AC 29-2C

Change 2Historical

Advisory circular · Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft

A newer version is currentThis is a historical version. AC 29-2C CHG 9 is the version in force, approved June 23, 2023.
Approved
April 25, 2006
Last reviewed
December 4, 2008
Family
AC 29-2 · 13 versions
Revision
C, change 2
14 CFR parts
29

Guidance, not mandatory unless a rule or AD requires it. DRS record last changed November 22, 2025.

Show pages 649–660
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Page F - 5 upon entirely. The dynamics of rotorcraft motion, coupled with the many added distractions and sensory demands made upon the pilot that are attendant to actual helicopter flight, have a profound effect on the pilot’s perception and usability of displays. Display designers, as well as FAA/Authority test pilots, should be aware that display formats previously evaluated and found acceptable in simulation may well (and frequently do) turn out to be unacceptable in actual flight.

( v ) Prior to defining the characteristics (color, symbology, etc.) or standards to be used on a specific display, a flight deck design philosophy should be established. Additionally, displays should be consistent across all systems in the flight deck. Documentation of the usage for display philosophy would help establish the working basis for determining compliance.

( 2 ) Symbology and Function .

( i ) When assessing the acceptability of the EFIS, consideration should be given to the effect of the loss of one of the CRT color guns. This type of failure is especially a factor in determining the acceptability of the installation for single-pilot operation.

(ii) Symbols should be distinctive to minimize misinterpretation or confusion with other utilized symbols utilized in the displays. The type and function of symbology should be clearly defined and appropriately classified for pilot understanding.

Symbols representing the same functions on more than one display should utilize the same shape and/or color-coding.

( 3 ) Display Chromaticity and Luminance . The chromaticity and luminance of the displays should be determined to be acceptable for all cockpit lighting conditions which are expected in service. An expanded discussion of these characteristics may be found in AC 25-11.

( 4 ) Temperature Survey to Determine Proper Cooling of EFIS Components.

( i ) Equipment Requiring Cooling Test . As with any avionics equipment, good engineering judgment may deem that all components of the EFIS should have an in-flight temperature survey performed to ascertain that the thermal environmental tolerance of the system components is not exceeded. Usually, the following general guidelines may be used to aid in determining when an in-flight temperature survey is warranted.

( a ) Components, which contain a CRT, require the temperature survey outlined in paragraph AC 29.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(4)(ii).

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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 6 ( b ) Equipment which does not contain a CRT, but is specified by the manufacturer to require forced air cooling (by an airframe-mounted system), usually requires a temperature survey.

( c ) Equipment, which does not contain a CRT and is not specified as requiring forced air-cooling may usually have its critical thermal environment substantiated by laboratory testing.

( i i ) Temperature Survey Testing . The temperature tests for the EFIS units should consist of a short-term test of approximately 30 minutes which accounts for an aircraft which has heat-soaked on the ramp. A factor of 25° F should be added to the maximum corrected temperature to account for “greenhouse effect.” A long-term test should be accomplished at various altitudes and limiting (low and high) airspeeds.

All avionic equipment should be turned on during this test, and the cockpit panel lights should be operated at full intensity. The environmental control unit (ECU) or air-conditioning system should not be operating during these tests; however, any windows or vents which are part of the “basic” TC rotorcraft may be utilized to ventilate the pilot’s stations. Both these tests should be corrected to the maximum temperature for which the rotorcraft is certified and a standard lapse rate for altitude as specified in this AC. If an airframe cooling system is necessary to keep the display units within acceptable temperature limits, then the pilot(s) must be made aware of a failure or malfunction of this cooling system. Some type of cockpit visual annunciation with the capability to perform a preflight test is usually utilized to fulfill this requirement.

( 5 ) System Reliability .

( i ) Failure of the EFIS to perform a required function which results in the reversion to standby instruments or requires the use of abnormal procedures should be shown to be improbable (for Category A rotorcraft, reference § 29.1309(b)).

( i i ) For IFR operations, Appendix B of Part 29, paragraph VIII(b)(5)(iii), requires that the equipment, systems, and installations must be designed so that one display of the information essential to the safety of flight which is provided by the instruments will remain available to a pilot, without additional crewmember action, after any single failure or combination of failures that is not shown to be extremely improbable. The display of attitude, altitude, or airspeed is individually “essential to the safety of flight,” and, therefore, the loss of all attitude display, all airspeed information, or all altitude information to the pilot(s) should be extremely improbable. Also, any malfunction or failure of the EFIS, which would result in the simultaneous incorrect display of this critical information, should be extremely improbable. In view of the relatively new technology embodied in the EFIS, the conventional technology electromechanical standby attitude indicator, with its independent power supply, should be retained.

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c. Standby Instruments . The EFIS, which have been approved on transport category rotorcraft at this time, have only presented the critical function of attitude display. A specific requirement for a standby attitude instrument is contained in Appendix B of Part 29. This requirement is usually satisfied by an electromechanical panel-mounted gyro with an independent power source. Because of the mature technology of this type of standby attitude indicator, certain aspects of the EFIS installation have not been an area for concern. If, however, a total commitment of critical display functions is made to the “glass” technology, such that the standby attitude instrument requirement is satisfied by a software based CRT system, then several major areas of concern will be raised. Among these are the electromagnetic vulnerability of the system (protection from the effects of lightning and high energy radio frequency fields) and software. The certifications of EFIS with an electromechanical standby attitude indicator have not considered loss of function critical from a software aspect. (reference paragraph AC 29.1309 for a discussion of software qualification.)

