LT Horizontal Vertical AC 29.1321. § 29.1321 (Amendment 29-21) ARRANGEMENT AND VISIBILITY.
a. Background. This section is the first in a series that concerns the installation of instruments. Other sections address specific requirements for individual instruments.
The instruments should be arranged so that pilots can see critical information without moving their heads, and without undue distraction. Additionally, for instrument flight, 14 CFR 29.1321(b) requires grouping of the attitude, altitude, airspeed, and compass indicators in the standard “T.” The design for the instrument location and arrangement, with respect to the pilot’s seat, should accommodate pilots from 5’2” to 6’0” in height.
Alternatively, a methodology to accommodate the 5th to the 95th percentile of male and female pilots may be used. Pilots within th is height range should be able to see and, where necessary, reach and operate all of the displays.
b. Procedures.
(1) Flight, navigation, and powerplant instruments should be placed such that the pilot and copilot, if a required crewmember, can easily see and read these instruments when seated normally. Additionally, the instruments’ location should minimize unnecessary pilot head turning. The instruments necessary for safe operation (airspeed indicator, gyroscopic direction indicator, gyroscopic bank-and-pitch indicator, slip-skid indicator, altimeter, rate-of-climb indicator, master caution or warning (if installed), rotor tachometers, and the indicator most representative of engine power) should be installed immediately in front of pilots in their primary field of view (FOV).
(i) Primary FOV: Figure AC 29.1321-1 depicts the primary FOV for rotorcraft.
Display high priority information and the primary flight information in the primary FOV.
Figure AC 29.1321-1 PRIMARY FIELDS OF VIEW
(ii) Secondary FOV: Figure AC 29.1321-2 depicts the secondary fields of view. Signals and information pilots scan as part of monitoring the aircraft and its performance are located in the secondary FOV. The priority of the information and signals when locating information in the secondary field of view should be considered.
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LT UP Horizontal Vertical 30° C/L 30° RT NOM ON AC 29-2C, Chg 7 2/4/2016 The farther away from the primary field of view a signal is located, the greater the chance a pilot will not notice it without a prompt. Additionally, the pilot’s scan workload to see information increases the farther away from the pilot’s primary field of view it is located. The secondary FOV is bound laterally to minimize the need for pilots to turn their heads to view the information. Examples of information typically located in the secondary FOV are:
(A) Ancillary navigation information (moving maps, weather displays, etc).
(B) Secondary powerplant information, such as engine oil pressures and temperatures.
(C) Caution advisory and warning system (CAWS) panel (unless a master caution or warning indicator is not located in the primary FOV, in which case the CAWS panel should be as close to the pilots primary FOV as possible).
(D) Autopilot controls (E) Navigation controls.
Figure AC 29.1321-2 SECONDARY FIELDS OF VIEW
(2) The other powerplant instruments should be grouped together and visible to any appropriate crewmember. On multiengine rotorcraft, there should be no confusion regarding which engine an individual gauge represents. This is usually accomplished by mounting the engine gauges vertically in the center of the instrument panel. Identical gauges are placed next to each other and positioned from left to right in the same position and sequence as the corresponding engine location in the airframe.
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(3) An evaluation should determine that vibration of the instrument panel does not exceed the tolerances of the instruments. The instrument manufacturer will usually provide data that indicate the level of vibration for which the instrument has been qualified. The flight test evaluation of the rotorcraft should explore and determine that the vibration of the instrument panel does not affect the readability of the instruments.
To meet these two criteria, it has been necessary in some installations to “shock mount” or otherwise isolate the instrument panel.
(4) The flight test evaluation should also determine that the flags or malfunction indicators of the instruments should be readily visible in all combinations of lighting for approved kinds of operations.
(5) For IFR-certified rotorcraft, there is an additional requirement that the airspeed, altimeter, attitude, and compass instrument be located in a standard “T” configuration in front of the pilot. This configuration is:
airspeed - attitude - altitude | compass (AC 29-2, section AC 29 Appendix B further addresses IFR panel arrangement.)
(6) Geometric variation from a perfect “T” has been permitted. Each installation should be evaluated for suitability based on criteria such as panel size, ease of scan, and readability of the individual elements in the overall presentation. AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems, provides additional guidance for “glass cockpit” installation.
