LAX99FA150

The pilot contacted FSS and requested weather at several local San Diego airports. He was told to expect low IFR conditions with visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and indefinite ceilings of 100 feet. The pilot then obtained a clearance to enter the Class B airspace using a fictitious call sign. He requested and was issued an IFR clearance to the airport, and was later cleared for the ILS runway 28R approach. Prior to issuing the approach clearance, the controller asked the pilot what his intentions would be when he made the missed approach. The pilot replied that he would want radar vectors for a second approach. Numerous times on the approach the controller either asked the pilot if he was receiving the glideslope satisfactorily, or told him his position and what his altitude along the approach segments should have been. The controller issued two low altitude alerts; the final one at the outer marker where the airplane was observed 300 feet low. Recorded radar data showed that the airplane was consistently below ATC assigned and charted minimum descent altitudes for most of the approach. The airplane collided with trees and the ground about 1 mile short of the runway. Two ground witnesses reported hearing a loud noise and began looking for the source of the noise. They almost ran over the downed trees and the burning aircraft wreckage before acquiring it visually due to the dense fog. None of the pilot's personal logbooks or aircraft records could be located to establish his instrument currency, although the pilot's daughter stated that he flew fairly frequently. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no abnormalities in either the engine or the airframe. The day before the accident the same airplane had been observed entering Class B airspace and landing at a controlled field without an ATC clearance.

History of flight

On April 15, 1999, at 0522 hours Pacific daylight time, a Beech 36, N7706R, collided with eucalyptus trees and power transformers on a city street near an industrial park adjacent to the Montgomery Field Airport, San Diego, California. The airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28R when the accident occurred. The airplane, owned and operated by the pilot, was destroyed during the impact sequence and subsequent ground fire. The private pilot and his passenger, the sole occupants, sustained fatal injuries. The personal flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 when the accident occurred. The flight originated at Calexico, California, at an unknown time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

A receipt found at the crash site indicated that the pilot checked out of his hotel room in Calexico at 0414. There were no eyewitnesses who observed the pilot depart from Calexico.

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records disclosed that at 0328, the pilot of the accident airplane telephoned San Diego Flight Service Station (FSS) and said that he was on the ground at Calexico, and wanted to know the weather reports for Montgomery Field. The FSS briefer stated that Montgomery Field was reporting "less than one quarter of a mile, fog, indefinite ceiling one hundred, temperature eleven, dew point eleven." The pilot then asked FSS what the forecast was for Montgomery Field. The briefer told him that IFR conditions would continue through the morning hours with low stratus clouds and fog. He also stated that Lindbergh Field was calling for 2 miles in mist with 300-feet overcast skies.

The pilot called FSS back at 0350 and asked what Gillespie Field was reporting. The FSS briefer told him that Gillespie doesn't report weather at night, and the closest airport he had was Montgomery Field. He reported their automated system was reporting measured 1/4-mile visibility in fog and an indefinite ceiling of 100 feet.

At 0506, the pilot contacted the FAA Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (Socal TRACON) at 6,500 feet while en route from Calexico to Montgomery Field. During this, and subsequent contacts with TRACON, the pilot used the aircraft call sign N3930F. The pilot requested weather information and was told to contact San Diego radio. At 0507, the pilot recontacted Socal TRACON and requested "radar vectors to the ILS." The controller issued a heading and a clearance to enter the San Diego Class B airspace, and told the pilot to expect his IFR clearance in 15 miles.

At 0512, the pilot was issued an IFR clearance to the airport. During this exchange, the controller asked the pilot what his intentions were "in the advent of a missed approach." The pilot responded by reciting the missed approach procedure. The controller then clarified his request by saying "I wasn't asking for the missed approach procedure, I just wanted to know what you wanted to do if you make a missed approach at Montgomery . . . do you want to go somewhere else." The pilot's response was "negative, radar vectors to a second approach." The pilot was subsequently cleared for the ILS runway 28R approach at 0515.

The controller notified the pilot at 0517 that he was receiving a low altitude alert, and that he should check his altitude immediately. The controller stated "you're still one mile east of NESTY (intersection) and your altitude should be 3,800." Review of the recorded radar data disclosed that the airplane's mode C report at this point was 3,100 feet. At 0518, the controller asked 30F (the call sign used by the pilot instead of N7706R) if he was receiving the glide slope satisfactorily, and the pilot replied "affirmative." One minute later the controller told the pilot "low altitude alert . . . check your altitude immediately, altitude should be 2,100 feet until DEORO (another intersection which is also the outer marker for the ILS approach)." Review of the recorded radar data showed the airplane's mode C report to be 1,800 feet at this point. The glide slope intercept at DEORO is published as 2,070 feet. The controller then advised the pilot to contact the Montgomery advisory frequency, since the control tower was not operating at this time.

A review of the recorded radar data provided by the FAA revealed that the mode C reports for the airplane were consistently below air traffic control (ATC) assigned and mandatory instrument approach step down and glideslope altitudes during most of the approach sequence.

Two witnesses reported hearing a loud explosion and witnessed the streetlights go out following an electrical power failure at 0522. The first witness said that due to the dense fog in the area, he could not see the wreckage until he was within 4 yards of it. The first eyewitness stated he was driving up Ruffin Road when he heard an explosion. He stated he was approximately 1/4 of the way up the road when he noticed debris from the Eucalyptus tree limbs on the roadway. He said that the fog was so bad he almost hit the tree limbs.

The second eyewitness stated he heard a loud "thump" and immediately noticed that the power went out to the area. He stated he noticed an airplane fully engulfed in flames, but the cockpit was intact. He emptied a 5-pound fire extinguisher on the aircraft with no success. He then said he attempted to secure the scene and search for any additional victims that might have been thrown from the airplane.

Personnel information

According to the pilot's daughter, the pilot flew to Calexico with some degree of frequency. She said he often flew down there in order to purchase automotive parts. The daughter said the pilot departed Phoenix, Arizona, on April 10, 1999, and originally planned to fly back to Phoenix via Bermuda Dunes Airport on April 15, 1999. The daughter was unable to verify his exact route of flight or intentions once he landed at Montgomery Field.

Certified copies of the pilot's FAA airman and medical record files were obtained from FAA Airman Certification Branch in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. A review of the records revealed that the pilot's medical certificate was administratively denied in July 1994 by the FAA's Aeromedical Certification Division. An Airman Stop Order, dated June 19, 1995, was located on the top page of the airman file. It noted that the Assistant Chief Counsel of the FAA Western Pacific Region revoked the pilot's private pilot certificate and airman medical certificate held by the pilot on an emergency basis. The reasons given for the emergency revocation were that the pilot had completed an application for an airman medical certificate dated July 1, 1994. In that application, the pilot marked the answer "no" to question No. 18 referencing a history of mental disorders and any suicide attempts. Additionally, the revocation letter stated that on December 27, 1993, in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County, the pilot was detained for an evaluation based on a finding by the court that the pilot was mentally disordered and in need of care, supervision, treatment, or restraint.

Additionally, the revocation order stated that the pilot had attempted to commit suicide by overdose on three occasions prior to the above mentioned court order, and had admitted suffering from depression. The file also contained a letter written by his physician to the Flight Surgeon, FAA Western Pacific Region. The physician reported in part, that the pilot once threatened to commit suicide by intending to crash his airplane.

The pilot's daughter reported that the pilot's personal flight records could not be located and no pilot logbooks were found in the wreckage. The pilot's recent flight experience, including recent instrument flights and approaches, could not be established through any source available to the investigation.

Aircra