should be conducted to confirm that the analyses are valid and that the rotorcraft can operate safely in any supercooled cloud icing condition defined by Part 29, Appendix C, or the altitude-limited icing envelope. References d(1) and (3) may be useful in determining the design points and extrapolation of test data to the desired design points.
(4) Planning. For best utilization of both the applicant’s and the FAA/AUTHORITY’s resources, the applicant should submit a certification plan at the start of the design and development effort. The certification plan should describe all efforts intended to lead to certification and should include the following basic information:
Rotorcraft and systems description.
Ice protection systems description.
Certification checklist.
Description of analyses or tests planned to demonstrate compliance.
Projected schedules of design, analyses, testing, and reporting efforts.
Methods of test - artificial vs. natural.
Methods of control of variables.
Data acquisition instrumentation.
Data reduction procedures.
(5) Environment.
(i) Definitions.
(A) Supercooled Clouds. Clouds containing water droplets (below 32° F) that have remained in the liquid state. Supercooled water droplets will freeze upon impact with another object. Water droplets have been observed in the liquid state at ambient temperatures as low as -60° F. The rate of ice accretion on an aircraft component is dependent upon many factors such as droplet size, cloud liquid water content, ambient temperature, and component size, shape, and velocity.
(B) Ice Crystal Clouds. Glaciated clouds existing usually at very cold temperatures where moisture has frozen to the solid or crystal state.
(C) Mixed Conditions. Partially glaciated clouds at ambient temperatures below 32° F containing a mixture of ice crystals and supercooled water droplets.
(D) Freezing Rain and Freezing Drizzle. Precipitation existing within clouds or below clouds at ambient temperatures below 32° F where rain droplets remain in the supercooled liquid state.
(E) Sleet. Precipitation of transparent or translucent pellets of ice which have a diameter of 5mm or less.
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(F) Hail. Solid precipitation in the form of balls or pieces of ice ---(hailstones) with diameters ranging from 5mm to more than 50mm.
(ii) Appendix C of Part 29 defines the supercooled cloud environment necessary for certification of rotorcraft in icing except that the pressure altitude limitation is that of the rotorcraft or that selected by the applicant, provided the remaining altitude envelope is operationally practical. Due to air traffic system compatibility constraints, approval of a maximum altitude less than 10,000 feet pressure altitude should be discouraged. However, there are operations where a lower maximum altitude has no effect on the air traffic system and would still be operationally useful. Figures 3 and 6 of Appendix C, Part 29, relate the variation of average LWC as a function of cloud horizontal extent. These relationships should be used for design assessment of the most critical combinations of conditions as a function of en route distance. This, in combination with a capability to hold in icing conditions for 30 minutes at the destination, is commensurate with policies previously established for fixed- wing aircraft. Figures 3 and 6 should be used in conjunction with the altitude-limited criteria of figures AC 29.1419-1 through -4 herein. It is emphasized that LWC extremes expressed in Part 29 Appendix C, criteria represent the maximum average values to be anticipated within an exceedance probability of 99.9 percent. Transient, instantaneous peak values of much higher LWC have been observed. These instantaneous peak values appear to be of little significance to the design of protected and unprotected surfaces; however, these high values, if encountered, may induce shedding of ice from some unprotected surfaces. This is due to radical changes in the rate of release of latent heat and resultant changes in the structural properties and adhesion force of ice.
(iii) An a nalysis performed at the FAA Technical Center in 1985 concludes that the aircraft icing environment below 10,000 feet is not as severe in terms of LWC and OAT as that depicted in the Part 29, Appendix C, envelope. This AC presents the altitude-limited envelope that may be employed by those applicants who elect to certify with a 10,000-foot pressure altitude limit. The altitude- limited envelope is based upon the same data that were used to derive the design criteria of Part 29, Appendix C (figures AC 29.1419-1 through -4). The data used to derive these limited envelopes cannot be used to further define icing conditions between 10,000 feet and 22,000 feet;
hence, above 10,000 feet, the Part 29, Appendix C, envelopes should be used. It should be noted that the engine inlets should still meet the icing requirements of § 29.1093. The limited icing envelopes may be used on an equivalent safety basis to show compliance with the intent of § 29.1093 if the altitude limit established for the rotorcraft is not greater than 10,000 feet.