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AC 29-2C, Chg 7 2/4/2016 AC 29.1322. § 29.1322 (Amendment 29-12) WARNING, CAUTION, AND ADVISORY LIGHTS.
a. Explanation.
(1) Cockpit devices are color coded to symbolically represent various functions and varying levels of importance for flight crew operation. From early times, an attempt has been made to take full advantage of associations developed early in life as a result of continuous exposure to our daily environment.
(2) Military design specifications were the first to reference color-coding in cockpit design requirements. In the mid-1940s, the CAA initiated the first color-coding requirements for civil cockpit design. Color-coding standards for cockpit visual signals soon followed. MIL-STD-411, May 31, 1957, identified three separate categories of light signals:
(i) Warning Light - indicates the existence of a hazardous condition which may require immediate corrective action.
(ii) Caution Light - serves to alert the operator to an impending dangerous condition requiring attention but not essential equipment, or attracts attention for routine purposes.
(iii) Advisory Light - indicates safe or normal configuration, condition of performance, or operation of essential equipment, or attracts attention for routine purposes.
(3) Examples of warning and caution signals were included in later versions of the military standard, and a few of those are shown below:
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Warning Signals Caution Signals Cabin Pressure Failure Trim Failure Fire Fuel Low Fuel System Failure Generator Inoperative Landing Gear Unsafe Defrosting Failure
(4) Specific color designation for civil advisory lights was first addressed in Amendment 3 to the Rotorcraft Certification Rules (Parts 27 and 29) on January 19, 1968, with adoption of new §§ 27.1322 and 29.1322.
(5) In subsequent revision (Amendment 29-12), green lights were redesignated and additional colors introduced for flexibility in the requirement.
(6) Green signifies a safe operating condition and more specifically has come to signify landing gear extended and locked. Extensive use of green annunciators throughout the cockpit should generally be avoided due to possible confusion with the special use of green for landing gear. If green annunciators are physically and functionally removed from the landing gear operation, they may be found acceptable for a variety of “safe operating” applications. One such application is “all green for approach,” used in autopilot, flight director, and other navigation system displays.
(7) Other colors may be utilized as advisory lights in accordance with § 29.1322(d). Red and amber must not be used as advisory lights due to the possibility of introducing confusion into the cockpit. Obviously, yellow and pink annunciators should be avoided due to their similarity to amber and red. White and blue have been successfully utilized as advisory segments in past civil designs.
(8) The primary test for designation of color is:
(i) Red - Is immediate action required:
(ii) Amber - Is pilot action (other than immediate) required?
(iii) Green - Is safe operation indicated, and is the indication sufficiently distinct to prevent confusion with the landing gear down indication?
(iv) Other advisory lights - Is the meaning clear and distinct enough to prevent confusion with other annunciators? Do the colors which are utilized differ sufficiently from the colors specified in paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3) above?
(9) Annunciator lights should be visible during bright daylight conditions. This should include visibility in direct sunlight unless lights are located in such a manner that direct sunlight cannot impinge on them.
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(10) If dimming capability is provided, all annunciators, including master warning and caution, may be dimmable so long as the annunciation is clearly discernible for night operation at the lower lighting level. Undimmed annunciations have been found unacceptable for night operation due to disruption of cockpit vision at the high intensity. The dimming circuit should automatically revert to the high intensity setting when power is removed. Automatic dimming/brightening through the use of a photo cell is also acceptable, as are circuits which enable a dimming switch through a position light or other cockpit lighting controls.
(11) The use of flashing lights should be minimized. If a flashing feature is used, it should be controllable through pilot action so that flashing annunciation does not persist indefinitely. The indicator should be so designed that if it is energized and the flasher device fails, the light will illuminate and burn steadily.
(12) The activation of caution and warning lights should readily attract the attention of the appropriate crewmember while performing duties under both normal and high workload conditions.
b. Procedures.
(1) Red shall be reserved for annunciation of emergency conditions requiring immediate corrective action. Typical examples include fire, transmission oil pressure, engine failure, and battery overheat. The use of red for annunciators which do not require immediate action must be avoided. Use of red when it is not needed tends to lessen the impact of a red annunciator and the needed pilot association for immediate action. In evaluating cockpit annunciators for acceptability, the FAA/AUTHORITY should assure all annunciators which require immediate action are red and that only those requiring such action are red. If a master warning light is provided, it should be red, and should be powered by the same signal that powers any of the individual red warning signals. An aural warning may accompany visual warning signals to enhance pilot response. Care should be taken that any aural signal is sufficiently distinct from other aural warnings, such as low rotor RPM, to prevent confusion and to assure proper crew response. A means to deactivate and reset the master warning (visual and aural) is required. Resetting the master warning must not deactivate any individual warning signal.
