WPR24FA202

A flight of three fire-fighting airplanes was being repositioned on a visual flight rules flight from Texas to Oregon. The flight crews planned a refueling stop at an airport in New Mexico. Before reaching the airport, they saw “a light rain shower” ahead of them near the Capitan Mountains in New Mexico. The pilots of the first two airplanes maneuvered to avoid the weather, and the lead pilot directed the other two airplanes to turn 30° and climb to reacquire visual contact with one another. However, one of the pilots observed the accident airplane maneuvering about 2,000 ft below the other airplanes, and the accident pilot subsequently reported that he had a visual flight rules (VFR) corridor through the weather. The pilot likely elected to continue through the VFR corridor rather than climb with the other airplanes. Because the airplanes had been cruising at about 9,500 ft mean sea level (msl), the accident airplane was operating at about 7,500 ft msl in mountainous terrain where elevations in the Capitan Mountain Range exceeded 10,000 ft msl. After the first two airplanes landed at the planned refueling destination, the pilots realized that the accident airplane had not arrived and was missing. After the FAA issued an Alert Notice for the missing airplane, the wreckage was located about 9 miles east-northeast of the Capitan Mountains by another airplane. All required flight control surfaces of the airplane were found at the accident site. The ground scars, tree impact signatures, and wreckage impact fragment distribution indicated that the airplane impacted rising terrain in a near-level flight attitude at high forward velocity, consistent with controlled flight into terrain. Although the airplane was highly fragmented, postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The impact signatures on the propeller blades were consistent with high RPM and engine power at the time of impact. Weather information for the area indicated widespread mountain obscuration, low ceilings, and light rain near the accident site. The National Weather Service (NWS) had several AlRMETs that were current at the time of the accident for mountain obscuration in the area, and weather observations near the accident site reported instrument flight rules (IFR) and low IFR (LIFR) conditions. Satellite imagery, weather radar data, and model sounding data indicated extensive overcast clouds and saturated atmospheric conditions over the mountainous terrain surrounding the accident site. Although IFR and mountain obscuration conditions existed in the surrounding area, the available evidence suggests that the pilot was likely attempting to maintain visual meteorological conditions while maneuvering through an apparent VFR corridor. As the airplane approached the mountainous terrain, the apparent VFR corridor ahead likely deteriorated rapidly due to rising terrain and mountainobscuration. Given the airplane’s near-level, high-speed impact attitude, the pilot was likely unable to perceive and avoid the terrain in sufficient time to prevent the collision.

In April 2003, the FAA published Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC highlights the inherent risk that CFIT poses for general aviation (GA) pilots. The AC defined “situational awareness” as the pilot's knowledge “of what is happening around the aircraft at all times in both the vertical and horizontal planes.” This includes the ability to project the near-term status and position of the aircraft in relation to other aircraft, terrain, and other potential hazards.” According to FAA information, GA CFIT accidents account for 17 percent of all GA fatalities. More than half of these CFIT accidents occur during IMC. The AC states that "in visual meteorological conditions, the pilot in command (PIC) is responsible for terrain and obstacle clearance (see and avoid) …" and identified several CFIT risks, including: · Loss of situational awareness. · Getting lost or being off the preplanned flightpath and impacting terrain or an obstacle. · Failure to adequately understand the weather conditions that resulted in the reduced conditions. · Breakdown in good aeronautical decision making. · Failure to comply with minimum safe altitudes. · Failure to turn around and avoid deteriorating conditions when first able. Additionally, AC 61-134, states: Recommendation – “Know and fly above minimum published safe altitudes. VFR: fly a minimum of 1,000 ft above the highest terrain in your immediate operating area in non-mountainous terrain. Fly a minimum of 2,000 ft in mountainous areas.” On June 21, 2024, about 1100 mountain daylight time, an Air Tractor AT-802A airplane, N331BS, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Capitan, New Mexico. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The airplane was in the No. 3 position in a flight of three airplanes that had completed their fire-fighting duties in Texas and were being repositioned to Oregon. The pilots departed Alpine-Casparis Municipal Airport (E38), Alpine, Texas, with a planned refueling stop at Gallup Municipal Airport (GUP), Gallup, New Mexico. The flight was operating under visual flight rules (VFR), at a cruise altitude of about 9,500 ft msl. The lead airplane was responsible for navigation and radio calls with Air Traffic Control (ATC) for the flight. The No. 2 airplane was positioned off the right side of the lead airplane, and the No. 3 airplane (the accident airplane) was positioned off the left side of the lead airplane. While En route to GUP, they encountered ”a light rain shower” near the Capitan Mountains in New Mexico. The No. 2 airplane’s pilot lost sight of the lead and No. 3 airplanes. The lead airplane pilot directed the other two airplanes to turn 30° and climb to reestablish visual contact with the formation. The No. 2 airplane climbed and turned right away from the lead airplane, while the lead airplane deviated slightly west. Shortlythereafter, the No. 2 airplane reestablished visual contact with the lead and No. 3 airplanes. The pilot of the No. 2 airplane reported that he had the No. 3 airplane in sight about 2,000 ft below him and heading in a different direction. The No. 3 airplane reported that “I’ve got this; I have a VFR corridor.” Afterward, the lead airplane tried to contact the pilot of the No. 3 airplane and queried ATC about whether they were in contact with him; ATC responded that they were not. The pilots of the lead and No. 2 airplanes proceeded on the route and expected to meet the pilot of the No. 3 airplane at GUP. The No. 2 airplane rejoined with the lead airplane as they approached GUP. After the remaining two airplanes landed at the planned refueling destination, the pilots realized that the accident airplane had not arrived and was missing. The FAA was notified, and shortly thereafter, an Alert Notice for the missing airplane was issued. Subsequently, that afternoon, an airplane located the airplane wreckage about 9 miles east-northeast of the Capitan Mountains, and a ground team was dispatched to the site. The Office of the Medical Investigator, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, conducted an autopsy on the pilot. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was “multiple blunt force injuries.” Toxicology testing performed by the FAA’s Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the pilot’s specimens was negative for tested substances. A review of the National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart depicted no boundaries or fronts over the route of flight. The NWS Short Range Prognostic Chart, valid for 1800Z or 1200 MDT, depicted a large area of precipitation expected over New Mexico, with rain likely and a 60-70% probability of precipitation over the accident site. The area surrounding the accident site was documented using official Aviation Routine Weather Reports (METAR) and Aviation Selected Special Weather Reports (SPECI). The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was Sierra Blanca Regional Airport (SRR), located in Ruidoso, New Mexico, about 11 miles southwest at an elevation of 6,814 ft mean sea level (msl). The airport had an Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS). At 1115 MDT, the AWOS reported the following conditions: Weather observation for KSRR at 1115 MDT, wind from 130 at 11 knots, visibility 5 miles in light rain, ceiling broken at 400 ft above ground level (agl), broken at 6,500 ft, temperature 17° C, dew point temperature 17° C, altimeter 30.40 inHg. The Storm Prediction Center Convective Outlook, issued at 1345, forecast general thunderstorms for the accident site area. The observations indicated MVFR conditions during the early morning, with low ceilings and light rain developing over the area after 0855 MDT. LIFR conditions were reported at the time of the accident. A review of the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) METAR display for 1045 MDT depicted LIFR conditions over SRR and generalMVFR to VFR conditions over the other reporting sites east and southwest of the accident site. Multiple stations were reporting rain over the area at the time. A review of the High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) numerical model sounding depicted a freezing level was at 16,750 ft and indicated the potential for in-cloud icing above that altitude. The sounding model was saturated from the surface through 18,600 ft, with higher altocumulus and cirrus clouds above. The precipitable water content was 1.15 inches. The Rawinsonde Observation (RAOB) analysis program supported nimbostratus type clouds with visibility near 3 miles in light rain, with an overcast ceiling at 300 ft agl. The closest Weather Surveillance Radar 1988 Doppler (WSR-88D) was located about 49 miles southwest of the accident site at Holloman Air Force Base (HDX). The composite reflectivity image for 1044 MDT depicted a large area of echoes ranging from 10 dBZ to 40 dBZ over southern New Mexico, and echoes in the range of 5 to 20 dBZ over SRR and the accident site, consistent with light rain. A review of local lightning data indicated no cloud-to-ground lightning strikes within 20 miles of the accident site during the hour before the accident and ruled out any thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. NWS lnflight Weather Advisories included no SIGMETs, Convective SIGMETs, or Center Weather Advisories current over the area during the accident time. The NWS had several Graphical AIRMETs (G-AIRMETs) current for mountain obscuration over the area, including a G-AIRMET for mountain obscuration current for 1045 MDT. Coastal Air Strike is a national on-call aerial firefighting company that employed a fleet of 9 Air Tractor AT-802 aircraft, which included the accident airplane. The company management included the president/director of operations, chief pilot, ground support manager, and business and contract development manager. The company is based at Immokalee, Florida. According to the other two pilots in the flight, the accident pilot appeared to be fine and in good spirits on the day of the accident and during the previous 3 days. Additionally, one of the pilots reported they had no firefighting flight taskings for the previous 4 days. The pilot had been employed by the company since 2023. He completed initial ground and flight training for the Air Tractor 802/802A on February 4, 2023, and received a certificate for the completion of the National Aerial Firefighting Academy. He had logged about 224 flight hours with the company. The flight hours included training flights, ferry time, and aerial firefighting missions. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted terrain in heavily wooded terrain consisting of trees up to about 50 ft in height at an elevation of about 7,160 ft msl on rising terrain sloping about 10°. The airplane was highly fragmented, and a large number of broken tree branches were found along the debris trail. The maindebris trail was about 120 ft long, and some smaller airplane fragments were scattered about 300 ft beyond the end of the main debris trail. The airplane came to rest on a northwest heading. The ground scars, tree impact signatures, and the wreckage impact fragment distribution indicated that the airplane impacted terrain in a near-level flight attitude with a high forward velocity, consistent with controlled flight into terrain. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all required flight control surfaces were found at the accident site. There was no evidence of preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A review of pictures of the propeller blades provided to the manufacturer revealed that the impact signatures were consistent with rotation at high RPM, high power, and generation of thrust at the time of impact. The Capitan Mountains in New Mexico range in elevation from about 5,500 ft msl to a maximum elevation of 10,201 ft msl.