Copy · U.S. DOT/FAA - AOT A57N006-14 Rev 00 · 15 pages

© Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0087; AD 2015-03-02 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.

TextOCR

This text is OCR from a scan. OCR can misread letters and numbers.

Query with SQL
duckdb -csv -c "SELECT p.page, p.text_source, p.text, f.rights_holder, f.license
  FROM 'https://openairdocs.org/data/latest/service_document_file_page.parquet' p JOIN 'https://openairdocs.org/data/latest/service_document_file.parquet' f USING (file_sha256)
  WHERE p.file_sha256 = '2f2e58dfb3cc22c4b4747dbd1ea5994da1094634ac39a9fde9dad3087f56ddd8'
  ORDER BY p.page"

Prints the whole list as CSV. It reads the release’s Parquet files over HTTPS, so there’s nothing to download first. Install DuckDB to run it.

Page 1OCROpen in PDF

• AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT SUBJECT: ATA 57 - INSPECT LH AND RH BOTTOM SKIN FASTENERS AT MAIN LANDING GEAR RIB 5 FOOTPRINT LOCATION FOR MIGRATED OR MISSING FASTENER AIRCRAFT TYPE: A318,A319,A320 OUR REF.: A57N006-14 Rev 00 dated 04/December/2014 04-DEC-2014.

1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED Applicable to MSN 5817, 5826, 5837, 5848, 5855, 5864, 5875, 5886, 5896, 5910 and all A318, A319 and A320 Aircraft delivered from MSN 5918 onwards

2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

2.1 APPENDIX AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision tree for weekly inspection.

AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B: decision tree for the 4 months inspection.

AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C: reporting sheet.

2.2 REFERENCES All limitations provided with concession suffix R related to this topic issued on delivered aircraft since November 2014 are superseded by this AOT.

Ref. A: SRM 51-42-11 Paragraph 9 Ref. B: AMM 57-51-37-000-008 Removal of the Access Door Ref. C: AMM 57-51-37-400-008 Installation of the Access Door Ref. D: AMM 51-78-00-615-005 Removal of Corrosion Preventive Compound Ref. E: AMM 51-78-00-916-001 Application of Temporary Protection System (TPS)

3. REASON Inspection of Taperlok fasteners on A320 Family aircraft, located in the joint between the Main Landing Gear Support Rib lower flanges & lower wing skins on LH & RH wings, is required to ensure continued airworthiness. The inspection program is aimed at detecting Taperloks that have failed.

3.1 FACTS During production of A318, A319, A320 wings a number of taperlok fasteners have been found failed after installation. Initial investigations highlight an issue with taperlok fasteners. The fasteners in question are located at the bottom skin of the MLG reinforcing plate, wing skin and Gear Support Rib 5 lower flange (refer to fig. 1 and 2).

The taperlok fasteners are installed on A318, A319 & A320 aircraft wings. A321 aircraft are NOT affected as wing assembly is done using parallel fasteners.

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 1 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 2OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT my -fap trac HE MEC Affected Area Figure 1- Location of affected fasteners

FORWARD

OUTBOARD Lower Wing Cover All fasteners heads identified as to be inspected on a weekly basis Gear Support Rib D572-52580 Figure 2a- Location of affected fasteners heads, view looking up AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 2 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 ® AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 3OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

FORWARD Inboard Outboard All fasteners tails/nuts OUTBOARD identified on the inboard to be inspected on a weekly basis Lower Wing Cover All fasteners tails/nuts identified on the outboard to be inspected on a 4-monthly basis Gear Support Rib D572-52580 Figure 2b- Location of affected fasteners tails/nuts, MLG support rib bottom flange upper surface

3.2 CONSEQUENCES Failure of these fasteners may results in a reduction in the design margin of the structure.

3.3 AIM The aim of this AOT is to ensure that taperlok fasteners, affected by the failure mode, are identified and replaced in order to restore the design margin.

Aircraft in the effectivity as per section1 are required to perform a weekly Detail Visual Inspection (DVI) of the external surface of the LH and RH lower wing surface for migrating or missing fasteners and of the inboard side of the MLG support rib lower flange for broken fastener tails/nuts (refer to fig.

