WPR24FA190

The pilot, one pilot-rated passenger, and a second passenger were conducting a cross-country flight to an airport located in a valley surrounded by mountainous terrain. The pilot had previously flown to the destination airport in a different make and model airplane. The pilot-rated passenger stated that he and the pilot discussed a plan to descend into the valley near the destination airport, overfly the runway to inspect it for hazards, continue north in the valley to climb, then return to land. The pilot-rated passenger reported that, after conducting the runway overflight about 700 ft above the ground, all engine controls were confirmed full forward. The airplane continued flying north in the valley toward rising terrain, and the passenger identified a location on the chart that he felt would be best for the pilot to turn toward. The pilot turned the airplane earlier than the passenger had instructed him to, and the passenger alerted the pilot to the error; however, the pilot was focused on the instruments and did not respond. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger recognized that the airplane was too low and checked to confirm that the airplane’s engine controls were full forward. The passenger encouraged the pilot to turn around and reported that the pilot slowed the airplane in an attempt to increase its rate of climb. He could not recall if the pilot attempted to turn the airplane. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 5 nautical miles north of the airport, at an elevation of about 3,755 ft mean sea level (about 928 ft above airport elevation). Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation; however, the extent of the engine exam was limited by postimpact fire damage. The wing flap jackscrew was found in a position consistent with the flaps being extended 30° at the time of the accident. If the flaps had been extended while the pilot attempted to climb the airplane out of the valley, the airplane’s climb performance would have been significantly reduced; however, it could not be determined when the flaps were extended relative to the impact with terrain. The weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to serious carburetor icing at cruise and glide power settings at the altitudes the airplane was being operated. It is possible that carburetor icing had formed at some point during the flight, which would have degraded the airplane’s climb performance. The passenger did not report whether the pilot had applied carburetor heat, and the position of the carburetor heat control at the time of the accident could not be determined. Additionally, the calculated density altitude at the destination airport was about 3,300 ft and the density altitude at the accident site was about 4,400 ft; these conditions would also have had an adverse effect on the airplane’s climb performance. The airplane was operated by a flying club whosepolicy required pilots to fly with an instructor if more than 120 days had passed since the pilot’s most recent flight. Club records indicated that the accident pilot’s most recent flight in a club airplane (the accident airplane) was 162 days before the accident. Other than the flights captured in flying club records, the pilot’s recency of experience, including his total experience in single-engine airplanes and his experience operating at mountain airports such as the accident airport, could not be determined, as his logbooks were not available for review.

he airplane was operated by a flying club. Review of the club’s flight log schedule showed that, during the approximate two years before the accident, the pilot scheduled a total of 16 intended flights in club airplanes, 8 of which were in the accident airplane. Before the accident flight, the pilot’s most recent flight in a club airplane occurred on January 2, 2024. The club maintained a policy that required club pilots to fly with a club instructor if more than 120 days had passed since their most recent flight in that make/model. According to the club’s manager, the pilot had scheduled an airplane for April 21, 2024, but subsequently cancelled the reservation due to poor weather conditions. A review of aircraft maintenance records revealed that the accident airplane’s most recent annual inspection was conducted on July 20, 2023. ID85 is a privately owned airport located at an elevation of 2,827 ft msl. It is equipped with a 3,000-ft-long by 150-ft-wide turf runway (runway 17/35). Review of the VFR sectional chart indicated that the airport was located in a valley that extended north about 3 nautical miles. The valley was surrounded by rapidly rising terrain; mountain peaks with elevations of 4,720 ft msl and 5,824 ft msl were charted west-northwest and northeast of the airport, respectively. On June 12, 2024, about 1006 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 177B airplane, N34903, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Elk River, Idaho. The pilot was fatally injured, and the two passengers (one pilot-rated) were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to official FAA ADS-B flight track data, the airplane departed Felts Field Airport (SFF), Spokane, Washington, and flew southeast toward Elk River Airport (ID85), Elk River, Idaho. As the airplane approached ID85, it overflew the community of Elk River, located south of the approach end of runway 17, then the flight track data showed a turn to the northwest and ended about