(iv) Significantly different effects can result from various combinations of parameters. For example, most rapid ice accumulations occur at the high values of liquid water content, although the greatest impingement area occurs at the high values of droplet size. Most critical ice shapes are a function of each of these parameters in addition to airspeed, surface temperature, and surface contour. Care should be taken to explore the entire specified ranges of these parameters during the design, development, and certification efforts.
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(v) Mixed conditions (i.e., a combination of ice crystals and supercooled water droplets) and freezing rain or freezing drizzle are not addressed in the Part 29 environmental criteria but can present more severe icing conditions than those defined.
Although the probability of encountering freezing rain is relatively low, mixed conditions commonly occur in supercooled cloud formations. Little data have been gathered on the effects of encountering mixed conditions (see paragraph AC 29.1419d(6)). There are no criteria for certification in mixed conditions or freezing rain at present. In addition to the hazards of operating any aircraft in icing, certain aspects of rotorcraft icing (relatively low altitude operation, asymmetric shedding with resulting vibration, and ice damage or ingestion) warrant a caution notice in the RFM advising that the rotorcraft is not certified for operation in freezing rain or freezing drizzle. Avoidance procedures
(e.g., climb or descent) may also be useful.
(6) Flight Test Prerequisites.
(i) The prototype rotorcraft should be capable of IFR and IMC flight.
(ii) Sufficient analyses should be developed, submitted, and accepted by FAA/AUTHORITY to show that the rotorcraft is capable of safely operating to the selected design points of both the continuous maximum and intermittent maximum conditions of Part 29, Appendix C, or the altitude-limited icing envelope. A detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the ice protection system should be performed.
(iii) Specific attention should be given to (1) assuring that the selected design condition(s) of atmospheric and rotorcraft flight envelopes have been identified;
(2) qualification and design of ice protection systems and components; and (3) component installation and ice formation effects upon basic rotorcraft structural properties and handling qualities. These assurances can be established from analyses, bench tests, and/or dry air flight tests or simulated icing tests, as appropriate, prior to flight tests in natural icing.
(iv) The applicant should assess rotor blade stability with ice deposits to assure that dynamic instability will not occur in icing conditions. This assessment may be accomplished by analysis including consideration of failure of the most critical segment of the rotor blade ice protection system. It also may be accomplished by experimental means such as attaching dummy ice shapes to the blades and using a whirl stand or wind tunnel.
c. Procedures.
(1) Compliance.
(i) In general, compliance can be established when there is reasonable assurance that while operating in the specified icing environment (1) the engine(s) will Page F – 97
not flameout or experience significant power losses or damage; (2) stress levels are not reached with ice accumulations that can endanger the rotorcraft or cause serious reductions in component life; (3) the handling qualities, performance, visibility, and systems operation are defined and are not deteriorated unacceptably; (4) inlet, vent, or drain blockage (such as fuel vent, engine, or transmission cooler) is not excessive; and
(5) autorotation characteristics are acceptable with maximum ice accretion between deice cycles. Assessment of performance loss should include not only the drag and weight of the ice itself but electrical or other load demands of the ice protection system and any performance changes resulting from modified rotor blade contours.
(ii) It is emphasized that ice formations (shape, weight, etc.) vary significantly under varying conditions of OAT, LWC, MVD, airspeed, attitude, and rotor RPM. The most critical conditions should be defined by means of analyses or test and verified by test. Performance changes under these various conditions should be determined and found acceptable.
(iii) Laborat ory, icing tunnel, ground spray rig, and airborne icing tanker tests are all very useful in developing an ice protection capability, but none of these, either individually or collectively, can satisfy the full requirements for certification. None can presently duplicate the combinations of liquid water content, droplet size, flow field, and random shedding patterns found in natural icing conditions. Airborne tankers hold considerable promise of being able to fulfill certification requirements (in addition to the advantage of being able to produce an icing environment on demand rather than having to wait for it to occur in nature), but tankers have not been able to generate droplet sizes that cover the complete envelope for certification. Many improvements have been made in some tankers in recent years; however, large droplet sizes have typically been a problem. Also, the size of existing tanker clouds is not of sufficient cross section to immerse the entire rotorcraft. There are also solar radiation and relative humidity effects to be considered and correlated with natural icing when using a tanker. The tanker should be able to immerse the entire rotor system as a minimum and should have a means of controlling and changing the cloud characteristics uniformly and repeatably. Until an artificial method has been successfully demonstrated and accepted, icing certification should include flight tests in natural icing conditions.