2a and 2b).

In addition, Aircraft in the effectivity are required to perform a repeat DVI every 4 Months of the MLG Support Rib lower flange upper surface on outboard side of the MLG support rib lower flange for failed nuts / tails (refer to fig. 2b).

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 3 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 4OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

4. SHORT TERM ACTION For the weekly inspection:

Refer to appendix AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A.

In the event of no more than 1 finding (fastener migration or missing, tail/nuts missing) per side, the affected fastener needs to be removed (if in place) within 1 week and re-install within 4 months.

NOTE:

- In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection.

- Remove/apply Temporary Protection System (TPS) in open hole as per Ref. D and E.

- Apply 1 layer of speed tape over the affected location and 1 more layer overlapping it at 90°.

For the 4 months inspection:

Refer to appendix AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B.

in the event of finding (fastener migration or missing, tail/nuts missing) during DVI, fastener(s) needs to be replaced before further flight as per Ref. A.

For both inspections, after fastener replacement, the inspections described in this AOT still have to be performed at the same intervals until further notice.

4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER

4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE For the weekly inspection:

Do a DVI of the external surface of the LH an RH lower wing surface for migrating or missing fasteners and a DVI of the inboard MLG support rib lower flange for broken nut/tail.

THRESHOLD: No later than 1 week from issuance of the AOT.

GRACE PERIOD: N/A INTERVAL: No later than 1 week.

Fig. 3a example of finding (migration) AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 4 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 5OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT Fig. 3b example of finding (nut/tail missing on inboard area) -timp trac Affected Area Fig. 4 view of lower surface of MLG rib 5 area AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 5 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 6OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT Area to be inspected Area to be inspected Fig. 5 view of inboard (looking outboard) of MLG rib 5.

For the 4 months inspection:

Do a DVI of the outboard MLG Support Rib lower flange fasteners and nuts THRESHOLD: No later than 4 Months after issuance of the AOT.

GRACE PERIOD: N/A INTERVAL: No later than 4 months.

Area to be inspected Fig. 6 view of outboard (looking inboard) of MLG rib 5.

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 6 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIA L AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 7OCROpen in PDF

• AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

4.1.2 MANPOWER The estimated amount of man hours to perform the weekly inspection is 1 hour per aircraft, both sides included.

The estimated amount of man hours to perform the 4 months inspection is 2 hours per aircraft, both sides included.

4.2 DESCRIPTION

4.2.1 ACCESS For the weekly inspection:

Support Equipment for access:

• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,

• Safety harness.

Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required For the 4 months inspection:

Support Equipment for access:

• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,

• Safety harness.

Work Zone and Access Panel:

• Access Panel 574AB & 674AB (Door entrance of false rear spar area),

• Warning & safety precautions:

WARNING:MAKE SURE THAT THE GROUND SAFETY-LOCKS ARE IN POSITION ON THE LANDING GEAR.

WARNING:PUT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE WARNING NOTICES IN POSITION BEFORE YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR:

THE FLIGHT CONTROLS

THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES

- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS

- COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.

MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS AND/OR CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT.

CAUTIONBE CAREFUL WHEN YOU DO MAINTENANCE TASKS ON THE WING TRAILING EDGE:

DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE RACEWAYS

DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLATIONS

- MAKE SURE THAT THE ELECTRICAL CABLES ARE INSTALLED CORRECTLY.

INCORRECT INSTALLATION CAN CAUSE DAMAGE.

Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required.

Perform access as per Ref. B and C.

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 7 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 8OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

4.2.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS Do a DVI of the external surface of the LH an RH bottom skin lower wing surface for migrated or missing fasteners.

Do a DVI of the INBOARD/OUTBOARD MLG Support Rib lower flange fasteners and nuts for missing nuts / tails.

4.2.3 FINDINGS Failed fasteners (broken, migrated, missing) Failed tail/nut (broken, missing) In case of finding, refer to Appendix A and B.

