(A) Constant Rate Tear. The minimum energy for complete separation should be 200 foot-pounds (reference 4.6.5.1).
(B) Impact Penetration. The drop height of a 5- pound chisel should be reduced to 8.0 feet (reference 4.6.5.2).
(C) Impact Tear. The drop height of a 5 -pound chisel should be reduced to 8.0 feet and the average tear criteria should not exceed 1.0 inch (reference 4.6.5.3).
(19) Section 29.952(g) also requires that all fuel tank designs (regardless of the materials utilized and whether or not a flexible liner of any type is used) for each tank or the most critical tank be analyzed and tested to the criteria of § 29.952 d(18)(iv), or equivalent.
(20) Any type of flexible liner or bladder used in any type of fuel tank construction (integral, hard shell, etc.) must meet the strength and puncture resistance requirements of § 29.963(b). Section 29.963(b) contains the new puncture resistance requirement for flexible liners and other liner material certification requirements.
Unlined, bladderless fuel tanks are also required to meet this requirement. Most unlined, rigid fuel cell designs should readily exceed the 370-pound minimum puncture force requirement because of overriding design requirements and material characteristics, such as stiffness and ductility.
NOTE: TSO -C80, “Flexible Fuel and Oil Cell Material,” is referenced in the advisory material for § 29.963(b) and contains the detailed qualification requirements for these materials. The current puncture resistance test of TSO -C80, paragraph 16.0, states that the force required to puncture the bladder material must be greater than or equal to 15 pounds (e.g., screwdriver test). Section 29.963(b) has increased the TSO paragraph 16.0 puncture force value to be greater than or equal to 370 pounds. This is for fuel cell bladder or liner material only. Oil cell material puncture force requirements are not changed.
e. Typical Examples of Loading Modes and Test Setups for CRFS Components.
The following figures, which are referred to periodically in the advisory circular, show typical examples of test setups for CRFS components such as breakaway fuel fittings, hoses, hose end fittings, and hose assemblies.
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LOAD LOAD LOAD
STATIC TENSION TEST STATIC SHEAR TEST LOAD LOAD HOSE LOAD
STATIC BENDING STATIC SHEAR TEST (TENSION-SHEAR) TEST (TANK-TO-TANK COUPLING] FIGURE AC 29.952-1 STATIC TENSION AND SHEAR LOADING MODES Page E - 87
АС 29-2C 9/30/99
LOAD LOAD
TENSION TESTS 90-DEGREE TESTS FIGURE AC 29.952-2 HOSE ASSEMBLY TESTS Page E - 88
Tension Load (Ib) Bending Load (Ib) Hose End Fitting Minimum Minimum Minimum Minimum Fitting Type Size Average Individual Average Individual Load* Load Load* Load STRAIGHT -4 600 475 425 400 Tension = -6 700 575 425 400 -8 900 650 650 600
- 10 1450 1175 675 625 Bending = - 12 1775 1475 950 850
- 16 2125 1825 1425 1300 -20 2375 2075 1550 1425 90 ELBOW -4 600 475 425 400 Tension = -6 700 575 425 400 -8 900 650 450 400
- 10 1450 1175 475 425 Bending = - 12 1775 1475 500 450
- 16 2125 1825 775 700 -20 2375 2075 1100 1000 *Average of at least 3 tests.
FIGURE AC 29.952-3 MINIMUM AVERAGE AND INDIVIDUAL LOADS FOR
HOSE AND HOSE-END FITTING COMBINATIONS Page E - 89
AIR FRAME STRUCTURE
- TANK
HOSE END
COUPLING FLEX HOSE _ METAL TANK FITTING
BREAKAWAY VALVE
FRANGIBLE SECTION - ITEM LOWEST FAILURE LOAD (LE)* FAILURE MODE Flex Hose 3000 Tension Breakage Flex Hose 1500 Pull Out of End Fitting Tank Fitting 7500 Pull Out of Tank Hose End Coupling 1650 Break (Bending) Breakaway Valve 2500 Pull Out of Tank Fitting Breakaway Valve Not More Than Break at frangible 1500 = 750 Section 2 Not Less Than 1500 = 375 *Loads may or may not be representative; values are for explanatory purposes only.