(2) Amber shall be reserved for indicating malfunction or failure conditions which do not require immediate crew action to assure safe flight. Typical examples include door unlatched, inverter failure, generator failure, fuel filter clogged, and parking brake engaged. Amber should generally be utilized for malfunction and failure conditions which do not require immediate action. The key word here is “require.”
Obviously, a pilot should perform corrective action for malfunction or failure conditions in a timely manner as soon as other cockpit priorities allow. The time increment associated with “immediate action” may vary with the system involved, the flight regime, and the aircraft; however, 15 seconds is a representative value in evaluating this term.
This by no means indicates that any red annunciator can be ignored for 15 seconds.
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For red annunciators, some type of immediate pilot response is expected. If immediate pilot action is not required, the FAA/AUTHORITY should recommend the use of an amber designation. If a master caution light is provided in addition to a master warning light, the master caution annunciator should be amber, and should be powered by the same signal that powers any of the individual amber caution signals. Reset considerations for the master caution are the same as those detailed above for the master warning.
c. Annunciator Panel Design
(1) Explanation.
(i) The annunciator panel design should be reviewed for the presence of failure modes that can cause illumination of multiple panel segments.
(ii) Many test circuits that are diode isolated are vulnerable to this condition. A typical sequence begins with the shorting of a test circuit diode. This failure is undetectable and goes unnoticed until an actual failure condition occurs which causes the associated panel segment to illuminate. At this time all panel segments connected to the test circuit will illuminate.
(iii) This configuration becomes a special problem when one or more of the panel segments are red. A red light calls for immediate action by the crew, and the crew does not have adequate information for immediate action when many false panel segments are illuminated.
(iv) If the design review indicates a problem, a redesign of the panel to eliminate the condition is considered to be the best solution and is highly encouraged.
(2) Procedures.
(i) An alternative to panel redesign might be the following:
(A) Review the annunciator panel design and note which segments are red.
(B) Determine if cross reference information is available in the cockpit to allow elimination from consideration of any the red segments. (Example: Red low fuel pressure light and low fuel pressure gauge. Normal operation of the gauge would be a reason to assume the light did not cause the problem.)
(C) Where a cross reference is available, further design review of that function is not necessary; however, it may be appropriate to include procedural information in the emergency procedures section of the rotorcraft flight manual.
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(D) If cross references are not available for red segments, additional isolation should be incorporated into the annunciator design for those functions.
(ii) If cross referencing is not practical the following approach is encouraged.
(A) Review the annunciator panel design and note which segments are red.
(B) Determine if isolation diodes are checked during the application of battery or external power before starting the engines. (Example: Red low oil pressure light. If isolation diode is shorted, all panel segments will light as soon as battery or external power is applied.)
(C) When the isolation diode can be checked before starting engines, further design review is not necessary.
(D) If diodes are not automatically checked before starting, then additional isolation, should be considered.
(3) Annunciator Panel Arrangement. The annunciator panels should be arranged in a logical manner to reduce the crew’s time required to locate faults and to increase their efficiency in following Aircraft Flight Manual procedures. For example, engine annunciators on multiengine rotorcraft should be physically located on the panel to coincide with engine location (left or right) so that properly operating engines are not inadvertently shut down due to crew confusion over which engine has malfunctioned.
AC 29.1323. § 29.1323 (Amendment 29-3) AIRSPEED INDICATING SYSTEM.
a. Explanation.
(1) The accuracy of all flight test data concerned with the velocity of the rotorcraft is dependent on the calibration of the airspeed indicating system. For this reason, the airspeed system position error should be determined very early in the program.
(2) Since air density varies with altitude, the speed reading will only be correct under standard sea level conditions. However, in an actual installation, the indicator reading, even under standard sea level conditions, may differ from the calibrated airspeed because the static system does not sense true static pressure. This error in detection of static pressure is called position error. It is caused by the pressure field built up around the rotorcraft in flight. This pressure field will vary in intensity with dynamic pressure making the position error a function of calibrated airspeed. Since airspeed information is presented to the crew in terms of indicated airspeed, it is necessary to determine the position error for the rotorcraft to be flown safely.
