ERA25LA223

NTSB accident investigation · Piper PA22 · Hebron, OH · June 7, 2025

Accident · No injuriesClass 4 · LimitedFinal report
Date
June 7, 2025, 13:09 local (17:09 UTC)
Place
Hebron, OH · At Turn Around Area/near Approach end of runway 01
Injuries
2 uninjured
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Landing
Aircraft
N6804BPiper PA22
Defining event
Landing-landing roll: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report April 30, 2026
Report
Approved by Office Director
Investigation class
Class 4 - Basic report with no Prelim publish
NTSB office
Eastern Region Aviation
Parties
FAA FSDO
Case key
200286

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

The airplane owner and pilot’s intentional allowance of unapproved maintenance and maintenance personnel’s failure to adequately maintain or service the brake system, which resulted in a total loss of brake pressure.

Findings · 5

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Maintenance: modification/alterationPersonnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnelPiper PA-22-150: 1 caseAll aircraft: 69 casesProbable cause
Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repairPersonnel issues › Task performance · Unknown/Not determinedPiper PA-22-150: 1 caseAll aircraft: 14 cases
Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repairPersonnel issues › Task performance · Maintenance personnelPiper PA-22-150: 1 caseAll aircraft: 14 casesProbable cause
Maintenance: unauthorized maint/repairPersonnel issues › Task performance · PilotPiper PA-22-150: 1 caseAll aircraft: 14 casesProbable cause

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

The pilot reported that the brakes functioned normally during taxi, and pretakeoff checks, with no anomalies noted. The flight was uneventful, and he entered the traffic pattern at his destination airport. After touchdown, he retracted the flaps, reduced engine power, and applied the brakes, and the airplane initially decelerated as expected. With about one-third of the runway remaining, total brake pressure was lost. He determined that insufficient runway remained to execute a go-around, so he elected to perform “S” turns in an attempt to slow the airplane. As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he applied right rudder to avoid a runway overrun. During the ensuing turn, the left wing impacted the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the wing. The mechanic who completed the most recent annual inspection of the airplane reported that, 10 days before the accident, he had installed a new brake booster in accordance with a supplemental type certificate (STC). The STC kit did not include the required “screw-vent”, so the mechanic temporarily installed a brake bleeder valve and instructed the owner not to fly the airplane before the correct screw-vent was installed. The brakes were bled multiple times, operationally checked, the maintenance logbook was signed, and the airplane was returned to service. The pilot reported that, 5 days before the accident, the brakes were inoperative due to a lack of pressure during an attempted taxi. He stated that a local mechanic sanded the brake caliper and replaced the O rings/packing; however, no maintenance logbook entry was made, and the mechanic denied performing the work. The mechanic did report that he had examined the airplane, provided advice to the pilot, and observed several discrepancies, including a missing screw vent. Following the reported maintenance, the pilot stated that an operational check of the brakes was conducted with no anomalies noted. Postaccident examination of the brake system by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed a significant amount of air in the system and no brake pressure. After the brakes were bled and an operational check was conducted, brake engagement did not occur until the final 10% of brake handle travel, and full brake effectiveness was not achieved. The examination also identified the presence of an unapproved part and incomplete compliance with the supplemental type certificate. Additionally, evidence indicated that undocumented maintenance had been performed following installation of the STC. Due to either an unapproved part, undocumented maintenance, and incomplete compliance with the STC, it is likely that the air in the brake system was a result of inadequate maintenance.

Aircraft

Registration
N6804B
Reported as
Piper PA22 (150)
Category
Airplane
Serial number
22-4099
Built
1956
Airframe hours
1,005
Engine
Lycoming O-320 SERIES, 150 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal · Part 91
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal; Standard, Utility
Last inspection
Annual · May 28, 2025
Destination
LHQ · Lancaster, OH
Airport
9OA5 · Buckeye, runway 19, 2,764 × 25 ft, asphalt
Equipment
ADS-B

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
39
Injuries
None
Certificate
Private
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land
Medical
Class 3, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
November 18, 2024
Seat
Left
Restraint
4-point
Flight hours
145 total · 56 in this make and model

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
Calm
Visibility
3 statute miles
Temperature
75 °F, dew point 63 °F
Altimeter
29.88 inHg
Observed at
VTA, 5 nm away
METAR
KVTA 071654Z AUTO 00000KT 3SM HZ FEW038 SCT048 24/17 A2988 RMK AO2 SLP111 T02390167

Docket · 7

The files NTSB released with the investigation on April 30, 2026, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 13.9 MB in all.