(iv) Flight testing in natural icing conditions also has limitations.
Paragraph AC 29.1419d(16) contains information that may be useful in planning natural icing flight tests. The key limitation of natural icing flight tests is being able to find the combinations of conditions that comprise critical design points. This is especially true of those points falling near the 99.9 percentile of exceedance probability; e.g., high LWC at low OAT with large MVD. It is emphasized that some more severe design points, however, may exist within the atmospheric icing envelope rather than near the edges or corners of the envelope. This does not mean that natural icing tests must be conducted at all the selected design conditions. Natural icing tests should be conducted in conditions as close to design points as possible and sufficient correlation shown with the analyses to assure that the rotorcraft can operate safely throughout the design envelope.
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(v) Certification flight testing should be extensive enough to provide reasonable assurance that either induced or random ice shedding does not present a problem. The most likely indication of a problem if it exists will be ice impact on the airframe or rotor imbalance resulting in vibration. The following should be considered sufficient for rejection:
(A) Vibrations sufficient to make the instruments difficult to read accurately.
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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 (B) Vibrations sufficient to exceed the structural or fatigue limits of any rotorcraft part such as blade, mast, or transmission components.
(C) Ice impact damage to essential parts, such as the tail rotor, that could create a flight hazard. Cosmetic, nonstructure flaws that do not exceed wear and tear characteristics or maintenance criteria are acceptable. Any ice shedding effects that require immediate maintenance action are unacceptable.
(vi) There should be a means identified or provided for determining the formation of ice on critical parts of the rotorcraft which can be met by a reliable and safe natural warning or an ice detection system. A system utilizing OAT must include an accurate OAT measurement since the onset of icing can occur in a very narrow temperature band requiring sensitive and accurate OAT measurement. OAT accuracy should be relative to the true temperature of the air mass. Total system accuracy should be ±0.5° C in the -5.0° to +5.0° C range and ±1° C throughout the remaining temperature range. The location of the sensor has been shown to be very critical and, in effect, there can be a position error or other errors induced by ice formations or solar radiation. If the system measures liquid water content, consideration should be given to the fact that the actual LWC fluctuates considerably as the rotorcraft passes through an icing environment. A warning system displaying or utilizing a peak or average LWC value (rather than an instantaneous readout) should include sufficient conservatism to provide a margin of safety. The value of an LWC detecting system lies in its utility as a warning that ice is being encountered. The actual magnitude of LWC in combination with OAT and MVD can be used to indicate the icing severity level. The U.S. Army is currently developing an advanced ice detection system for potential application to rotorcraft.
(2) In-flight Ice Detection Sensing Systems
(i) With the advent and development of In-flight Ice Detection Sensing Systems (IIDSS) technology designed to warn flight crews of potential ice accumulation on critical helicopter components, standardized guidelines for certification have been established. These guidelines will permit applicants for new, amended and supplemental type certificates under FAR 29 to present a rational compliance plan to the respective Authority. Currently there are two types of IIDSS; advisory and primary.
(ii) The advisory system enunciates the presence of icing conditions. The flight crew is responsible for monitoring the icing conditions as defined in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) and activation by the flight crew of the anti-icing or de-icing system(s) remains a requirement.
(iii) The primary system has automatic control of anti-icing or de-icing systems when the flight crew has selected the automatic switch position. The automatic feature can be de-selected and the system reverts to advisory, where the crew is responsible for monitoring the icing conditions and activating the anti-icing or de-icing Page F – 100
system(s). Neither the advisory nor the primary IIDSS are designed to operate on the ground.
