FTW03FA008

The single-engine airplane impacted a vertical bluff while maneuvering shortly after takeoff from a grass runway. The flight instructor, a private pilot, and a student flew to the airport, ate dinner, and departed just before nightfall because the runway did not utilize runway lights. Numerous witnesses reported the airplane did not accelerate normally during the takeoff roll, and it took nearly all of the 3,200-foot turf runway to liftoff. The witnesses then described a slow, nose-high climb. The airplane flew to the east along a river before turning to left prior to encountering power lines. The airplane impacted the bluff, and erupted in flames. A post-accident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no anomalies that would have prevented their normal operation. The flap handle was found selected to 25 degrees. People familiar with the airport indicated that the best way to depart the airport area was to fly along a valley that veered toward the northeast instead of flying along the river as the accident flight did. The river is in line with steep bluffs and is crossed by a power lines.

History of flight

On October 8, 2002, at 1845 central daylight time, a Piper PA-28-140 single-engine airplane, N4344J, was destroyed when it impacted a bluff while maneuvering near Lakeview, Arkansas. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot. The commercial pilot, and two pilot-rated passengers sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The cross-country flight originated from Gastons Airport, Lakeview, Arkansas, and was destined for the Springdale-Branson Regional Airport, Springdale, Arkansas.

According to witnesses, the airplane arrived at Gastons Airport approximately 1730. The three occupants ate dinner at the restaurant located at the airport. Restaurant staff reported that when the main course was finished the occupants were offered dessert; however, declined and stated that they needed to depart before dark because the airport was not equipped with runway lights. The occupant's meal ticket was closed at 1836.

Four witnesses reported approximately 1840, they observed the airplane's engine start and the airplane takeoff. One witness stated, he observed the airplane hold prior to runway 6 for landing traffic; however, he did not hear the pilot perform a pre-takeoff engine run-up. The four witnesses commented the airplane was slow to accelerate and the airplane used most of the 3,200 foot-long turf runway before becoming airborne. One witness stated that he was "surprised to see him lift off." Another witness reported that after airborne the airplane's attitude was "nose high," and it appeared as if the airplane "wasn't climbing or accelerating normally." One witness reported that most airplanes that size become airborne around cottage 20, and the accident airplane did not lift off until cottage 68. The cottages are oriented along the south side of the runway, between the runway and the White River.

Three witnesses along the White River stated that the airplane was flying at a low altitude. One witness observed the airplane approach power lines and then make a climbing left turn away from the power lines. She stated, she thought the airplane would have contacted the wires if it had continued straight ahead. Subsequently, the airplane impacted a bluff and a fire erupted.

A witness in the restaurant stated that he did not see the airplane depart; however, he did notice the fire. He stated that the fire appeared approximately 10 minutes after the 3 three gentlemen left the restaurant.

Personnel information

One pilot held a commercial pilot certificate, with single- and multi-engine land airplane ratings and an instrument-airplane rating. He also held an FAA issued flight instructor certificate for single-engine land airplanes and instrument-airplanes. He was issued a second-class medical certificate on May 1, 2002, with a limitation to wear corrective lenses. According to records provided by Proflite, a flight school where the pilot was employed, the pilot accumulated a total of 4,033.7 hours. He underwent his last biennial flight review on February 1, 2002.

One of the other occupants held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. He held a third class medical certificate that was issued on March 21, 2003, with the limitation he must wear corrective lenses. Additionally, he held airframe and powerplant mechanic certificates.

The third occupant had recently started flying again (after 20 years) and had recently received instruction including one ground instruction unit and one flight instruction unit. The instructor who was on board the accident airplane provided the instruction.

The NTSB could not determine where each occupant was seated at the time of the accident.

Aircraft information

The 1967 model airplane (serial number 28-22720) was equipped with a 150 horsepower Lycoming O-320-E2A engine, and a 2- bladed, fixed pitch, Sensenich propeller. The airplane underwent its most recent annual inspection on October 1, 2001, at an airframe total time of 5,232.52 hours. The next entry, which was also the last entry in the airframe logbook, was dated May 12, 2002, and the entry stated that a new G-35 Gill battery was installed. A total airframe time was not listed on the May 12, 2002 entry.

The last entry in the engine logbook, dated August 12, 2002, revealed that an oil and filter change was performed, at a tachometer time of 5,448 hours, 1,777.9 hours since its last overhaul. During this oil and filter change, and the previous four engine oil changes (spaced approximately 50 hours apart), one pint of "AVBLEND oil additive" was added to the engine oil. AVBLEND is purported to restore and maintain used aircraft engines to improved performance levels and "provides protection against rust, corrosion, dry start damage and premature wear." According to AVBLEND's website, it "slowly dissolves carbon and helps to improve valve and ring sealing in the combustion chamber. This provides better cylinder combustion (peak pressure) efficiency resulting in improved engine horsepower. Engines must be at least dimensionally correct within service limits to restore performance."

Personnel at Proflite reported the flight instructor/aircraft owner had mentioned he was trying to "troubleshoot a low power problem." The instructor pilot reported to Proflite, he had the intake gaskets replaced and the "power problem was fixed." There was no record in the engine (or airframe) logbook that this maintenance had been performed; however, parts sales sheets from Springfield Aircraft & Charter Sales, Inc., indicated that on September 18, 2002, the flight instructor purchased two intake gaskets (part number 71973), and then on October 4, 2002, four more of the same gaskets were purchased.

Meteorological information

At 1853, the weather observation facility located at the Baxter County Regional Airport, which is approximately 3 miles east of the accident site, reported the wind from 080 degrees at 3 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, a few clouds at 8,500 feet, scattered clouds at 25,000 feet, temperature 61 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 30 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 30.08 inches of mercury.

Aerodrome information

According to the FAA's Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD), the Gastons Airport is located at North 036.55.243 latitude and West 092.25.587 longitude, and at an altitude of 479 feet msl. The airport has one turf-covered runway, 06-24, and is 3,200 feet long and 55 feet wide. All aircraft are required to land on runway 24 and depart runway 06. Obstructions to runway 06 include a road and obstructions to runway 24 include trees.

Wreckage and impact information

The accident site was located 1.3 miles southeast of the departure airport, at an elevation of 709 feet msl (166 feet above the Gastons Airport elevation). A global positioning system recorded the location at North 036 degrees 21.131 latitude and West 092 degrees 31.882 longitude. The airplane came to rest along a bluff with a 60-degree slope. Witness marks at the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted a solid rock cliff, which was oriented 90 degrees to ground level, in a near wings level attitude. The airplane came to rest 25 feet below the initial impact area. A post-accident fire consumed the cockpit, fuselage, both inboard wing sections, and a portion of the empennage.

Flight control continuity was established from the left aileron to the T-bar; the control cables for the right aileron were destroyed. The left rudder control cable was destroyed and the right rudder control cable was destroyed. Control continuity was established for the stabilator trim. The horizontal stabilator trim tab was found in the full nose up position (13/4 shaft extension with 16 threads exposed). The stabilator n