- Date
- June 8, 2002, 14:05 local (21:05 UTC)
- Place
- Rio Rico, AZ
- Injuries
- 3 fatal
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Phase of flight
- Enroute
- Aircraft
- N4302PPiper PA-23-160
- Weather
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Status
- Completed · report February 28, 2006
- Report
- Approved by Office Director
- Parties
- Federal Aviation Administration, Textron Lycoming, New Piper Aircraft
- FAA report
- 20020608013529A
- Case key
- 54902
From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.
On this page
Probable cause
a loss of engine power in the left engine for undetermined reasons, and the failure of the flying pilot to maintain an adequate single engine minimum control airspeed and aircraft control. Also causal was the decision of all three of the pilots to continue the flight with known engine discrepancies.
Sequence of events
NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.
Analysis
Shortly after takeoff, and about 3 miles from the airport, the airplane crashed into desert terrain near a rural residential area. The airplane had been flown to the departure airport earlier in the day for a certified flight instructor (CFI) multiengine check ride by the examinee, his CFI, and a multiengine rated private pilot passenger. No discrepancies were noted with that portion of the flight. During the engine run-up for the check ride, both the designated pilot examiner (DPE) and examinee noted that the left engine was not producing sufficient power for the pre-takeoff engine check. They cycled the engine at higher and lower mixture settings before they could conduct a normal run-up. After completing a simulated engine failure, the check ride continued with a normal takeoff. Towards the departure end of the runway, the DPE observed a loss of climb performance and noted that the left engine's manifold pressure was at 21.5-22.0 inches. They were going to make an off airport landing; however, they were able to gain enough altitude to land back at the airport. He also noted that, on the downwind leg for landing, the right engine oil temperature was near the upper limit, and the oil pressure showed a decrease toward the lower limit. On final, the oil pressure for the right engine dropped further near the lower redline limit. Once they landed, the oil pressure and oil temperature returned to normal. The pilots decided to do another run-up check, but during the check, the left engine was not developing power equal to that of the right engine, so they discontinued the check ride and taxied back to the ramp. The DPE discussed the situation with the CFI, who then called the flight school's mechanic and discussed the situation with him. Both the CFI and mechanic felt that the check ride should be discontinued, but it was safe to fly the airplane back to home base. The DPE observed the occupants board the airplane and reported that the CFI sat in back, with the examinee in the right front seat, and the private pilot in the left front seat. The airplane yawed to the left three times during the takeoff roll; each time the airplane returned to the runway centerline and the ground roll continued. The airplane lifted off after a long ground roll and gained altitude very slowly. The witnesses indicated that the airplane sounded normal during the takeoff. A few minutes later a loud shriek was heard on the UNICOM frequency, and a few minutes after that they were notified of an airplane down by local law enforcement. A post impact ground fire thermally destroyed the aircraft, and severely damaged the engine accessories and controls. No discrepancies were found during an examination of the airframe. Mechanical and valve train continuity were established for both engines. A differential compression check was conducted on both engines. The compression check for the left engine revealed low pressure on the numbers 2 and 4 cylinders. Both cylinders were staked with no difference noted in the number 2 cylinder. The number 4 cylinder had an improved compression reading. The numbers 2 and 4 cylinders were removed for further inspection. No internal discrepancies were noted with either the number 2 or 4 cylinders. Due to the degree of thermal destruction, no meaningful tests could be performed on the fuel or ignition system components. Ground scars and impact damage indicated that the airplane hit the ground in a steep left bank attitude and tumbled, which could be consistent with a loss of power on the left engine and a failure of the flying pilot to maintain an adequate airspeed above single engine minimum control airspeed. The anatomical evidence on the occupants was inconclusive as to who may have been manipulating the flight controls at the time of impact.
