AC 29-2C, Chg 4 5/1/2014
engine controls; however, the purpose could also be extended to simulate an engine failure during other conditions (i.e., failure during the cruise). In any case, the maneuver to be simulated with its initial and final points has to be clearly identified by the applicant in order to prepare the certification plan.
(2) Functional Hazard Assessment.
(i) The purpose of the system is the input for the hazard assessment where all the potential failures are identified and appropriately classified taking into account the most critical phase of flight, thus establishing in a systematic way the integrity levels required for each function provided. It is to be noted that an OEI Training Mode is designed to increase the level of safety relative to traditional training operations and therefore the design of the systems should be such that the associated functional failures are never more severe than those associated to an engine cut intentionally to idle. It should be recognized, however, that operation in training mode is an intentional operation in a degraded condition and that the consequences of certain failures may be more severe than those expected in normal operation.
(ii) The functional hazard assessment has to take into account the other systems that interact with the OEI Training Mode (typically the engine control system and the cockpit displays) and all the potential failures that can occur during operation of the training mode. The effect of engine failures and malfunctions that are likely to occur during the operation of the system need to be taken into account. The functional hazard assessment should also cover the failure associated with the safety devices introduced in the system.
(3) Engine failures. Actual engine fa ilure while in OEI training mode should be addressed. While recognizing that an actual failure during training mode is potentially more severe than one during normal operation, adequate safety devices should be provided to minimize the consequences of actual engine failure during training mode.
(4) Display of powerplant instruments. There may be different ways to present the engine data during the OEI training mode functioning. Past experience has shown that some applicants have developed systems where during the simulation, engine limits and associated cautions and warnings are re-scaled in order to present to the flightcrew the same scenario that would occur in case of an actual engine failure. As the current part 29 requirements (including § 29.1305) do not allow displaying biased parameters, the applicant should show an equivalent level of safety with respect to §§ 29.1305 and 29.1549. In particular, while the training mode is engaged, the pilot being trained should be provided with a set of information related to the training drill and not be confused by other data; the safety pilot or instructor should be informed of any abnormal conditions. If a rotor droop is gen erated during the training maneuver, it is acceptable that the NR indicator shows the limits relevant to OEI conditions even if both engines are running.
Page MG 22 - 2
(5) Management of Engine Power.
(i) Careful consideration has to be given to the method implemented by the applicant to simulate the engine failure. As of today, two different methods have been used:
(A) Reducing one engine to flight idle and using the other engine up to a limit chosen by the applicant.
(B) Reducing both engines to an intermediate power and use the total power available to simulate the OEI power.
(ii) The second method is expected to provide better acceleration characteristics in case a failure occurs to one engine during the use of training mode.
However, if an applicant would like to implement the first method, evidence has to be provided that the engine accelerating characteristics are acceptable. In both cases, the OEI training engine acceleration characteristics have to be demonstrated by the applicant for the envelope for which approval of the system is sought.
(6) Human Interface Aspects. The human interface aspects of the system have to be carefully considered and appropriately addressed in the certification plan. The information provided to the flightcrew during normal operation of the system and during emergency situation is the main subject of the investigation in order to assess the effectiveness and avoid misleading information on the status of the system that can result in flightcrew errors. During the assessment, consideration should be given to:
(i) Color coding.
(ii) Labeling of the controls (e.g., switches, buttons, etc.) used by the training mode.
(iii) Clear and unambiguous identification of the status of the system; all the parameters that are presented to the flightcrew in a modified scale have to be clearly identified and easily recognizable by the flightcrew.
(iv) OEI training control segregated from the standard engine controls.
(v) Flightcrew alerts. If flightcr ew alerts are generated by the OEI training system, consideration should be given to the following points:
(A) Prioritization of OEI training alerts with respect to those generated in case of actual failures. The OEI training alerts should not change the priority given to the helicopter systems alerts or introduce a delay when these are generated.
Page MG 22 - 3
AC 29-2C, Chg 4 5/1/2014 (B) Capability of the flightcrew to distinguish the OEI training alerts from those generated by the other helicopter systems. Distinguishable alerts will prevent flightcrew confusion of the actual status of the rotorcraft.
(C) Representation of OEI training alerts with respect to the actual case for which the system is designed. Lack of co mplete representation of the OEI training alerts can be accepted and documented in the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM).
