilot applied full power to go around, but the engine did not respond and remained at low power. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and attempted to troubleshoot, but was unable to restore engine power. The airplane continued to descend, and the instructor attempted to make a forced landing in the grass adjacent to runway 32. The airplane touched down on the right side of runway 32, impacted a lighted taxiway sign box, veered sharply to the left, and subsequently impacted the trees bordering the west side of the airport property. The fuselage came to rest on an embankment between two trees that were impacted by the left and right wings. The impact nearly separated the left wing from the fuselage and the right outboard portion of wing was crushed. The airplane rested on the embankment at about a 60° nose-down position. The cockpit, fuselage, engine compartment, and propeller remained relatively intact. The quantity of fuel in the fuel tanks could not be determined given the position of the wreckage, but following recovery of the wreckage from the accident site, both fuel tanks were found absent of fuel. The condition of the fuel tanks was not documented, and whether there was any fuel spillage at the accident site before recovery of the airplane was not determined. Examination of the engine confirmed powertrain continuity through 720° of crankshaft rotation at the propeller hub. After confirming powertrain continuity, an engine run was accomplished. A portable fuel tank supplied fuel to the engine through the right fuel tank supply line; the fuel selector was not moved, and was in the same position as discovered at the accidentsite. After priming, the engine started on the second attempt and ran continuously at idle speed. All indications remained nominal and there was no anomalous behavior with the engine or any corresponding systems. Engine power was applied from idle to maximum power with no anomalous behavior from any of the systems. Examination of the wreckage and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation. The airplane was equipped with a Lycoming O-235-L2C engine driving a 2-blade Sensenich fixed pitch propeller. The airplane held 12 gallons of fuel in each wing tank cell for a total of 24 gallons, of which 22 gallons was usable. The fuel was managed by a fuel selector valve on the center console marked left, right, and off, and the fuel quantity was indicated by sight gauges located on the left and right side of the cockpit. The Lycoming engine operator’s manual for the O-235 series engine indicated that at performance cruise (75% rated power) at 2,500 rpm, the engine would consume 6.7 gallons per hour (gph) and at full power and 2,800 rpm, it would consume 9.5 gph. Section V of the airplane’s pilot operating handbook stated that performance information was derived from actual flight test and was corrected to standard atmospheric conditions. Actual performance varied based on atmosphere, engine and propeller condition, mixture leaning techniques, and other performance variables. In addition, fuel consumption was computed for level flight with the mixture leaned. At 2,500 feet and 85% rated power (2,600 rpm), the engine consumed 7.3 gph, and at 77% rated power (2,500 rpm), the engine consumed 6.5 gph. During a postaccident interview, the flight instructor stated that the airplane’s engine consumed about 6 gph.