ERA23FA182

The instrument-rated private pilot was commuting to work in his airplane. The pilot did not request any air traffic control services for the 22-minute flight, and the airspace at the destination airport was not tower-controlled. Recorded track data revealed that the pilot began a descent to the destination airport and crossed over the approach end of the runway on a heading perpendicular to the runway heading. He then made two turns of about 180° while flying at airspeeds near the airplane’s published stall speed, and reached about 40° of bank during each turn. Additionally, the post-accident position of the flaps suggested that at least the final phase of this maneuvering was being performed with the wing flaps retracted. The airplane impacted terrain about 1,200 ft short of the runway approach end and about 40 ft north of runway centerline. Although there was an instrument approach procedure for the runway, the track data revealed that there was no attempt by the pilot to execute it. The lowest weather minimums for the approach required at least one mile visibility. Weather at the destination airport at the time of the accident included a 300-ft ceiling, ¼ mile visibility in fog, and calm wind. The weather conditions cleared about an hour after the accident. A postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of a mechanical malfunction or anomaly that would have precluded normal operation. Engine operation was recorded on the onboard avionics and revealed increasing power at impact consistent with the pilot advancing the throttle. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot attempted to fly under the low overcast while trying to acquire the airport visually. During this attempt, he excessively banked the airplane at slow speed, and with the wing flaps retracted, exceeded the airplane’s critical angle of attack, and lost control of the airplane, resulting in a collision with terrain. His tendency to not be late for appointments may have added self-induced pressure and affected his decision-making during the flight.

According to the Cirrus Design SR22 Pilot’s Operating Handbook, at the maximum gross weight of 3,400 lbs, stall speed with flaps up and 45° bank was 81 kts indicated airspeed (KIAS) at the most aft center of gravity (G.G.) and was 84 KIAS with flaps up and 45° bank at the most forward C.G. With flaps full down, the stall speeds under the same conditions were 72 and 73 KIAS, respectively. On April 6, 2023, about 0750 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, N911TK, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Jesup, Georgia. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to recorded data from the airplane’s primary flight display (PFD) and multi-function display (MFD), the airplane took off from Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida, about 0728, climbed to about 1,800 ft, and flew to the north-northwest. About 0746, the airplane began descending. The pilot did not request any air traffic control services during the flight. As the airplane approached Jesup-Wayne County Airport (JES), Jesup, Georgia, from the south, it slowed to an indicated airspeed of about 75 knots (kts) and maintained this airspeed within ±5 kts for the remainder of the recording. Track data showed that the airplane initially crossed over the approach end of runway 29 perpendicular to the runway heading (see Figure 1). At 07:50:03, the airplane began to roll right to an ultimate bank angle of about 40° at 07:50:37, and then immediately rolled left to 40°. The airplane subsequently began to roll slightly back towards wings level before it rolled left and pitched down. The MFD stopped recording at 07:51:00, and the PFD stopped recording at 07:51:09. Figure 1 – Final Flight Track and Wreckage Location There was a published RNAV GPS approach to runway 29; however, the airplane’s recorded flight track was inconsistent with that instrument approach procedure. The lowest weather minimums for the approach required at least one mile visibility. The airport was equipped with an Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) and the 0750 observation included ¼-mile visibility in fog, calm wind, and a ceiling of 300 ft. Airport personnel who arrived to work about 5 minutes after the accident reported and documented fog on the ramp at the time of their arrival. The AWOS reports issued surrounding the time of the accident indicated that restricted visibilities in mist were first observed at 0615, with dense fog being reported from 0635 through about 0820, then mist at 0821 through 0835 before clearing at 0855. According to the pilot’s flight instructor, the pilot completed an instrument proficiency check on September 29, 2021, in the accident airplane. No record of a current flight review per 14 CFR 61.56 (a) and (c) was found. His most recent logged flight review was completed on September 11, 2019. According to interviews with thepilot’s spouse and the JES airport manager, the pilot owned the airplane and used it to commute between his home in Fernandina Beach, Florida and Jesup, where he owned a chiropractic practice. His wife reported that he was “obsessed with weather” and they had an agreement that he would take “no chances” regarding the weather. If the weather was questionable, he would drive instead. The pilot’s spouse and the airport manager both reported the pilot was never late for appointments. His office opened at 0800; however, his spouse did not know what time his first appointment was. The wreckage came to rest upright, and there was no fire. Ground signatures were consistent with a right-wing-low, nose-low impact with terrain. The wreckage came to rest near to the point of initial ground impact on a heading of 040°. The wing flaps actuator was found in the retracted (up) position. One of the propeller blades fractured during the impact sequence. The blades exhibited chordwise scratching, surface polishing, and “S” bending signatures. The airplane was equipped with the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The system had not activated, and the parachute was not deployed. The CAPS safety pin was found in place in the CAPS handle holder. The airplane was equipped with electronic multifunction and primary flight displays. The non-volatile memory from those units were forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for examination and download of the data. Recorded engine data from the Avidyne components revealed that the engine was in operation at the time of impact with the terrain, and the data was consistent with an application of power during the last few seconds. The last recorded engine parameters indicated 2,290 rpm, oil pressure 51 psi, oil temperature 178°F, fuel flow 17.1 gph, and manifold pressure 24.9 inHg. Examination of the airframe, engine and propeller did not reveal evidence of a mechanical malfunction or anomaly that would have precluded normal operation.