FIGURE AC 29.952-4 TYPICAL METHOD OF BREAKAWAY FUEL FITTING
LOAD CALCULATIONS (TANK INSTALLATION USED AS EXAMPLE ONLY; BASIC TECHNIQUE
APPLICABLE TO OTHER CONFIGURATIONS) Page E - 90
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE • TANK WALL
FRANGIBLE BOLT METAL TANK FITTING
CRITICAL FLANGE AREA A. FRANGIBLE BOLT
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE ITEM LOWEST FAILURE LOAD (LBI* FAILURE MODE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE 4000 SHEAR TANK FITTING 3000 PULLOUT OF TANK FLANGE 5000 SHEAR
FRANGIBLE BOLT NOT MORE THAN NOT LESS THAN I BREAK 3000 = 1500 3000 = 750 (TENSION-SHEAR) FIGURE AC 29.952-5 TYPICAL METHODS OF FRANGIBLE OR DEFORMABLE ATTACHMENT LOAD CALCULATIONS: EXAMPLE 1, FRANGIBLE BOLTS.
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- AIRFRAME RIGID BULKHEAD
GROMMET
FRANGIBLE BAFFLE
UNCUT FLEX HOSE ED
END FITTING ITEM LOWEST FAILURE LOAD (LB)* FAILURE MODE RIGID BULKHEAD 4000 BEARING FLEX HOSE 3000 TENSION BREAKAGE FLEX HOSE 1500 PULLOUT OF END FITTING END FITTING 1750 BENDING
FRANGIBLE BAFFLE NOT MORE THAN NOT LESS THAN BEARING 1500 = 750 1500 = 375 2 4 *VALUES ARE SHOWN FOR EXPLANATORY PURPOSES ONLY FIGURE AC 29.952-6 TYPICAL METHODS OF FRANGIBLE OR DEFORMABLE ATTACHMENT LOAD CALCULATIONS: EXAMPLE 2, FRANGIBLE BAFFLE.
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AC 29.953. § 29.953 FUEL SYSTEM INDEPENDENCE.
a. Explanation.
(1) Section 29.953(a)(1) stipulates that fuel systems for Category A rotorcraft must meet the requirements of § 29.903(b) engine isolation.
(2) Section 29.953(a)(2) specifies independent fuel feed systems for each engine for Category A rotorcraft unless other provisions are made to meet the § 29.903(b) engine isolation requirement.
(3) Section 29.953(b) specifies independent fuel feed systems for each engine for Category B rotorcraft, except that separate fuel tanks are not required.
b. Procedures.
(1) The purpose of § 29.953(a) is to ensure an independent fuel supply system for each engine. Multiengine Category B rotorcraft do not require separate fuel tanks, as are intended for Category A.
(2) The assessment to ensure compliance with § 29.903(b), engine isolation, should include consideration of component failure, malfunction, and damage. For multiengine Category B rotorcraft, leakage of the fuel cell could be excluded from consideration since § 29.953(b) explicitly states that separate fuel tanks are not required for this category rotorcraft.
NOTE: Of interest is that § 29.903(c), engine isolation for normal category airplanes, also excludes the fuel tank from consideration if only one tank is used.
(3) Consideration of fuel tank leakage under § 29.903(b) has dictated separate fuel tanks for Category A rotorcraft, but the regulation leaves the door open for unique designs by the expression, “Unless other provisions are made…,” in § 29.953(a)(2).
Separate tanks are intended for Category A as evidenced by the identical fuel system independence requirements for multiengine Category B rotorcraft, except that separate tanks are specifically not required.
(4) A common supply tank, with individual “collector” tanks for each engine for Category A rotorcraft, has been allowed under § 29.953 provided that the capacity of the collector tanks will allow 20 minutes of maximum allowable en route OEI power.
(5) The fuel system independence regulations are not intended to preclude single-point fueling designs.
(i) For multiengine Category B rotorcraft, the assessment of an independent fuel supply system for each engine would begin at the fuel supply pickup point within the tank and continue to the engine fuel inlet at the engine.
