WPR10LA253

NTSB accident investigation · Schweizer G-164B · Robbins, CA · May 21, 2010

Accident · Serious injuriesLimited investigationFinal report
Date
May 21, 2010, 16:00 local (23:00 UTC)
Place
Robbins, CA
Injuries
1 serious
Damage
Substantial damage
Phase of flight
Landing
Aircraft
N3633CSchweizer G-164B
Defining event
Landing-landing roll: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report September 13, 2012
Report
Approved by Office Director
NTSB office
Western Pacific Region
Parties
Federal Aviation Administration
FAA report
20100521005679A
Case key
76078

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

The failure of the wheel hub flange, which allowed the over size tire to expand and impinge on the brake disc and caliper, which resulted in a loss of control during the landing.

Findings · 2

NTSB’s coded findings. Those marked are part of the probable cause; the rest are factors or other findings. Under each, the cases with the same finding.

Sequence of events

The events NTSB coded, in order, by phase of flight. The defining event is the one that best describes the accident. Under each, the cases with the same event anywhere in their sequence.

Analysis

During an agricultural application flight, the pilot noticed that the right brake pedal was stiff and saw what appeared to be hydraulic fluid on his foot. The pilot tried without success to set and release the brake to correct the stiff brake pedal. He radioed his base of operations to notify ground personnel of the possible brake problem and of his intention to return to the airfield. The pilot attempted to land the tailwheel-equipped airplane with a direct crosswind that was 15 knots, gusting to 20 knots. As soon as the airplane’s right wheel touched down, the pilot felt the airplane start to pull to the right. When he tried to correct the airplane’s direction to the left, the pilot felt the wind shift and the airplane veered off the left side of the runway into an adjacent irrigation ditch. The left wing came to rest on the sloping terrain forming the ditch. The investigation showed that the right brake calipers separated from the airplane at touchdown. Examination of the right wheel revealed that the inner wheel hub flange sustained a circumferential failure that allowed the inflated tire and tube to expand and impinge upon the brake disc and caliper. The examination further showed that the tire installed on the airplane was a larger size than the standard tire size recommended by the manufacturer of the wheel assembly (29x11.0-10 instead of 8.50-10). Because of its larger-than-standard size, the tire impinged on the brake disc and caliper after the wheel hub flange failed, which resulted in the caliper’s separation upon touchdown. According to the type certificate holder for the airplane, some G-164B operators of the accident airplane model have obtained field approval from their local Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight standards district office to use the oversize tires. The FAA had issued such a field approval for the accident airplane. As a result of this accident and the subsequent investigation, on December 15, 2010, the FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-11-06, which reminded operators that oversized tire modifications require analysis and substantiation as well as periodic inspections to prevent unsafe conditions, none of which were accomplished in this case.

Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 21, 2010, about 1600 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a Schweizer G-164B AgCat, N3633C, during landing with a suspected brake problem, the airplane veered off the runway and came to rest in an irrigation ditch near Robbins, California. Sunrise Dusters, Inc., was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 137. The certificated commercial pilot sustained serious injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wing spars. The local agricultural aerial application flight departed Robbins about 1530. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The pilot reported that during the flight he noticed that the right brake pedal was stiff. He saw what appeared to be hydraulic fluid leaking on his foot from what he thought might be from the parking brake valve. The pilot tried without success to set and release the brake to correct the stiff brake pedal. He radioed in to his base of operations; he notified ground personnel of the possible brake problems, and his intentions to return to the airfield. During the landing, as the right wheel touched down the airplane pulled to the right; the pilot attempted to bring the airplane back towards the left. During the correction, the pilot felt the wind shift. The airplane veered back towards the left, departed the runway, and came to rest in an irrigation ditch. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both the right and left wing spars. The propeller was substantially damaged, and a large quantity of soil entered the engine intake. The left and right main landing gear struts were damaged when the aircraft went into the ditch. The right brake calipers separated from the airplane, and were found within a few feet of the initial touchdown point of the right main landing gear tire. The airplane was recovered from the ditch, and moved to the company’s hangar for further examination. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident coordinator examined the airplane and the accident site. The right wheel was found to have the entire inboard flange separated from the inboard wheel half. The tire was a tube type and the tube was still inflated. The tire expanded beyond where the flange once was and pushed the broken wheel flange pieces into the brake disc assembly. The tire was deflated and the parts were retained for examination. The attach points of the brake disc were found to be bulged and stressed. The attach points of the disc are normally located on the wheel assembly inner diameter. The force of the inflated tire and tube pushed inward radially against the brake disc with great force. The FAA inspector opined that the wheel flange failed in-flight, and gave the pilot a locked brake pedal feel. The installed tire on the accident airplane was 29x11.0-10. The manufacturer of the wheel assembly for the Ag-Cat G-164B (Part number 40-101) reported that the proper tire size should be 8.50-10.The FAA accident coordinator contacted the type certificate holder of the Ag-Cat G-164B and was advised that some operators of the accident airplane model have obtained a field approval to use oversize tires from their local FAA Flight Standard District Office. As a result of this accident and the subsequent investigation, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin SAIB CE-11-06 on December 15, 2010, making recommendations to operators who may be operating oversized tires. The SAIB made the following recommendations: “All operators of 14 CFR part 21, section 21.25 Restricted Category and 14 CFR part 23 Normal Category certificated airplanes that are currently operating with or may modify their aircraft to operate with oversized tires different from the aircraft’s approved type design, should acquire an STC or field approval supported by FAA-approved data with similar original equipment manufacturer (OEM) restrictions for installation, pressure, etc. before doing so. The approved data should include flight test requirements and their results as well as system design and structural analysis. Guidance for replacing OEM tires with oversized tundra tires is provided in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) AC 23-17B. The AC summarizes the results of flight tests recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board, and conducted by the FAA for evaluation of tundra tires installed on a Piper PA-18. In addition, the AC provides information of these tires as well as testing of their installation. Although the guidance in the AC is based specifically on the Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-18, it identifies issues and guidance that can be extended to other airplane types equipped with oversized tires. The AC also identifies the possible performance effects and flight and ground handling characteristics that may be altered with the installation of the tundra tires. Potential propulsion system effects such as unusable fuel may be affected by changes in normal flying attitude. Review of all these potential effects as identified in AC 23-17B should be evaluated. Before installation of larger tires operators should do the following as a minimum: 1. Initially inspect wheels for cracks using an industry standard fluorescent penetrate process with annual inspections thereafter. Install only approved vendor supplied tires. Install new tubes. Determine the appropriate tire pressure for the specific tire, aircraft, and aircraft operations in consultation with the approved tire manufacturer and FAA Advisory Circular, AC 23-17B. Check for clearance between the tire and brake components. Check the tire pressure and abnormal wear at 2 week intervals or less. Additional safety information to the public of potential problems associated with aircraft with oversized tires is also provided in Safety Alert for Operations (SAFO) 10007, dated 5/24/10. The SAFO provides recommended actions for persons interested in operating aircraft with oversized tundra tires as well as withskis, or wheel/ski installations. Owners and operators of Restricted Category and Normal Category airplanes who intend to modify their aircraft with oversized tires should review the above documents for guidance and the issues to consider and evaluate when replacing the manufacturer’s recommended main landing gear wheels and/or tires with oversized replacements.”

Aircraft

Registration
N3633C
Reported as
Schweizer G-164B
Category
Airplane
Serial number
776B
Airframe hours
10,400
Engine
Walter M601E11, 750 horsepower, turbo prop
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial application · Part 137
Operator
Sunrise Dusters Inc
Registered owner
Sunrise Dusters Inc
Airworthiness certificate
Special, Restricted (Special)
Last inspection
Annual · May 1, 2010 · 50 hours before
Departed
CA18 · Robbins, CA
Destination
CA18 · Robbins, CA
Airport
CA18 · Wagner Field, runway 14, 3,100 × 35 ft, gravel

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot
Age
63
Injuries
Serious
Certificate
Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Medical
Class 2, With waivers/limitations
Last flight review
May 6, 2009
Seat
Single
Flight hours
17,350 total · 2,223 in this make and model

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
240° at 13 knots, gusting 20
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
None
Temperature
68 °F, dew point 39 °F
Altimeter
29.94 inHg
Observed at
SMF, 12 nm away

Docket · 4

The files NTSB released with the investigation on May 24, 2012, on NTSB’s docket system: statements, records, photos and specialists’ reports. 819 KB in all.

FAA reports on this event · 1

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.

Other investigations on N3633C · 3

Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.