(iv) The following factors should be considered during the design and certification of an IIDSS:
(A) The IIDSS display(s) status lights and/or crew alerting messages must be located so that they are within the seated flight crew’s forward vision scan area while performing their normal duties. The IIDSS display must also meet the applicable requirements of § 29.1322. Fixed probes must be located in areas easily scanned by the crew, and must be visible under normal daytime and nighttime flying conditions.
(B) Icing conditions can exist when visible moisture in any form is present and the Outside Air Temperature (OAT) is 41ºF (5° Celsius) or lower or the Total Air Temperature (TAT) is 50ºF (10°C) or lower. It should be noted that icing conditions may also exist when the OAT is 50ºF or lower while operating on the ground where surface snow, water, slush, etc., may be ingested by engines or freeze on engines, nacelles, engine sensor probes, rotors, or other critical surfaces.
(C) The core of any IIDSS is the ice detector device and its location.
Ice detectors should be installed in carefully determined locations to avoid interference from air data sensors, external protuberances (including aircraft options such as rescue hoists, flotation devices, and radar units), rotor downwash induced water impingement, wheel splash during ground operation, etc.
(D) From the standpoint of powerplant icing protection, airframe visual icing cues are not an acceptable means to advise the flight crew to activate the engine ice protection system. Delaying the use of the engine ice protection system until ice build-up is visible from the cockpit may result in severe engine damage and/or flameout due to shed ice ingestion, and is therefore unacceptable. The engine ice protection system is to be activated by the flight crew in accordance with approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) procedures when icing conditions exist, if using an advisory system, or automatically if using a primary system. Current engine induction ice protection systems are operated as anti-ice systems, as required by the RFM limitations and procedures. These requirements provide the necessary margin between system activation and the ambient conditions. In- service experience has shown that adherence to these RFM limitations and procedures has provided satisfactory engine operation.
(E) An IIDSS that is intended as the prime means of alerting the flight crew or operating the de-icing/anti-icing systems should contain certain features:
(-1) An IIDSS system hazard analysis should be completed in order to choose the IIDSS architecture.
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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03
(2) The effectiveness of the IIDSS must be demonstrated during the icing flight tests of §§ 29.1093 and 29.1419.
(3) The threshold level chosen to activate the ice detection and annunciation system should be guided by:
(i) The assurance that when the amount of ice that is accreted on the critical surfaces is shed, there will be no damage to the helicopter or engines, and
(ii) The assurance that the amount of ice accreted can be safely eliminated by the ice protection system.
(iii) An advisory system should not be overly sensitive and annunciate frequent changes from “on” to “off” and thereby induce the pilot to ignore detector indications (i.e., lose confidence in the system). However, the system must be sensitive enough to readily detect sudden exposure to icing conditions throughout the complete approved icing envelope.
(4) If overheat of structure (such as engine inlet cowl or rotorblade) can result from the anti-ice/de-ice systems being “on” during any operations, then a means should be provided to alert the flight crew or an automatic means included that will prevent such a condition.
(5) The operation of an anti-ice/de-ice system should be examined for the combined effect of an undetected failure of the annunciation system together with a time delay before the flight crew manually activates these systems. Specific considerations that warrant investigation include:
(i) The amount of ice that can be accreted on critical areas.
(ii) The effect of the ice shedding on the aircraft and propulsion system.
(iii) The capability of the anti-ice/de-ice systems.
(6) The RFM should address the following:
(i) Normal operational use of the IIDSS and any limitations.
(ii) Procedures to use in case of disagreement between the dual ice detectors, if applicable.
(iii) Failure mode indications, and appropriate crew procedures.
(7) An IIDSS must meet the applicable requirements of FAR 27.1309. Multiple systems, automatic fault monitoring, Built -in Test Equipment Page F – 102
(B ITE), pre-flight status tests, etc., may be used to support the design reliability, depending on IIDSS system hazard analysis.
(8) To ensure the continued airworthiness of IIDSS, it will be necessary to develop maintenance procedures.
(F) Compliance with the regulations may be demonstrated by tests, analyses, models, similarity with approved systems, or a combination thereof as outlined in the compliance plan and approved by the Authority.
(3) Instrumentation and Data Collection.
