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© Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0930; AD 2015-08-08 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.
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- Manufacturer
- Airbus
- Type
- All Operators Transmission
- Number
- A57N006-14
- Latest revision known
- A57N006-14, Revision 01, dated February 16, 2015
- Copies
- 3 files of 2 revisions
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Text · 19Partly OCR
Revision 01, the newest copy. Some pages are OCR from a scan. OCR can misread letters and numbers. © Airbus S.A.S. Filed by the FAA in regulations.gov docket FAA-2015-0930; AD 2015-08-08 incorporates this document by reference. Not covered by OpenAirDocs’ CC0 dedication.
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ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 1 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
SUBJECT: ATA 57 – INSPECT LH AND RH BOTTOM SKIN FASTENERS AT MAIN LANDING GEAR RIB 5 FOOTPRINT LOCATION FOR MIGRATED OR MISSING FASTENER
AIRCRAFT TYPE: A319,A320
OUR REF.: A57N006-14 Rev 01 dated 16 Feb 2015.
0. REASON FOR REVISION
The revision 01 of this AOT is required to extend the inspection interval from 8 days to 60 days for the external area and for the internal inboard side. The 120 days repetitive inspection remains for the internal outboard area. A318 references have been r emoved since none of these aircraft type has been manufactured with the suspected batch of fasteners. Inspection flow charts have been modified to reflect the new intervals and clarify the sequence of actions. Spare parts numbers have been clarified.
The revised paragraphs are indicated between **BEG. REV** and **END REV**.
1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED
**BEG. REV** Applicable to MSN 5817, 5826, 5837, 5848, 5855, 5864, 5875, 5886, 5896, 5910 and all A319 and A320 Aircraft delivered from MSN 5918 onwards.
**END REV**
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION
2.1 APPENDIX AOT A57N006-14 Appendix A: decision tree for the external inspection.
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix B: decision tree for the internal inspection.
AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C: reporting sheet.
2.2 REFERENCES All limitations provided with concession suffix R related to this topic issued on delivered aircraft since November 2014 are superseded by this AOT.
**BEG. REV** Ref. A: SRM 51-42-11 Paragraph 9 Ref. B: AMM 57-51-37-000-008 Removal of the Access Door Ref. C: AMM 57-51-37-400-008 Installation of the Access Door Ref. D: AMM 51-78-00-615-005 Removal of Corrosion Preventive Compound Ref. E: AMM 51-78-00-916-001 Application of Temporary Protection System (TPS) Ref. F: TFU 57.21.00.012 latest issue.
Ref. G: EASA AD 2014-0270 & FAA AD 2014-26-53.
**END REV**
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 2 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
3. REASON
Inspection of Taperlok fasteners on A320 Family aircraft, located in the joint between the Main Landing Gear Support Rib lower flanges & lower wing skins on LH & RH wings, is required to ensure continued airworthiness. The inspection program is aimed at detecting Taperloks that have failed.
3.1 FACTS
During production of A319, A320 wings a number of taperlok fasteners have been found failed after installation. Initial investigations highlight an issue with taperlok fasteners. The fasteners in question are located at the bottom skin of the MLG reinforcing plate, wing skin and Gear Support Rib 5 lower flange (refer to fig. 1, 2 and 3).
**BEG. REV** The taperlok fasteners are installed on A319 & A320 aircraft wings. A318 aircraft are NOT affected as no wing assembly have used fasteners coming from suspected batches. A321 aircraft are NOT affected as wing assembly is done using parallel shank fasteners.
**END REV**
Figure 1- Location of affected fasteners/ External
Affected Area
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 3 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Fig. 2 view of inboard (looking outboard) of MLG rib 5 / Internal
Fig. 3 view of outboard (looking inboard) of MLG rib 5 /Internal
Area to be inspected Area to be inspected Area to be inspected
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 4 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
**BEG. REV**
Figure 4a- Location of affected fasteners heads, lower wing skin view looking up
Figure 4b- Location of affected fasteners nuts/bolt tails, MLG support rib bottom flange upper surface, view looking down Outboard Inboard All fasteners nuts/bolt tails identified on the outboard to be inspected on a 120 days basis All fasteners nuts/ bolt tails identified on the inboard to be inspected on a 60 days basis All fasteners heads identified as to be inspected on a 60 days basis
FORWARD
OUTBOARD Gear support rib installation D572-52180 LH shown – RH symmetrical Gear support rib installation D572-52180 LH shown – RH symmetrical Gear rib 5 web axis Inboard Outboard External Internal
FORWARD
OUTBOARD
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 5 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
**END REV**
3.2 CONSEQUENCES
Failure of these fasteners may results in a reduction in the design margin of the structure.