one mile north of ID85. One of the surviving passengers, who was a certificated pilot, stated that the accident pilot had planned to fly the airplane from Felts Field Airport (SFF), Spokane, Washington, to Elk River Airport (ID85), Elk River, Idaho, then return to SFF. They had not flown the accident airplane to ID85 previously, but had flown a different make and model airplane to ID85 in the past and determined that the accident airplane had the performance to complete the flight. The passenger stated that the preflight inspection and engine runup were uneventful, and after departing from SFF, the pilot requested and received visual flight rules (VFR) flight following until the pilot had ID85 in sight. The pilot and passenger discussed a plan to approach the airport from the south to inspect the runway, continue north in the valley, climb out of the valley, then make a turn to return for landing on runway 17. The passenger estimatedthat the airplane overflew the runway about 700 ft above ground level (agl) and reported that when the airplane crossed the threshold, it was configured with full throttle, the fuel mixture fully rich, and the wing flaps retracted. The airplane continued flying along the valley and the passenger consulted aeronautical charts to determine the route that would provide the most time to climb out of the valley. The pilot subsequently turned at a fork in the valley, and the passenger told the pilot that this was not the optimal route, that there would be more room to climb if they continued straight rather than turning at the fork. The pilot did not respond to the passenger, but remained focused on the airplane’s instruments. The passenger felt that the airplane was not high enough above the ground and the pilot reduced the airplane’s airspeed in an attempt to increase its rate of climb. The pilot stated, “It’s just not climbing…I don’t like this.” The airplane was near stall speed and the passenger and pilot each verified that the throttle, propeller, and mixture were positioned fully forward. The passenger stated to the pilot that they needed to turn around but realized that the airplane was too slow and did not have space to make the turn. The passenger did not have clear memory of whether the pilot attempted to make a turn before impacting trees. A post-crash fire ensued. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Clearwater County Coroner, at the request of the Spokane County Medical Examiner’s Office. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was cutaneous and internal thermal injuries, and the manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no drugs of abuse. The closest weather reporting station to the accident site was Pullman/Moscow Regional Airport (PUW), Pullman, Washington, located about 39 miles west of the accident site, at an elevation of 2,566 ft. The automated weather observation at 0953 reported wind from 260° at 9 knots, variable from 230° to 330°, 10 statute miles visibility, clear sky, temperature 15°C, dewpoint 4°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.13 inches of mercury (inHg). An environmental study revealed that visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the route of flight. At 1003, conditions conducive to serious carburetor icing at both cruise and glide power settings were identified at the airplane’s last recorded ADS-B altitude of 5,400 ft mean sea level (msl). The calculated density altitude for ID85 was 3,282 ft msl and the calculated density altitude at the accident site was 4,428 ft msl. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi engine land, with private pilot privileges for airplane single engine land. He held a flight engineer certificate and type ratings for multiple Boeing 700-series airplanes, as well as for the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 airplane. At the pilot’s most recent aviation medical exam,dated June 2024, he reported 7,528 total hours of flight experience. The pilot’s logbooks were not available for review. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted trees and came to rest inverted in 45° sloping, mountainous terrain, at an elevation about 3,755 ft msl about 5.2 miles north of ID85. The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a 120 ft tall tree located 114 ft west of the main wreckage. The debris path was about 103 ft long and oriented on a magnetic heading of 086°. The outboard 2 to 3 ft of the left wing and left aileron were observed 103 ft from the main wreckage, consistent with separation at the FIPC. The fuselage was oriented on a magnetic heading of 153°, lying across a downed tree. All major components of the airplane were located throughout the debris path. The fuselage was destroyed by thermal damage. Flight control cable continuity was established for the ailerons, rudder, and stabilator. The flap actuator jackscrew position was consistent with the wing flaps being extended to 30° at the time of impact. The engine also sustained thermal damage. The spark plugs were removed and exhibited significant wear. Due to thermal damage, the engine crankshaft could not be rotated by hand. Disassembly revealed no anomalies of the cylinders. The connecting rods, camshaft, and oil pump were rotated manually and exhibited no anomalies. Thermal damage precluded functional testing of the single-drive, dual magneto and the fuel pump. Examination of the recovered wreckage revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.