(i) Ins trumentation proposed for certification tests, including flight strain surveys, should be reviewed as early as possible in the program to establish that it will provide the necessary data. The need for accurate OAT measurement previously noted for operation in icing also applies to the certificated configuration. Mechanical devices such as the rotating multicylinder and rotating disc have been used for measuring the ice accretion rate which is related by calibration to average LWC and MVD. More recently, hybrid mechanical/electronic LWC measuring devices have been used.
Devices that rely on ice accretion as a signal source are subject to the Ludlam limit (the limits whereby latent heat of fusion is not totally absorbed, thus resulting in incomplete freezing of the moisture and some inaccuracy in the indication). The Ludlam limit is a function of various parameters including OAT, airspeed, LWC, and MVD. The Ludlam limit may vary from one device to another. (See paragraphs AC 29.1419d(8) and d(9)(i) for further information). Gelatin slides, soot and oil slides, and more recently, laser nephelometers have been used to measure droplet size. Other calibrated devices intended for measurement of LWC should be used. Paragraph AC 29.1419d(16) describes several of these devices. Photographic coverage of critical areas may be necessary to ascertain that ice protection systems are functioning properly and that there are no runback problems. (The term “runback” refers to liquid water that has not been evaporated by surface de-ice equipment and flows back to an unheated area subject to freezing.) Paragraph AC 29.1419d(19) highlights use of video techniques and equipment for this purpose. Some systems will require acceptable calibration techniques and data.
(ii) Gelatin, soot, and oil slides provide data that can be used to estimate MVD at discrete intervals while laser nephelometer data can provide time histories of MVD droplet size distributions. Gelatin slide data should be taken frequently dur ing test flights to properly characterize the cloud. Laser nephelometer data have been found to be highly dependent upon knowledge of the equipment and calibration. Proper calibration, maintenance, and data processing techniques should be utilized and demonstrated. Additional information on the subject may be found in paragraph AC 29.1419d(18).
(iii) Structural instrumentation requirements should also be established as early as possible in the program. Flight strain measurements are strongly Page F – 103
recommended in assessing the ice imposed stress on the rotorcraft. The flight strain measurements should determine the effect on fatigue life due to ice accumulation for such items as main rotor blades, main rotor hub components, rotating and fixed controls, horizontal stabilizer, tail rotor, etc. The subsequent proper operation of retractable devices such as landing gear should be demonstrated with representative ice accretion. In addition, the static and fatigue strength of the blade with heater mat must be substantiated. Any effect of the heater mat on fatigue strength of the blades must be considered.
(4) Additional Considerations. The following are items to consider in an icing certification program. They are not intended to be all -inclusive, and the possibility of widely differing characteristics and critical areas among various rotorcraft in icing should be considered.
(i) The rotorcraft should be shown by analysis and confirmed by either simulated or natural icing tests to be capable of holding for 30 minutes in the design conditions of the continuous maximum icing envelope at the most critical weight, CG, and altitude with a fully functional ice protection system.
(ii) A single ice protection system and power source may be considered acceptable provided that after any single failure of the ice protection system, the rotorcraft can be shown by analysis and/or test to be capable of safe operation (no hazard) for 15 minutes following failure recognition in the continuous icing envelope used as the basis for certification within the same icing limits used for the 30-minute hold criteria. During this 15- minute period the rotorcraft may exhibit degraded characteristics. Pilot controllable operating limitations such as airspeed may be used to satisfy this continued safe flight criteria. For purposes of determining performance and handling qualities degradation, ice protection system failure need not be considered to occur simultaneously with engine failure unless ice protection system operation is dependent upon engine operation.
(iii) Although current airborne weather radar technology systems may be useful in avoiding potential icing conditions by detecting precipitation, the use of weather radar is not an FAA/AUTHORITY requirement for icing certification.
(iv) If the ice protection is not operating continuously, there must be a means to advise the crew when the rotorcraft is in icing conditions in order that the system may be activated.