**BEG. REV**
3.3 AIM
The aim of this AOT is to ensure that taperlok fasteners, affected by the failure mode, are identified and replaced in order to restore the design margin.
Affected aircraft operators have to perform a Detail Visual Inspection (DVI) of the external surface of the LH and RH lower wing surface for migrating or missing fasteners and of the internal side of the MLG support rib lower flange for broken fastener tails/nuts (refer to fig. 4a and 4b).
4. SHORT TERM ACTION
For the external inspection:
Visually inspect inboard/outboard fastener head.
For the internal inspection:
Visually inspect inboard /outboard fastener nut/bolt tail.
NOTE:
- In the event of no more than 1 fastener missing per side, the affected fastener needs to be replaced within 120 days as per Ref. A.
- In case of more than one fastener missing per side, the operator has to replace affected fasteners before next flight leaving no more than 1 missing fastener.
For both inspection areas, even after fastener replacement, the inspection described in this AOT has to be performed at the same intervals until further notice.
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 6 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER
4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE
For the external inspection:
THRESHOLD: No later than 60 days from last inspection as per AD Ref. G or since entry into service.
GRACE PERIOD: N/A INTERVAL: No later than 60 days.
For the internal inspection:
Inboard:
THRESHOLD: No later than 60 days from last inspection as per AD Ref. G or since entry into service.
GRACE PERIOD: N/A INTERVAL: No later than 60 days.
Outboard:
THRESHOLD: No later than 120 days from last inspection or from AD Ref. G first issuance whichever occurs later or 120 days since entry into service.
GRACE PERIOD: N/A INTERVAL: No later than 120 days.
Note: - For the 60 days inspection refer to Appendix A
- For the 120 days inspection refer to Appendix B
4.1.2 MANPOWER
The estimated amount of man hours to perform the DVIs every 60 days is1 hour per aircraft, both sides included.
The estimated amount of man hours to perform the DVIs every 120 days is 2 hours per aircraft, both sides included.
**END. REV**
4.2 DESCRIPTION
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 7 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4.2.1 ACCESS **BEG. REV** For the 60 days inspection:
Support Equipment for access:
• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,
• Safety harness.
Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required.
For the 120 days inspection:
Support Equipment for access:
• Access platform 2M (6 FT) adjustable,
• Safety harness.
**END REV**
Work Zone and Access Panel:
• Access Panel 574AB & 674AB (Door entrance of false rear spar area),
• Warning & safety precautions:
WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE GROUND SAFETY-LOCKS ARE IN POSITION ON THE LANDING GEAR.
WARNING: PUT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE WARNING NOTICES IN POSITION BEFORE YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR:
- THE FLIGHT CONTROLS
- THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES
- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS
- COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS AND/OR CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE EQUIPMENT.
CAUTION: BE CAREFUL WHEN YOU DO MAINTENANCE TASKS ON THE WING TRAILING EDGE:
- DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE RACEWAYS.
- DO NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE ELECTRICAL CABLE INSTALLATIONS.
-
MAKE SURE THAT THE ELECTRICAL CABLES ARE INSTALLED CORRECTLY.
INCORRECT INSTALLATION CAN CAUSE DAMAGE.
Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position. The use of magnifying tools may be required.
Perform access as per Ref. B and C.
4.2.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
Do a DVI of the external surface of the LH an RH bottom skin lower wing surface for migrated or missing fasteners.
Do a DVI of the INBOARD/OUTBOARD MLG Support Rib lower flange fasteners and nuts for missing nuts / tails.
For typical findings refer to Fig 5a and 5b.
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 8 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Fig. 5a example of finding (migration)
Fig. 5b example of finding (nut/tail missing on inboard area)
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 9 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
4.2.3 FINDINGS
Failed fasteners (broken, migrated, missing) Failed tail/nut (broken, missing) In case of finding, refer to Appendix A and B.