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b. Procedures.
(1) There are different methods to determine position error such as trailing bomb, airspeed course, boom system, and so forth. Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages, but will yield satisfactory results if done correctly. The airspeed system should be calibrated throughout the airspeed range of the rotorcraft and under the various flight conditions of cruise, climb, and autorotation standard. In addition, the effects of gross weight and center of gravity should be investigated.
(2) It may also be necessary to recalibrate the system with a change in external configuration if such a change may affect the airflow near the pitot or static sources.
(3) Additional information regarding position error is included in AC 29 Appendix B b(10) and should be considered if pursuing an IFR approval.
(4) Static system installation information is included in paragraph AC 29.1325.
Technical Standard Order (TSO) C16, Airspeed Tubes (Heated), gives minimum performance standards for pitot tubes, and pitot tubes qualified to this TSO normally allow for a satisfactory aircraft installation.
(5) The calibration requirements of the standard seem to be self-explanatory and are not discussed further in this paragraph.
AC 29.1323A. § 29.1323 (Amendment 29–24) AIRSPEED INDICATING SYSTEM.
a. Explanation. Amendment 29- 24 to the regulations provides the requirements for Category A and Category B and defines the maximum allowable error for both.
b. Procedures. All of the policy material pertaining to this section remains in effect. In addition, calibration should be determined in level flight speeds of 20 knots and greater, and over an appropriate range of speeds for flight conditions of climb and autorotation; and takeoff. The takeoff calibration should be repeatable with respect to field lengths defined in the flight manual and avoidance of height-speed limiting envelope defined in § 29.79. Calibration errors, excluding instrument errors, may not exceed the following:
(1) Category A - Three percent or 5 knots, whichever is greater, in level flight at speeds above 80 percent of takeoff safety speed; and 10 knots in climb at speeds from 10 knots below takeoff safety speed to 10 knots above VY.
(2) Category B - Three percent or 5 knots, whichever is greater, in level flight at speeds above 80 percent of the climb-out speed attained at 50 feet when complying with § 29.63.
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AC 29.1325. § 29.1325 (Amendment 29-24) STATIC PRESSURE SYSTEMS.
a. Explanation.
(1) This section, in conjunction with § 29.1323, provides minimum performance standards for static pressure systems. The standard provides some relief when considering the icing environmental condition in that it allows the use of an alternate static port to account for the icing condition.
(2) The standard for the consideration of environmental conditions is § 29.1309(a).
(3) The standard for consideration of malfunction conditions is § 29.1309(b).
(4) For rotorcraft that will be approved for IFR operation, the provisions of Appendix B VIII(b)(5) of Part 29 as discussed in paragraph AC 29 Appendix B, should also be considered.
b. Procedures. The installation of the static system should consider the following:
(1) Static lines should be initially routed upward immediately behind the static pressure port. This procedure will minimize the entry of moisture into the system when operating in rain or washing the rotorcraft.
(2) Drain(s) should be located at low points in the system. Line routing and clamping should allow for all moisture that does enter the system to be routed to the drain(s).
(3) If independent systems are provided, the placement of each system component should allow for maximum practicable separation of each system. As much as possible, one system should be on one side of the rotorcraft and the second system on the opposite side.
(4) Most static pressure ports that are provided for IFR operation are heated.
Before any tests are conducted, a program to qualify the heater on the port should normally be agreed upon through discussions between the FAA/AUTHORITY and the applicant. It is suggested that the requirements of TSO C16, Airspeed Tubes (Heated), be used as a guide for these discussions. If the ports are not to be heated, a comprehensive analysis should be prepared, and limited testing should be conducted to verify the analysis.
(5) Other static system considerations are included in paragraphs AC 29.1323 and AC 29 Appendix B.