Factual narrative
History of flight
On June 8, 2002, about 1405 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-23-160, N4302P, crashed under unknown circumstances near Rio Rico, Arizona. Accelerated Flight Crew Training, Chandler, Arizona, operated the rental airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. Post impact fire destroyed the airplane. The private pilot, the commercial rated pilot, and a pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight that departed Nogales, Arizona, about 1355. The flight was destined for Stellar Airpark Airport (P19), Chandler. The wreckage was at 31 degrees 26.212 minutes north latitude and 110 degrees 55.255 minutes west longitude.
The commercial pilot (examinee), his certified flight instructor (CFI), and the private pilot passenger flew from Chandler to Nogales for the examinee's CFI multiengine check ride. Nogales was 3 miles on a magnetic bearing of 090 degrees from the accident site.
Witnesses stated that the weather was calm winds with a temperature of 93 degrees Fahrenheit. The airplane departed runway 21, which was 7,199 feet in length by 90 feet wide.
Witness statements
Statement from the Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE)
According to the DPE, the accident airplane arrived at Nogales at 1050. The examinee was testing for his flight instructor airplane multiengine certificate. Once the examinee and DPE completed a walk-around inspection of the airplane, they boarded and taxied to the run-up area for runway 21. According to the DPE the examinee set the mixtures at the "number three (3) position;" however, the left engine did not develop sufficient power for the check. The examinee then had the DPE readjust the mixture setting to a richer setting and then a leaner setting. The leaner setting restored normal engine power to the left engine. The examinee readjusted the right engine power settings to match the left engine, and conducted a normal engine run-up.
On takeoff, the DPE simulated an engine failure, which the examinee recovered from, and aborted the takeoff. Both pilots elected to then continue the takeoff from their current position, as there was enough remaining runway. The DPE stated that the takeoff roll and initial climb out were normal until they were over the departure end of the runway. There was a loss of climb performance, and the airplane yawed slightly to the left. He noted that the left engine manifold pressure gage read between 21.5-22.0 inches, and both engines were indicating 2,600 rpm (revolutions per minute). The DPE, the pilot flying, initiated a turn toward a golf course. The airplane was still climbing about 200-300 feet per minute, and was able to climb to 4,800 feet mean sea level (msl) aided by an updraft.
The DPE indicated that while on the downwind leg for landing at Nogales, he noted that the right engine oil temperature had climbed near the upper limit, and the oil pressure was showing a decrease. A discussion ensued between the pilots about how the DPE should deal with the situation.
As the airplane turned onto the final approach, the DPE noted that the oil pressure on the right engine had dropped further and was now near the lower redline limit. After touchdown, he idled the right engine, and the oil pressure increased to the lower green limit. As they cleared the runway; he noted that the oil temperature had dropped and the pressure further improved.
After clearing the runway, the DPE and examinee decided to discontinue the check ride. They also decided in order to provide a confirmation of the problem to the flight school's mechanic; they decided to double check the mixtures and attempt to troubleshoot the problem. They taxied to the run-up area to do another engine performance check. They noted that the left engine was not developing power equal to that of the right engine. Since the results were different than that of the first run-up, they decided to discontinue troubleshooting, and taxied back to the ramp where they shutdown the engines.
Further discussions ensued in which the DPE and examinee decided to let the airplane cool down and check the engines further. When they got back into the terminal area, the DPE had a discussion with the CFI where he indicated that they had mechanical problems during the flight check, and he felt that they should not continue flying the airplane. The CFI indicated that she would contact her company.
In the meantime the DPE, the examinee, and a local instructor went back to the airplane. The DPE manually rotated the propeller for the left engine. He indicated that the number 1 and 2 cylinders felt normal; the number 3 cylinder provided some resistance, and the number 4 cylinder was just slightly less than the number 3 cylinder. All of the cylinders on the right engine were the same. The examinee then did the same check, and both of them had the same result on both engines.
After returning to the terminal area, the CFI told the DPE that she had been in contact with the school's mechanic, who told her that "there is a problem and you are right not to fly, but it should be safe to fly home, but don't push it." She also told the DPE that the mechanic thought that the gage was probably faulty. The DPE told them again not to fly the airplane. However, the CFI stated that it would be okay "and they would fly airport to airport on the way home." The DPE stated that the other two pilots made no additional comments about the airplane in his presence.