(7) Representativeness of the maneuver. Although the final decision on the use of the system for training purposes is the responsibility of the national operational authority, the applicant and certificating authority should ensure that the system adequately represents the actual maneuvers the system is designed to simulate. In this regard, the certification team should:
(i) Ensure that the engine failure dynamics of the training mode favorably compare with an actual engine failure. This can be accomplished by comparing the time histories of Ng/torque during an actual engine failure and a training mode engine failure.
(ii) Qualitatively evaluate the piloting techniques required for the training maneuver and the maneuvers used for certification. Ensure the techniques are sufficiently similar to provide adequate training.
(iii) If the training mode does not adequately replicate portions of an OEI event, to include a realistic reproduction of the resultant flight path, those areas should be identified in the RFM (e.g., “The OEI training mode does not accurately represent second stage climb performance.”).
(8) Limitations and Performance Charts.
(i) RFM data necessary for the use of the system typically include:
(A) Weight limitations for training.
(B) Performances associated to the system operative (e.g., rate of climb, take off and landing distances.
(ii) This data should be validated by actual tests or analysis validated by tests or a combination of both to assure the same level of accuracy as the other RFM data.
(9) RFM. The RFM should contain the following information:
(i) Description of the system and its functions.
(ii) Clear statement on the scope of the training mode and the extent of the validity of the system.
Page MG 22 - 4
(iii) Limited to essential crew only.
(iv) Detailed description of the safety features implemented in the system and their use during normal and emergency conditions.
(v) Weight limitations for training, which should be presented in the same format used for the category A Weight-Ambient-Temperature Charts.
(vi) Normal and emergency procedures to be applied; these procedures need to include those necessary to exit the training in case of emergency.
(vii) Performance information (i.e., rate of climb, take off and landing distances), if different from non-training). Performance information in case of actual engine failure while in training mode is not required.
Page MG 22 - 5
AC 29-2 C, Chg 4 5/1/2014
Page MG 22 - 6
CHAPTER 3
AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS
TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
MISCELLANEOUS GUIDANCE (MG) AC 29 MG 23 AUTOMATIC FLIGHT GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS (AFGCS) INSTALLATION IN PART 29 ROTORCRAFT.
a. Purpose.
(1) This guidance recognizes the following Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) documents as acceptable for showing compliance with regulatory requirements for the installation of automatic flight control guidance and control systems (AFGCS).
(i) RTCA Document DO-325, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems and Equipment, issued December 8, 2010.
(ii) RTCA Document DO-336, Guidance for Certification of Installed Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) for Part 27/29 Rotorcraft, issued March 21, 2012.
(2) RTCA Document DO-325 contains the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for AFGCS equipment, included by reference in TSO-C198. DO-336 provides guidance on obtaining installation approval of AFGCS in rotorcraft. It invokes parts of D0-325 as performance standards applicable for installation of AFGCS equipment in rotorcraft. It provides guidance on conducting a safety assessment.
Lastly, DO-336 lists the regulations applicable to an AFGCS installation and acceptable methods of compliance to those regulations.
(3) This guidance is not mandatory. It describes an acceptable means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with applicable 14 CFR regulations. Following this guidance alone does not guarantee acceptance by the FAA. D epending on circumstances, we may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding compliance.
b. Background. Technical standard order (TSO), TSO-C198, Automatic Flight Guidance and Control System (AFGCS) Equipment, replaced TSO-C9c, Automatic Pilots, and TSO-C52b, Flight Director Equipment. TSO -C198 identifies a new comprehensive minimum operation performance standard (MOPS) under RTCA Document DO-325 and qualifications for software and airborne electronic hardware.
Page MG 23 - 1
AC 29-2C, Chg 6 7/25/2014
Not e: The i ntent was to highlight to the system designer that early coordination with an aircraft original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is important to minimize the compliance requirements at the time of installation, and that even without an OEM, the guidance is relevant when installing the system.
c. Guidance for the use of RTCA Documents DO-325 and DO-336.
(1) RTCA Document DO-325 identifies the typical functions of an AFGCS. We recommend that AFGCS equipment manufacturers obtain technical standard order authorization (TSOA) for TSO-C198 to minimize compliance showings that would be required at installation approval stage. There should be a declaration of any non-TSO functions in the TSOA application so there can be an appropriate evaluation and acceptance of the software and hardware qualification data related to those functions. If AFGCS equipment does not have TSOA for TSO-C198, the applicant for installation approval would have to show compliance with the DO-325 MOPS, as appropriate to functions provided, and conduct the necessary software and hardware qualifications defined in DO-178 and DO-254 guidance documents.