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AC 29.1327. § 29.1327 MAGNET IC DIRECTION INDICATOR.
a. Background. This section contains specific requirements regarding installation and functioning of a magnetic direction indicator. The magnetic direction indicator (commonly referred to as a compass) described by this paragraph is the unit required by § 29.1303(c) or the unit or system required for IFR operation by Appendix B VIII(a) to Part 29. Both of these indicators provi de the pilot with an aircraft heading which is referenced to the earth’s magnetic field. The unit required by § 29.1303(c) is the indicator commonly referred to as a “whiskey compass.” This unit was given this designation because early units were constructed using alcohol as the medium in which the compass ball floats. This unit is general ly approved as meeting the requirements of TSO-C7c. The indicator required by Appendix B to Part 29 is usually a system of units which meets the requirements of TSO-C6c.
b. Procedures. In showing compliance to § 29.1327(a), generally the magnetic indicator and its respective components will be tested to an appropriate standard such as RTCA DO 160B for use in a rotorcraft. If the unit functi oned properly as described in the TSO during this testing, then no additional evaluation is generally required concerning vibration immunity. To determine the immunity of the indicator (system) from magnetic effects and its installed accuracy, a ground and flight test should be performed. This test should turn the rotorcraft a full 360° heading change in 45° increments. The indicator should not have an error in excess of 10° on any of the 45° increments. When performing these tests, t he electrical equipment and systems should be functioning normally, and the effect of windshield heating (if installed) should be investigated. The results of the investi gation may be used to construct the calibration placard which is required by § 29.1547. It should be noted that a calibration placard has not been traditionally required for slaved compass systems. Also, it should be emphasized that other aspects of the functioning and installation of these indicators should comply with the other general requirements (i.e., §§ 29.1301, 29.1309, 29.1555, etc.).
AC 29.1329. § 29.1329 (Amendment 29- 24) AUTOMATIC PILOT SYSTEMS.
a. Explanation. The automatic f light control systems used on most modern rotorcraft often perform two different and distinct functions when viewed from a regulatory compliance aspect. These two functions are augmentation of the stability of the rotorcraft and a pilot aid in maintaining attitude, altitude, and airspeed, or in radio navigation tasks. The first function of st ability is not covered in § 29.1329 but is included under § 29.672. The second function as a pilot aid is the automatic pilot function covered by this section. The following procedure discusses only those parts or systems which are installed as a pilot aid. MG 3 of this AC discusses the use of automatic systems for Category II approaches, and AC 29-2 Appendix B discusses the evaluation of stability augmentation systems.
b. Procedures.
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AC 29-2C, Chg 4 5/1/2014
(1) General.
(i) The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can perform its intended function of flying the rotorcraft and that it complies with the installation, operation, and malfunction requirements of § 29.1329. In demonstrating malfunctions of the autopilot system, generally servo actuator hardovers are the most critical malfunction. If this is the case and the autopilot system utilizes the same servos and servo amplifiers as the stability augmentation system (SAS) and the autopilot function cannot produce a more severe hardover than the SAS, then no additional consideration is required for this malfunction. An evaluation using the guidance in Appendix B of this AC would be sufficient.
(ii) There have been autopilots approved that require the use of a monitor since they cannot meet the hardover malfunction requirements. These approvals have involved a finding of equivalent safety that is beyond the scope of this guidance. Such findings of equivalent safety are made on a case-by-case basis. If an applicant is considering such a design, the applicant and the approving office should contact the Rotorcraft Standards Staff specialists for guidance.
(iii) The rule specifies that unless there is automatic synchronization, there should be some method to indicate the alignment of the actuating device to the pilot.
The intent of this requirement is to provide a means such that the pilot does not inadvertently engage the system into a hardover condition. One method of achieving this has been the use of servo force meters. These meters monitor the current into the servo motor and indicate to the pilot if a signal is being sent to the servo prior to system engagement.
(iv) Various autopilot systems have used a preflight test to ensure adequate reliability. The question that often arises is: Should the preflight test function be interlocked so the autopilot cannot be engaged if the preflight test has not been accomplished? The guidance used in the past to answer this question is: If the preflight test is simple and rapid enough that the pilot may reasonably be expected to perform such a test, then it is not required to be interlocked. If, however, the preflight test is very complicated and lengthy and a pilot who was pressed by a schedule might skip such a test, then this preflight test should be interlocked.
(v) Most of the autopilots that have been approved utilize series actuators or servos such as those required for a SAS. Ho wever, this does not preclude the approval of an autopilot that uses outer loop parallel actuation. This type of autopilot may be particularly helpful in a VFR aircraft.
(2) Cockpit controls. Evaluation of the cockpit controls should include the following items:
(i) Location of the automatic pilot system controls are such that their operation is properly labeled and is readily accessible to the pilot(s).
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