Prior to their departure, the private pilot asked the DPE, "If I lost an [engine] on takeoff here I shouldn't go straight ahead should I?" The DPE told him that, because of the mountains, straight ahead would not be the best idea, and that either a left or right turn would provide him with more options (golf course or river beds).
About 5 minutes later, while in his office, the DPE saw the airplane taxiing out. He observed the CFI in the rear seat, the private pilot in the left seat, and the examinee in the right seat. He then went outside and watched the airplane take off. On the takeoff roll, he observed the airplane yaw to the left three times, each time returning to the runway centerline. He thought that they were going to liftoff at taxiway "C"; however, the airplane continued down the runway rotating about 3,300 feet down the runway. The nose pitched up abruptly, and the landing gear was retracted immediately. The airplane began to settle toward the runway. About 15 feet above the ground, the nosed pitched to level, and the airplane accelerated and began a slow climb out. The DPE stated that the airplane sounded normal, and he went back into his office. A couple of minutes later he heard a loud shriek on UNICOM, and then received a phone call from a deputy from Santa Cruz Sheriff's Department that a 911 call had been made reporting a downed airplane. The deputy asked if any airplanes had just taken off from the airport, and the DPE said yes. The DPE then got on the radio and tried to contact the airplane with no success. An airplane on final for Nogales was asked to look for and confirm that an airplane was down, which the pilot was able to confirm.
Statement of flight school mechanic
According to the flight school's mechanic, he spoke to the CFI about 1200 the day of the accident. She had called him to say that the DPE reported that during the check ride the left engine was producing less power than the right engine. They discussed engine instrument indications inside the cockpit for the left engine. The CFI indicated that the manifold pressure was at 25 inches, the engine rpm was 2,600, and the oil temperature and pressure were normal.
The mechanic then questioned her about whether they had any problems on the way down, and the CFI responded, "None, everything is good." She then indicated that the DPE said that the right engine was "running hot." The me
Aircraft
- Registration
- N4302P
- Reported as
- Piper PA-23-160
- Category
- Airplane
- Serial number
- 23-1803
- Airframe hours
- 5,000
- Engines
- Lycoming, reciprocatingLycoming O-320, 150 horsepower, reciprocating
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Fire
- On-Ground
- Flight
- Personal · Part 91
- Registered owner
- Accelerated Flight Crew Training, Inc.
- Airworthiness certificate
- Standard, Normal
- Last inspection
- 100 hour · May 1, 2002 · 50 hours before
- Departed
- OLS · Nogales, AZ
- Destination
- P19 · Chandler, AZ
Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.
Flight crew · 2
As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.
- Role
- Co-pilot
- Age
- 28
- Injuries
- Fatal
- Certificate
- Private
- Airplane ratings
- Multi-engine land
- Medical
- Class 1
- Seat
- Left
- Toxicology
- Performed
- Flight hours
- 29 in this make and model
- Role
- Flight instructor
- Age
- 30
- Injuries
- Fatal
- Certificates
- Flight instructor, Commercial
- Airplane ratings
- Multi-engine land
- Instrument ratings
- Airplane
- Medical
- Class 1
- Seat
- Rear
- Toxicology
- Performed
- Flight hours
- 191 total · 136 in this make and model
Weather
- Conditions
- Visual (VMC) · Day
- Wind
- Variable at 6 knots
- Visibility
- 10 statute miles
- Lowest ceiling
- None
- Temperature
- 100 °F, dew point 45 °F
- Altimeter
- 29.96 inHg
- Observed at
- TUS, 40 nm away
Docket · 19
The files NTSB released with the investigation on November 9, 2005, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 15.1 MB in all.
FAA reports on this event · 1
The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.
Other investigations on N4302P · 1
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.