(2) RTCA Document DO-336 has two primary focus items: to highlight the requirements for a proper safety assessment (Chapter 8) and the compliance demonstration (Chapter 9). Each of these should be discussed with the appropriate Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) very early in the program and included in the certification plan.
d. References.
(1) 14 CF R Regulations (available at http://rgl.faa.gov/):
Section Title
29.671 General. (Control Systems)
29.672 Stability augmentation, automatic, and power-operated systems.
29.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
29.1329 Automatic pilot system.
29.1335 Flight director systems.
Appendix B to Part 29 Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument flight
(2) TSOs (available at http://rgl.faa.gov/):
TSO Title TSO-C198 Automatic Flight Guidance and Control system (AFGCS) Equipment Page MG 23 - 2
(3) ACs (refer to current version; available at http://rgl.faa.gov/):
AC Title 20-115 Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautic, Inc., Document RTCA/DO-178B 20-138 Airworthiness Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems 20-152 RTCA, Inc., Document RTCA/DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware.
21-50 Installation of TSOA Articles and LODA Appliances 29-2, Section
29.671 Control Systems - General.
29-2, Section
29.672 Stability Augmentation, Automatic, and Power-Operated Systems.
29-2, Section
29.1309 Equipment, Systems, and Installations.
29-2, Section
29.1329 Automatic Pilot System.
29-2, Section
29.1335 Flight Director Systems.
(4) Industry standards (refer to the current version; RTCA documents are available at www.rtca.org and SAE international documents are available at www.sae.org):
Document Title RTCA/ DO-178 Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification RTCA/ DO-254 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware RTCA/ DO-325 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems and Equipment, issued December 8, 2010.
RTCA/ DO-336 Guidance for Certification of Installed Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) for Part 27/29 Rotorcraft, issued March 21, 2012.
SAE, International ARP 4754 Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems SAE, International ARP 4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment Page MG 23 - 3
AC 29-2C, Chg 6 7/25/2014
Pag e MG 23 - 4
AC 29-2C
APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) are required by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)/Joint Airworthiness Regulations (JAR) § 29.1529. Appendix A to FAR/JAR Part 29 specifies the requirements for Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The following 70 pages for this AC 29- 2C, Appendix A, provide a template for the ICA. This ICA Template was prepared to assist applicants in preparing an ICA for their type design change to rotorcraft.
The guidance is intended for applicants that are required to comply with FAR/JAR § 29.1529 to prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness acceptable to FAA/AUTHORITY.
The ICA Template contains requirements of Appendix A to FAR/JAR Part 29, identified by bold type. The bold type requirements are to be included in the applicant Instructions for Continued Airworthiness as applicable to the applicant’s type design change. Items in regular type are not required by FAR/JAR; however, these items are an aviation industry standard and are found in most current Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The underlined words and sentences are to emphasize the information.
It is recommended the applicant include those in their ICA for standardization and clarity.
The ICA Template is arranged as a sample Instructions for Continued Airworthiness document and can be used as a template for the preparation of the applicant’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The ICA Template was prepared to cover a complete rotorcraft. The applicant for a type design change need not include all information for the appropriate type design, only the applicable information to their type design change.
Appropriate text in regular type can be copied from the ICA Template. Text in italics and the appendices are for instructions and are not to be copied.
The ICA Template is formatted using the Airline Transport Association (ATA) Chapter numbering system. The ATA Chapter format is not required; however, it is recommended. The ATA chapter numbers that are not listed in this document do not relate to ICA’s and are not used in the ATA system for ICA’s (Maintenance Manual).
The Standard Practices chapters are broken out separately from the other listed chapters because they are not a requirement. However, Standard Practices are an industry standard and are found in most industry Maintenance Manuals.
Page Apdx A - 1
AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 AC 29-2C
APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS (continued) The set of parentheses in the index and chapters indicates the chapter on the ICA Template that is applicable to various ATA chapters. The set of parentheses in Fi gure 1 and Figure 2 is used to indicate the applicability of the item for that type design change.
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness will be reviewed and evaluated by FAA/AUTHORITY to ascertain their acceptability.
Page Apdx A - 2
AC29 APPENDIX A. INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS (MANUAL IDENTIFICATION)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS TEMPLATE (COMPANY NAME)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS (DRAWING/PHOTOGRAPH) (OPTIONAL) (ROTORCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL) REVISION: (DATE) Revision 4 Page i Page Apdx A - 3