WPR24FA057

The pilot and two pilot-rated passengers were returning to their home airport after they were advised by the pilot’s flight instructor not to return due to dense fog that reduced visibility to about 500 ft. During their arrival, the pilot made multiple advisory radio calls that confirmed his intention to land and activated the pilot-controlled runway lights (PCL). Recorded ADS-B data showed that while on the downwind leg, after passing the runway lights, the airplane veered toward the runway centerline as it continued the downwind leg. The pilot then performed a 180° base to final turn and overshot the runway centerline twice. The airplane then flew past the runway threshold and off to the side of the runway, where it impacted a power distribution line support pole about 694 ft from the approach end of the runway threshold. A postaccident fire substantially damaged the airplane. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions of failures that would have precluded normal operation. A weather study confirmed that instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed about the time of the airplane’s arrival. The pilot likely lost his ability to maintain visual reference through the fog during the landing approach.

The destination airport, 7S5, was a public, non-towered airport surrounded by Class G airspace. The runway was equipped with marginal intensity runway lights that were activated by the CTAF. According to a business owner located on the airport, the lights used three radio clicks for low, five clicks for medium, and seven clicks for high intensity. The airport was also equipped with pilot-controlled precision approach path indicator lights (PAPI). According to the flight instructor, the PAPI had not worked in the past five years. On December 16, 2023, about 1654 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 172G airplane, N3992L, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Independence, Oregon. The pilot and the two pilot-rated passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The owner of the airplane reported that he allowed the pilot to use the airplane to obtain his private pilot certificate and to prepare for an instrument rating and commercial pilot certificate. According to the pilot’s flight instructor, on the day of the accident flight, the flight instructor was not available for training but supervised the pilot as he conducted a training flight that would include instrument approaches conducted in visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. The pilot stated to the flight instructor that he would take along a pilot-rated passenger who held an instrument rating. ADS-B data showed the flight began around 1500 and originated from the pilot’s home airport, Independence State Airport (7S5) Independence, Oregon, and progressed to Mc Minnville Municipal Airport (MMV) Mc Minnville, Oregon. The flight instructor monitored the flight’s progress via FlightAware, an internet-based flight tracking site, and observed that the pilot was training as he had briefed. The flight instructor became aware that fog had developed around 7S5 sooner than he had expected. He telephoned the pilot, who had landed at MMV. The flight instructor advised the pilot not to return to 7S5 because of fog on the ground and that the visibility was about 500 ft. The pilot explained to the flight instructor that he had plenty of fuel and that he would fly to 7S5, see how it looked, and if it was unacceptable, he would divert to McNary Field Airport (SLE) Salem, Oregon, or possibly return to MMV. The pilot also informed the flight instructor that, while at MMV, he had picked up a second pilot-rated-passenger. ADS-B data showed that the airplane departed MMV about 1638 and proceeded directly to 7S5. A recording of the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) for 7S5 revealed the pilot made a 10-mile and a 5-mile advisory call and that both calls included an intention to land. About 3 minutes later, the pilot reported entering the downwind leg for landing on runway 34. Shortly afterwards five clicks were recorded from the CTAF frequency, consistent with activating the PCL to medium intensity. About 1minute later, the pilot made his last radio call and advised 7S5 traffic that 92L had turned final for runway 34. ADS-B data recorded the airplane as it entered the 7S5 traffic pattern on the downwind leg while about the traffic pattern altitude of 1,200 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane initially flew parallel to the runway but upon passing the runway, the airplane drifted left toward the runway centerline. After continuing south of the runway by about 1.4 miles, the airplane began a descending 180° left-hand “base to final” turn. During the turn, the airplane overshot the runway centerline to the east (right of the centerline). The pilot continued the left descending turn and crossed the runway centerline a second time; at the conclusion of the 180° turn, the airplane was left of the runway centerline by about .4 mile. The airplane continued to descend and deviate left, away from the runway. The last ADS-B data point recorded the airplane about 200 ft msl, or about 22 ft above ground level (agl), at a distance about 288 ft southwest of the accident site, which was about 694 ft northwest of the threshold of runaway 34 (figure 1). The airplane contacted a powerline support pole at a height of about 69 ft above ground level and impacted terrain, coming to rest about 170 ft from the pole. The airplane was substantially damaged by impact and postimpact fire. Figure 1. Image showing the ADS-B track, runway centerline (dashed line), the runway, the accident location (circle), and the support pole (small rectangle). The arrow points in the direction of travel An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Oregon State Medical Examiner. The cause of death was listed as blunt force head injury. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no drugs of abuse. According to the flight instructor and the airplane owner, after the accident, while they both were at the hangar, the visibility was about 500 ft due to ground fog. A weather study revealed the destination airport, 7S5, did not have a weather reporting station. The closest airport with an automated weather reporting station was McNary Field (SLE) Salem, Orgon, located about 9 miles east-northeast. Automated weather reported about the time of the accident was wind from 180° at 3 knots, visibility 5 miles in mist, sky clear below 12,000 ft, temperature 2° Celsius (C), dew point temperature 1° C, altimeter 30.17 inches of mercury. The observations indicated that low instrument flight rules (LIFR) to instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions were reported at SLE before 1130. The conditions improved to marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) to VFR conditions immediately before the accident, with a fog bank and lower visibility reported to the southeast of the station before the accident, and rapidly deteriorating conditions to LIFR conditions about 15 minutes after the accident and continuing into the evening. The National Weather Service (NWS) had a Graphic-AIRMET current forIFR conditions, which extended over the destination and SLE, for ceilings below 1,000 ft agl and/or visibility below 3 miles in fog/mist, as shown in figure 2. Figure 2. Image showing a region of IFR conditions. A pilot report (PIREP) from Aurora State Airport (UAO), located about 29 miles northeast of the accident site, reported at the time of the accident a layer of clouds with bases near 200 ft and tops near 400 ft during his departure. The study reported that sunset was at 1632. At the time of the accident, the sun was about 4° below the horizon at an azimuth of 240°. According to the owner of the airplane he hosted the accident pilot, who was a former military pilot from Afghanistan. The two pilot-rated passengers were friends of the accident pilot, and both were also former Afghan military pilots. Both pilot-ratedpassengers had previously earned their instrument airplane ratings. The airplane came to rest inverted on the edge of an open field, about 694 ft northeast of the threshold of runway 34. The first point of probable impact was to a support pole, about 69 ft above the ground and about 170 ft from the main wreckage. The pole had fractured into three major pieces. A white color transfer, consistent with the white paint of the fuselage, was observed on a section of the pole. One section of the pole had fallen and came to rest on the right wing. A dual red-light beacon had separated from the top of the powerline support pole and was within the wreckage. A section of a power distribution line was in the fuselage section of the wreckage. A postaccident fire reduced the fuselage and cabin area to ash. The wings and empennage were not destroyed by the fire and were located next to the fuselage. The engine had separated from the airplane and was about 60 ft northwest of the main wreckage. The propeller remained attached to the engine, with both propeller blades exhibiting chordwise aft bends toward the engine. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.