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(ii) For Category A rotorcraft, the assessment would begin with the tanks and continue to the engine fuel inlet.
(6) If supply line crossfeed capability is included as a feature, care must be exercised to ensure that the opening of the crossfeed does not jeopardize the continued safe operation of more than one engine. For example, if the crossfeed valve is automatically operated by a low pressure signal in the supply line for one engine, the possibility that fuel line leakage could cause opening of the crossfeed and jeopardize the continued safe operation of both engines should be considered. Similarly, opening the crossfeed valve with a suction lift system following engine or system malfunction should not allow air into the fuel supply line of the remaining engine.
(7) The independent fuel supply system requirement for each engine is for normal fuel system operations. Care should be exercised to ensure that flight manual procedures do not authorize normal usage of fuel system configurations which may violate the engine isolation principle. For example, routine fuel balance procedures should not allow usage of a common supply line if a failure can jeopardize the continued safe operation of more than one engine.
(8) Fuel system designs which allow the continued safe operation of all engines under expected fuel system component failure conditions (for example, a failed boost pump) by using common fuel flow paths under failure conditions are not prohibited.
(9) For APU’s which perform a required in-flight function, a separate, independent fuel system complying with the corresponding engine fuel system rules should be provided. Other APU’s (which do not perform a required in- flight function) may be supplied with fuel from a tee connection to a main engine fuel supply. The fuel shutoff valve for the APU should be located as close as possible to the APU system’s connection to the main engine fuel system and a checkvalve should be included in the APU fuel system to prevent reverse-flow if negative pressure exists momentarily in the main engine fuel system. Maximum fuel demand of the APU will not jeopardize compliance with § 29.955.
AC 29.954. § 29.954 (Amendment 29-26) FUEL SYSTEM LIGHTNING PROTECTION.
a. Background. During the initial development and promulgation of the standards concerning the airworthiness of rotorcraft, it was not deemed necessary to specify design features that would protect the rotorcraft from the meteorological phenomenon of lightning. This was due, in part, to the fact that rotorcraft were primarily operated in a VFR and non-icing environment. Also, a prudent pilot avoided thunderstorms where the possibility of encountering severe weather and a lightning strike was much greater. The construction, design, and operating environment of civil rotorcraft have changed markedly within the past two decades. Many rotorcraft are now authorized to fly IFR in all types of weather environment. One transport design has been approved for flight Page E - 94
into known icing conditions. Additionally, many rotorcraft now use the same advanced technologies in structures and systems as do airplanes. Because of these facts the possibility of a lightning strike encounter to the rotorcraft has been greatly increased. If the fuel system of the rotorcraft has not been properly designed and constructed, a fuel vapor ignition may occur. This occurrence generally results in a catastrophe to the rotorcraft. To prevent such a catastrophe and provide a level of safety equivalent to transport category airplanes, a specific rule for the lightning protection of transport category rotorcraft fuel systems was adopted in Amendment 29–26.
b. Explanation.
(1) This regulation requires that the rotorcraft’s fuel system be designed and constructed so that an ignition of fuel vapor will not occur when the rotorcraft is involved in a lightning strike. For the purposes of this regulation the fuel system is comprised of the fuel tank with all its associated plumbing and any other areas of the rotorcraft likely to have fuel vapor present (such as sumps and drains for the tank itself). Externally mounted fuel tanks are also considered to be part of the “fuel system.”
(2) Other associated installations such as electrical wiring in the fuel tanks which could provide a source of ignition due to an indirect or induced effect should also be considered.
c. Procedures.
(1) The current revision of Advisory Circular 20-53 provides guidance on an acceptable method and procedure to be utilized to demonstrate that the design and construction of the fuel system is compliant with § 29.954.
(2) FAA Report No. DOT/FAA/CT-89/22 contains additional information regarding the lightning environment. Also contained in this report are design and test techniques which provide for a design that will be adequately protected from fuel vapor ignition when the rotorcraft encounters the lightning environment. This report is available to the public by order from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161.
AC 29.955. § 29.955 (Amendment 29-2) FUEL FLOW.
a. Explanation.
