WPR19FA095

The student pilot and flight instructor in the Cessna were landing at the non-tower-controlled airport when a North American T-28 collided with the Cessna from behind, fatally injuring the student. Radar data indicated that the T-28 overflew the airport before joining the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for the landing runway; about this time, the Cessna was on final approach. The pilot of the T-28 reported that the bright sun and the haze created a glare on the windscreen that obscured his forward vision, making it difficult for him to see directly ahead, and the glare became worse as he descended toward the runway on final approach. The T-28 pilot saw the Cessna ahead of him on the runway just before the collision occurred. The instructor onboard the Cessna could not recall the details of the flight but reported that his student would have made radio calls on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) as they approached the airport for landing. The CTAF was not recorded, and the radio frequency settings of the Cessna could not be determined due to thermal damage. Examination of the T-28 revealed that its radio was not tuned to the airport's CTAF; therefore, the T-28 pilot was neither receiving position reports from other aircraft in the traffic pattern, nor was he broadcasting his position. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the T-28 pilot's failure to see and avoid the Cessna while landing with reduced visibility due to sun glare, and it is likely that his failure to monitor and use the CTAF contributed to the accident.

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-66B, Non-Towered Airport Flight Operations, recommends that: All traffic within a 10-mile radius of a non-towered airport or a part-time-towered airport when the control tower is not operating should continuously monitor and communicate, as appropriate, on the designated CTAF until leaving the area or until clear of the movement area. After first monitoring the frequency for other traffic present passing within 10 miles from the airport, self-announcing of your position and intentions should occur between 8 and 10 miles from the airport upon arrival. Departing aircraft should continuously monitor/communicate on the appropriate frequency from startup, during taxi, and until 10 miles from the airport, unless 14 CFR or local procedures require otherwise. Neither pilot was in contact with an air traffic control facility, nor were they required to be. CPM's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) was not recorded. The Cessna's radio settings could not be determined due to thermal damage. The T-28 was equipped with a Garmin GTR SL40 communications radio, located immediately below a Garmin 327 transponder mounted to the bottom of the panel. When the electrical system was powered on following the accident, the active radio frequency was 125.00 and the standby frequency was 121.50. The CPM CTAF was 123.05. Commonly referred to as "GUARD," 121.5 MHz is reserved for emergency communications for aircraft in distress, as well as the frequency utilized by earlier generation emergency locator transmitters as a means of locating downed aircraft. When positioned in the pilot's seat in the T-28, investigators noted that the radio frequencies were partially obscured from the pilot’s field of vision. While in a normal flying position, an investigator of similar height of the T-28 pilot could only see the bottom half of the displayed frequencies. On March 13, 2019, about 1850 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 152 airplane, N48962, and a North American T-28 Trojan (T-28), N5440F, were involved in an accident near Compton, California. The T-28 sustained substantial damage and the airline transport pilot onboard was not injured. The student pilot onboard the Cessna was fatally injured, and the flight instructor sustained serious injuries; the airplane was destroyed. The T-28 was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight; the Cessna was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight. Review of radar data revealed two discrete secondary beacon code targets that were correlated to the two airplanes as they approached Compton/Woodley Airport (CPM); the Cessna from the south-southwest and the T-28 from the north/east. (See figure 1.) The instructor onboard the Cessna stated that he and the student were simulating a diversion to CPM. He was seriously injured during the accident and could not recall the details of the flight but stated that the student would have made all radio calls over theairport's common radio frequency. Radar indicated that the Cessna entered the airport traffic pattern on the downwind leg at an altitude about 950 ft above ground level (agl), then proceeded to fly the base and final legs of the traffic pattern for runway 25 left (25L). Figure 1. Recorded radar data of both airplanes The T-28 pilot stated that he was returning the airplane to CPM following maintenance. As he approached the area at an altitude about 1,000 ft above ground level (agl), he began to become concerned, because the haze was extreme and the sun was low and bright, obscuring his forward vision. He was initially unable to find CPM but located an open area without buildings and thought that was likely the airport, which he confirmed as he got closer. In an effort to announce his presence at the airport, he overflew the runway from the southeast, crossing midfield then making left descending turns into the left traffic pattern for runway 25. Radar data indicated that the T-28 approached CPM from the east, overflew the airport about 700 to 750 ft agl, then entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 25L. (See figure 2.) Figure 2. Radar data The T-28 pilot stated that as he turned from the base to final legs, the bright sun and the haze created a glare on the windscreen that obscured his forward vision, making it difficult for him to see directly ahead. As he descended toward the runway, the glare became worse and he realized he was between runways 25L and 25R. He side-stepped to runway 25L and the airplane touched down on the runway surface. Several seconds later, the pilot saw the Cessna on the runway ahead of him. He applied hard braking and felt the impact with the other plane and resulting explosion immediately thereafter. The T-28 continued about 1,000 ft before coming to rest off the right side of runway 25L. (See figure 3.) Figure 3. Compton Airport accident diagram Multiple video recordings captured the accident (see figure 4); review of the footage revealed that the Cessna touched down on runway 25L and continued its landing roll. The T-28 crossed the runway threshold about 10 seconds after the Cessna and subsequently touched down about 1850:36. On the landing roll, adjacent to the runway halfway point sign, the T-28 impacted the Cessna. Figure 4. Video frames of the airplanes before impact The time of sunset was 1859:24. The sun’s azimuth at the time of the accident was 267° (see figure 5) and the elevation was slightly above the horizon at 0.50°. Figure 5. Sun information T-28 Pilot (A-1) The 84-year-old pilot was issued a third-class special issuance Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman medical certificate with a limitation for glasses for near vision. On his most recent medical exam, his color vision and field of vision were normal, and his uncorrected distant vision was 20/30. At his November 2017 ophthalmology examination, the pilot was diagnosed with age-related cataracts that had both a nuclear andcortical component. He was noted to wear eyeglasses with prism correction, and his uncorrected distant vision was 20/30 in each eye. An ophthalmology exam on October 2019 found a worsening of his cataracts and distant vision. Review of the pilot’s uncorrected vision results from exams spanning over thirty years for first or second-class medical certification showed some gradual decrement of distant vision with aging, which required him to wear corrective lenses when flying. The T-28 pilot stated that he used his “Flight Guide” book for determining airport frequencies. Examination of the actual guide found at the airplane revealed that the page for CPM was missing; a paper note in place of the page read, “Pg 34, Aug 2017 Compton a/d removed.” The Cessna came to rest on the north side of runway 25L, about 150 ft west of the left outboard wing. The T-28 was 450 ft further west of the Cessna. The marks on runway revealed no indications of braking by the T-28 before the collision.