**BEG. REV** If a failed fastener has to be removed the following instructions are to be followed:
Mark the orientation of the fastener on the head (i.e. inboard/outboard).
Mark the location of the fastener on bolting diagram as per Appendix C.
Get access to the area.
Remove affected fastener.
All effort should be made not to damage the fracture surface of the fastener during removal.
The fastener and associated nut/tail is to be returned to Airbus.
Report all findings to Airbus as per Appendix C.
Refer to TFU Ref. F for additional guidance for access and fastener replacement.
4.3 SPARES AND TOOLING
In case of finding, for fastener replacement Airbus recommends to order the following:
- Nominal part number.
- First oversize (as precautionary measure).
- Associated nut.
- Washers part number (both thickness).
- Reamer & installation tooling (as precautionary measure)
FORWARD
OUTBOARD LH shown – RH symmetrical Gear support rib installation D572-52180
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 10 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Fig. 6 Identification and location of fasteners at rib 5 attachment.
Fasteners part numbers:
fastener identification as per Fig 7 Nominal 1st Oversize 42 NSA5486-9-25N NSA5487-9-25N 41 NSA5486-9-26N NSA5487-9-26N 8-40-43 NSA5486-9-27N NSA5487-9-27N 2-37-38-39-44-45 NSA5486-9-28N NSA5487-9-28N 1-18-36 NSA5486-9-29N NSA5487-9-29N 9-17-19-26-27 NSA5486-9-30N NSA5487-9-30N 10 NSA5486-9-31N NSA5487-9-31N 11-23 NSA5486-9-32N NSA5487-9-32N 21 NSA5486-9-33N NSA5487-9-33N 7 NSA5486-9-34N NSA5487-9-34N
46 NSA5486-10-22N NSA5487-10-22N 29-30-31-32 NSA5486-10-28N NSA5487-10-28N 28 NSA5486-10-29N NSA5487-10-29N 4-5-6-20-33-34-35 NSA5486-10-30N NSA5487-10-30N 3-15-25 NSA5486-10-31N NSA5487-10-31N 13-14-22-24 NSA5486-10-32N NSA5487-10-32N 12 NSA5486-10-33N NSA5487-10-33N 16 NSA5486-10-35N NSA5487-10-35N
Nuts part numbers:
NSA5472-9K7 NSA5472-10K7
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 11 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
Washers part numbers:
NSA5372-1016AX NSA5372-1016BX NSA5372-916AX NSA5372-916BX
NOTE:
-1016: washer diameter -10 -916: washer diameter -9 AX: washer thickness of 0,8mm BX: washer thickness of 1,6mm
Installation tool in case of oversize:
SOA57N00614
Reporting sheets appendix C to be sent to Airbus AOG spares (e-mail: aog.spares@airbus.com) with corresponding findings and purchase order.
5. FURTHER INFORMATION
5.1 FOLLOW-UP PLAN
This repeat inspection is to be continued until Airbus has defined a terminating action to this AOT.
Pending the level of finding this AOT may be revised to refine its instructions.
Refer to TFU Ref. F. for follow up.
5.2 IMPACTED DOCUMENTATION
N/A
ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT
AOT ref: A57N006-14 Rev 01 Page 12 of 19 Date: 16-FEB-2015 © AIRBUS S.A.S. 2014. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT
6. AOT APPROVAL
The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.031.
This AOT is mandated by the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive Ref. G.
**END REV**
7. REPORTING
Questions about this AOT should be sent to the SEES2 department via the on-line TechRequest tool.
Inspection results with findings are to be sent (ref AOT A57N006-14 Appendix C) to Airbus Customer Services engineering as soon as possible, after the AOT application, to the attention of:
Julie BLANCHOT Structure Engineer Structure Engineering – SEES2
CUSTOMER SERVICES Phone: +33(0)5 61 93 60 20 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 Mailto: julie.blanchot@airbus.com
Ludovic MENARD Outer Wing Product Leader Structure Engineering – SEES2
CUSTOMER SERVICES Phone: +33(0)5 67 19 16 36 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 36 14 Mailto: Ludovic.menard@airbus.com
Best Regards,
Jean-Luc MOUYSSET
VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING SUPPORT
CUSTOMER SERVICES Gilles DE CEVINS VICE PRESIDENT A320 PROGRAMME