(v) No autorotational performance data is required for rotorcraft which have Category A powerplant installations. All rotorcraft certified for flight in icing conditions must be capable of full autorotational landings with the ice protection system operating. Autorotational entry, steady state, and flare entry flying qualities and performance should be evaluated with an ice load. Since the Category A en route performance can vary as the ice protection system operates, a mean value of cyclic torque is acceptable provided, at no time, the rate of climb falls below zero. The Page F – 104
rotorcraft is assumed to be clear prior to takeoff, and, therefore, the takeoff performance is not degraded. The landing performance can be based on the in- flight assessment of overall performance degradation. Items such as fuel burns can be used as part of the in-flight performance degradation determination. Regardless of the methods used to determine performance degradation, they must be easily used by the crew. The hover performance should be addressed for the termination of a flight after an icing encounter.
The engines must be protected from the adverse effects of ice. When ice does accumulate on the inlets, screens, etc., it must be accounted for in performance, engine operating characteristics, and inlet distortion.
(vi) The handling qualities of the rotorcraft must be substantiated if ice can accumulate on any surface. When ice can accumulate on unprotected surfaces, the rotorcraft must exhibit satisfactory VFR/IFR handling qualities. In addition, following the failure of the de-ice system, the rotorcraft must be safely controllable for 15 minutes,
i.e., the rotorcraft must be free from excessive and rapid divergence. Artificial ice shapes may be acceptable for acquisition of flight test data necessary for handling qualities and performance evaluations and demonstrations.
(vii) Items such as fuel tank vents, cooling vents, antennas, etc., must be substantiated for maximum icing effects.
(viii) The ice protection system should be sufficiently reliable to perform its intended function in accordance with the requirements of § 29.1309. These requirements may in some instances be met by the use of sound engineering judgment during design and compliance demonstrations. In many instances, use of good design practices, failure modes and effects analysis, and similarity analyses combined with good judgment will be adequate. In some instances the need for reliability analyses may be desirable. Additional information pertaining to reliability is contained in paragraph AC 29.1309 (§ 29.1309).
(ix) The subject of lightning must be addressed. The criteria applied on rotorcraft with ice protection systems are that “the rotorcraft must be protected in such a manner to minimize lightning risk.” The general rules of § 29.1309(a), (b), and (c) are applicable to ensure adequate lightning protection.
(x) Ice protection of pitot-static sources, windshields, inlets, exposed control linkages, etc., must be considered.
(xi) The impact of ice protection system failure, complete and partial, and achieving adequate warning thereof must be assessed.
(xii) The impact of delayed application of ice protection systems should be assessed. Hazardous conditions should not be apparent. Any rotorcraft characteristic changes resulting should be covered in cautionary material in the rotorcraft flight manual.
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(xiii) Possible droop stop malfunction with ice accumulation and its potential hazard to the rotorcraft, its occupants, and ground personnel must be assessed.
(xiv) Possible ice shedding hazards to ground personnel or equipment in proximity to turning rotors following flight in icing conditions should be given much consideration.
(5) Flight Manual. Areas of the flight manual which may require input are:
(i) Operating limitations including approved types of operation and prohibiting operation in freezing rain or freezing drizzle conditions. Avoidance procedures may also be useful.
(ii) Normal Operating Procedures. Information on the ice detection means or system and ice protection system and their capabilities.
(iii) Emergency Operating Procedures. Operating procedures containing essential information particularly with system failure.
(iv) Caution Notes. These caution notes should advise or address:
(A) Against inducing asymmetric shedding with rapid control inputs or rotor speed changes, except possibly as a last resort. Rotor speed changes appear to be more effective than control inputs in removing ice from the rotor blades of some rotorcraft.
(B) Loss in range, climb rate, and hover capability following prolonged operation in icing.
(C) The need for clean blade surfaces and use of approved cleaning solvents or ground deicing/anti-icing agents prior to start of rotors turning.
(D) Changes in autorotational characteristics resulting from formations.
(E) If the rotorcraft has been certificated for flight in supercooled clouds and falling and blowing snow, flight in other conditions such as freezing rain, freezing drizzle, sleet, hail, and combinations of these conditions with supercooled clouds should be avoided.
(F) The potential hazards to ground personnel, passengers deplaning, and equipment in proximity to turning rotors following flight in icing conditions.
d. Icing References.
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