(1) Section 29.955 is intended to ensure adequate fuel flow to the engine(s) at maximum power under the intended aircraft operating conditions and maneuvers. In ensuring adequate fuel flow, both hot and cold fuel would normally be evaluated for the suction lift system, whereas cold fuel is usually more critical for the boosted pressure system.
(2) In showing adequate fuel flow, the rule provides that-- Page E - 95
(i) The fuel be supplied within the appropriate engine fuel pressure range;
( ii) The test be conducted with minimum fuel onboard, consistent with test safety;
(iii) For pump systems, fuel flow requirements be satisfied with the critical airframe furnished pump inoperative; and
(iv) The f uel flowmeter, if installed, must be blocked such that fuel must flow through the meter or its bypass.
(3) Section 29.955(b) specifies that if an engine can be supplied with fuel from more than one tank, the fuel system must feed promptly when fuel becomes low in one tank and another tank is selected.
b. Procedures.
(1) Testing (including bench tests) has been the accepted method to show compliance with § 29.955(a). Analytical techniques may be used to adjust the system test results to various fuel conditions and flows or to account for minor modifications to a system. A purely analytical approach is not generally acceptable.
(i) Methods to adjust the test data for different fuel properties and flows should be verified by limited testing.
(ii) If a suction lift system is used and hot fuel verification is involved (reference § 29.961) testing is appropriate.
(2) Demonstrating that the system is capable of providing “…100 percent of the fuel flow required under the intended operating conditions…” will depend on the particular system design, whether boosted or suction lift, Category A or Category B, and whether single or multiengine. Some of the factors to be evaluated are as follows:
(i) Acceleration fuel flow requirements may exceed those for steady-state operation. For example, if on a cold day, engine torque is the limiting parameter, the steady-state fuel flow demand corresponding to that torque may be exceeded during engine acceleration to that power.
(ii) For single-engine rotorcraft and for multiengine rotorcraft with all engines operating, some margin should be included to account for possible inadvertent overtorque.
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NOTE: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 84-19 proposes to include this consideration as a firm requirement (reference 49 FR 46670; dated November 27, 1984).
(iii) For multiengine rotorcraft, adequate fuel flow under OEI conditions should be ensured.
(A) For Category A systems, evaluation of § 29.903(b) should ensure that following the failure of one engine, lack of fuel flow will not jeopardize the safe operation of the remaining engine(s). Since governor -controlled engines will automatically accelerate to some limit if power demand is high, and since immediate crew action is not presumed under § 29.903(b), compliance with § 29.955 would include adequate fuel flow to the cold day maximum OEI torque to be expected (reference § 29.927(b)(2)).
(B) A proposed revision to § 29.955 (reference NPRM No. 84-19) would require that fuel flow for multiengine Category B rotorcraft be adequate for the § 29.927(b)(2) OEI overtorque condition.
(C) Following an engine failure, the remaining engine(s) may accelerate to the gas producer speed topping limit fuel flow, rather than to the fuel flow for the steady-state OEI power value. This consideration would be most important for suction lift systems which may be critical with hot fuel at altitude.
(3) The critical fuel system configuration should be evaluated.
(i) For pump fed (boosted) systems, fuel flow requirements should be satisfied with the critical airframe furnished pump inoperative.
(ii) If on multiengine rotorcraft it is acceptable to operate following an engine failure in more than one fuel system configuration (for example, if crossfeed is an acceptable mode), then the supplying of multiple engines through common components may be more critical than the OEI condition.
(4) Adverse transient and steady-state maneuver loads should be considered since the g-loading experienced may tend to decrease the engine fuel inlet pressure below allowable limits.
(5) The fuel should be delivered to the engine inlet within the limits specified in the engine type certificate. The method of specifying these fuel inlet pressure requirements varies with the engine model. Some of these include:
(i) Specification of a gage pressure as a function of altitude for suction system operation. The particular fuel and fuel temperature for demonstrating the criteria may be specified in the engine documents. Other approved fuels, fuel temperatures, and boost-pump-on operation are considered satisfactory if the demonstration with the specified fuel is successful.
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