MIA05FA017

The pilot did not perform weight and balance calculations for the accident flight; though, postaccident calculations indicated that the airplane was under gross weight and the center of gravity was within limits. The pilot reported that he did not have any memory of the accident flight. The accident flight was the second flight of the day for the pilot and began immediately after landing from the previous skydive drop flight. The passengers were loaded and the pilot taxied to runway 11 where he began the takeoff. Witnesses and a pilot-rated passenger in the airplane reported that after rotation, the airplane pitched up. The pilot-rated passenger who was seated behind the pilot moved forward and noted the pilot moving the manual elevator trim wheel in the nose-down direction. The airplane was observed to stall, pitch nose down, and collide with terrain. The flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the elevator trim was found set 10 degrees trailing edge tab down, or aircraft nose-up. The maximum elevator trim trailing edge down takeoff setting is 4 degrees. The airplane "Owner's Manual" before takeoff checklist indicates to set the elevator trim to the takeoff setting. The pilot reported that he had performed a takeoff in the accident airplane 2 times previously in which the elevator trim was position full nose-up. During those occasions, he moved the elevator trim to the nose-down direction and continued the takeoff. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted to the flight controls for roll, pitch, yaw, or pitch trim. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

History of flight

On October 30, 2004, about 1206 eastern daylight time, a Cessna P206, N2588X, registered to PTP, Inc., and operated by Jacksonville Extreme Sports, crashed shortly after takeoff from Herlong Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91, local, parachute drop flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and three passengers sustained serious injuries, one passenger sustained minor injuries, and one passenger was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

Several witnesses who were located on the airport reported that shortly after takeoff from runway 11, the airplane was observed in a steep nose high attitude. Witnesses on the airport reported seeing the airplane pitch nose down, roll left, then disappear behind trees.

One passenger in the airplane who is a pilot reported that the airplane pitched up after becoming airborne. He moved forward, and noticed the pilot "frantically" moving the elevator trim wheel 4 or 5 times towards the nose down direction. The passenger reported the airplane then descended in an approximately 15-20 degrees left wing low attitude. The passenger and several witnesses on the airport reported hearing no discrepancies with the engine. The pilot-rated passenger also reported the engine was "humming fine, it sounded great."

The pilot reported in writing that due to his injuries, he does not remember, "...any of the events that took place before, during, or after the accident...." His normal procedure was for him and often times the jump master to preflight the airplane at the beginning of each day in accordance with the "operating handbook." The flight controls would be tested, and he would check for water in the fuel. He verbally reported using the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) to perform the preflight inspection of the airplane for the first few times when flying the airplane for jump flights, but stopped using the POH once he was familiar with the airplane.

He reported that based on the typical fueling procedure, he could fly 2 loads without refueling between flights. He would not give any jumpers any briefing before the flight; the jump master would brief them on the use of lap belts. With respect to 2 tandem jumps and a photographer on-board, the jump master would have been all the way aft in the airplane. He also verbally advised he would not do a weight and balance on every skydive flight. It was a standard procedure to have all occupants belted for takeoff, and they would remain belted until the airplane was in a stable climb. Most jumpers remained in that position until the airplane climbed to 10,000 feet. He estimated that at the time of the accident there were 8 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank and 15 gallons of fuel in the right fuel tank. For takeoff he would typically extend the flaps to 20 degrees and set the elevator trim to the takeoff setting. He did not recall the seating positions of the passengers which he and the on-board jump master devised, and does not recall if all people were belted in for takeoff on the accident flight. There was no problem with the airplane during his preflight inspection, or during the engine run-up before takeoff; otherwise, he would not have started the flight. He has a general rule not to fly an airplane if he finds anything inconsistent with how the aircraft should be. He reported that on every other flight the elevator trim indicator was operable.

Personnel information

The pilot is the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. On November 24, 2003, he was issued a first class medical certificate with no restrictions or limitations.

The pilot reported having a total time of 1,603 hours, and 28 hours total time in the accident make and model airplane. He reported having accrued 133 hours in the last 90 days, of which 28 hours were in the accident make and model airplane. In the last 30 days he reported having accumulated 60 hours, of which 28 hours were in the accident make and model airplane. He verbally reported flying 25-30 jump flights in the accident airplane since being checked out on or about September 27, 2004.

Aircraft information

The airplane was manufactured in 1965 by Cessna Aircraft Company as model P206, and was designated serial number P206-0088. It was certificated in the normal category and was equipped with a Teledyne Continental IO-550-F (9) factory new engine rated at 300 horsepower when operated at 2,700 rpm, installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA2830SO on November 7, 2001. The airplane was also equipped with a constant-speed 3-bladed Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1RF propeller also installed in accordance with STC SA2830SO on November 7, 2001.

The airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection which was signed off as being completed on August 11, 2004. The airplane had accumulated approximately 72 hours since the inspection, and the engine had accumulated 1,774.3 hours since manufacture at the time of the accident.

The primary pitch control system consisted of a single control yoke installed at the left seat, interconnected to a bellcrank near the control surface by a combination of a push/pull rod and steel cables guided by several pulleys along its length. The secondary pitch control system consisted of a manually operated trim wheel located in a pedestal about the center of the instrument panel and immediately below it, interconnected by steel cables also guided by several pulleys along its length to an jackscrew type actuator located inside the right horizontal stabilizer and forward of the right elevator. The elevator trim tab actuator is connected to the trim tab via a link. Secondary pitch flight control system setting is indicated by a pointer adjacent to the manual trim wheel. The aircraft did not have an electric elevator trim system.

Meteorological information

A surface observation weather report taken at Jacksonville International Airport (KJAX) Jacksonville, Florida, on the day of the accident at 1156, or approximately 12 minutes before the accident, indicates the wind was from 260 degrees at 3 knots, the visibility was 6 statute miles with haze, few clouds existed at 500 feet, the temperature and dew point were 26 and 21 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.11 inHg. The accident airport is located approximately 14 nautical miles and 210 degrees from KJAX.

Airport information

The Herlong Airport is equipped with runways designated 7/25, and 11/29, the later being the runway utilized by the pilot for departure. Runway 11/29 is an asphalt runway 3,500 feet in length by 100 feet wide. The airport is equipped with a common traffic advisory frequency of 123.0 mHz, which is not recorded.

Wreckage and impact information

The airplane crashed on airport property; the wreckage came to rest at position 30 degrees 16.637 minutes North latitude and 081 degrees 47.983 minutes West longitude, or approximately .41 nautical mile and 104 degrees magnetic from the approach end of runway 11. The accident site was also located approximately 400 feet north of the north edge of runway 11.

Examination of the wreckage revealed the airplane came to rest upright on a magnetic heading of 095 degrees adjacent to a line of trees. The airplane was resting on the fuselage and right wingtip. The nose landing gear strut was located at the initial ground contact location, which was approximately 55 feet from the main wreckage resting location. The heading from the initial ground scar to the main wreckage was approximately 115 degrees magnetic. All components necessary to sustain flight were attached or located in close proximity to the main wreckage.