If a failed fastener is to be removed the following instructions are to be followed:

Mark the orientation of the fastener on the head (i.e. inboard/outboard).

Mark the location of the fastener on bolting diagram as per AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C.

Remove affected fastener as per Ref. A.

All effort should be made not to damage the fracture surface of the fastener during removal.

The fastener and associated nut/tail is to be returned to Airbus.

Report all findings to Airbus.

If finding please report to Airbus as per AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C.

4.3 SPARES AND TOOLING Fasteners part numbers affected:

nominal 1st oversize 2nd oversize NSA 5486-9-27N NSA 5487-9-27N NSA 5488-9-27N NSA 5486-9-28N NSA 5487-9-28N NSA 5488-9-28N NSA 5486-9-29N NSA 5487-9-29N NSA 5488-9-29N NSA 5486-9-30N NSA 5487-9-30N NSA 5488-9-30N NSA 5486-9-31N NSA 5487-9-31N NSA 5488-9-31N NSA 5486-10-22N NSA 5487-10-22N NSA 5488-10-22N NSA 5486-10-28N NSA 5487-10-28N NSA 5488-10-28N NSA 5486-10-29N NSA 5487-10-29N NSA 5488-10-29N NSA 5486-10-30N NSA 5487-10-30N NSA 5488-10-30N NSA 5486-10-31N NSA 5487-10-31N NSA 5488-10-31N NSA 5486-10-32N NSA 5487-10-32N NSA 5488-10-32N NSA 5486-10-33N NSA 5487-10-33N NSA 5488-10-33N NSA 5486-10-35N NSA 5487-10-35N NSA 5488-10-35N Nuts part numbers affected:

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 8 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 9OCROpen in PDF

O AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT NSA5472-9K7 NSA5472-10K7 Tooling list as per Ref. A to be made available.

5. FURTHER INFORMATION

5.1 FOLLOW-UP PLAN This repeat inspection is to be continued until Airbus has defined a terminating action to this AOT.

Pending the level of finding this AOT may be revised to refine its instructions.

TFU is under preparation for follow-up.

5.2 IMPACTED DOCUMENTATION N/A AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 9 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 10OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

6. AOT APPROVAL The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.031.

It Is anticipated that this AOT will be mandated by the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive.

7. REPORTING Questions about this AOT should be sent to the SEES2 department via the on-line TechRequest tool.

Inspection results with findings are to be sent (ref AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C) to Airbus Customer Services engineering as soon as possible, after the AOT application, to the attention of:

Julie BLANCHOT Structure Engineer Structure Engineering - SEES2

CUSTOMER SERVICES Phone: +33(0)5 61 93 60 20 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 Mailto: julie.blanchot@airbus.com Ludovic MENARD Outer Wing Product Leader Structure Engineering - SEES2

CUSTOMER SERVICES Phone: +33(0)5 67 19 16 36 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 Mailto: Ludovic.menard@airbus.com Best Regards, Jean-Luc MOUYSSET Gilles DE CEVINS VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING SUPPORT VICE PRESIDENT A320 PROGRAMME

CUSTOMER SERVICES CUSTOMER SERVICES AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 10 of 15 Date: 04-Dec-2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 11OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision trees for weekly inspection.

YES WING LOWER SURFACE AREA TO BE INSPECTED Fasten er Missing.

astener head side lopen nole YES igrafion > 1mm YES Apply Speed Tape on pply Speed.

side head side rape eno NOTE In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection.

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 11 of 15 Date:04/Dec/2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Page 12OCROpen in PDF

AIRBUS

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision trees for weekly inspection.

Replace the fastener within 4 conditions of speed tape. Inspect weekly for good Apply Speed Lape on tall nut YES Nut all Missing Inspect Nut / Tail on a weekly basis MLG SUPPORT RIB LOWER FLANGE INBOARD Months side NOTE:

In case of more than one finding per side, the operator has to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no more than 1 failed fastener until the 4 months inspection.

AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 00 Page 12 of 15 Date:04/Dec/2014 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT

Pages 13–15 of 15