AC 29.1305. § 29.1305 (Amendment 29- 10) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.

a. Explanation . This section specifies those instruments which are required for reciprocating and turbine engine installations. It also provides instrumentation requirements for operating rotorcraft in Category A or Category B. These instruments will provide the pilot with essential data to determine operational status of critical components and select desired performance conditions.

b. FAR 29.1305(a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(9) requires a warning device for low fuel, gearbox oil pressure, and transmission oil temperature. An indicator/gage is not acceptable for use as a warning device since the indicator/gage is not a primary instrument and therefore is not actively monitored.

c. There are advanced display systems that take advantage of microprocessor power by integrating the processing of several parameters. These systems have to date been referred to as Engine Caution Advisory Systems (ECAS) or as Integrated Instrument Display Systems (IIDS) and possibly other variations of these names. These systems typically integrate propulsion instruments, fuel quantity indication, and caution and warning system into a single display system. In traditional designs the powerplant instruments, fuel quantity display, and the caution and warning system are independent from each other. The integration of these systems/indicators eliminates their independence from one another and increases the probability of loss of more than one indicator/system as a result of a single fault or malfunction. Redundant design is generally applied to compensate for the loss of independence.

(1) This integration and resultant mi tigation of independence can result in an increased opportunity for common mode failures. Approval of the compensating features is elevated in importance as it is this aspect that allows the concept to be acceptable and subsequently certifiable. The loss of all displayed information or erroneous information should be considered for determination of worst case criticality.

With this determination of criticality, the design can be evaluated to see that it meets the

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Page F - 8 minimum associated level of design assurance. Additionally, due to space limitations, some systems employ “page over” features that may have some difficulty displaying the required information when needed and human factors aspects must be considered.

(2) The instrument display system must be investigated and found to be acceptable under both normal and emergency conditions, must perform its intended function under foreseeable operating conditions, and must be designed to minimize the hazards in the event of probable malfunction or failure.

(3) It must be shown that there is appropriate redundancy to provide adequate compensation for the loss of independence in the system. If a multi-page system is employed, it must be shown that needed information is displayed when required.

Specific issues that must be addressed to assure compliance with the minimum safety standards are as follows:

(i) The level of most severe hazard must be determined.

(ii) Equivalent reliability and softw are design assurance to the determined criticality level must be shown.

(iii) Pretest capability must be provided for the warning and caution system to preclude an associated latent failure.

(iv) Human Factors (reference §§ 29.1321 and 29.1322).

d. Additional rules to be consulted w hen determining the powerplant instrument installation design are §§ 29.1321, Arrangement and visibility; 29.1337, Powerplant instruments; 29.1381, Instrument lights; 29.1543, Instrument markings: General;

29.1549, Powerplant instruments; 29.1551, Oil quantity indicator; and 29.1553, Fuel quantity indicator.

AC 29.1305A. § 29.1305 (Amendment 29- 26) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.

a. Explanation . Amendment 29-26 revises, edits, and adds new powerplant instrument requirements. Section 29.1305(a)(4) was revised to require a low fuel warning device for each tank that can be used to feed an engine. The amendment allows a longer time between warning actuation and fuel exhaustion and requires the low fuel warning device to be independent of the normal fuel quantity indication system.

Section 29.1305(a)(17) was changed to extend its application to all rotorcraft (not just those with turbine engines) and to require an indication to the crew of the degree of filter blockage as it relates to the fuel flow requirements in § 29.955. Section 29.1305(a)(19) was revised to require function indicators only for fuel heaters that can be selected or are controllable. A new paragraph (a)(20) was added to § 29.1305 that combined identical requirements for fuel pressure indicators in paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(2) and modified the applicability of these requirements to only

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Page F - 9 those fuel systems with devices or components that could adversely affect fuel pressure at the engine, if they fail. It also eliminates the requirement for fuel pressure indicators in fuel systems, such as suction or gravity feed systems, which do not incorporate pumps or filters. A new § 29.1305(a)(21) was added that requires a warning device to indicate to the flight crew the failure of any fuel pump that is required to supply adequate fuel flow to the engine according to § 29.955; such indication is not required for fuel pumps which are demonstrated to be only necessary for engine starting.

Section 29.1305(a)(22) adds a requirement for a warning or caution device to alert the flight crew when particles are detected by the chip detector required by § 29.1337(d). A new § 29.1305(a)(23) added a requirement for powerplant instruments or warning devices for auxiliary power units installed in rotorcraft.

b. Procedures . The requirement and purpose for each instrument is self-explanatory in the amendment. Other sections that should be considered when designing powerplant instruments are listed in paragraph AC 29.1305.

AC 29.1305B. 29.1305 (Amendment 29- 34) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.

a. Explanation . Amendment 29-34 added §§ 29.1305(a)(24) and 29.1305(a)(25) to provide for 30-second/2-minute OEI power ratings.

(1) Section 29.1305(a)(24) adds the r equirement that a device or means be provided to alert the crew of the use of the 30-second and 2-minute OEI power level.

The crew should be alerted when the 30-second or 2-minute interval begins and when the time interval ends. The amount of time spent at the 30-second or 2-minute OEI power levels is at the crew’s discretion, unlike the other limits for 30-second OEI that are set by an automatic control required by § 29.1143. The purpose for providing the time interval alerts and automatically controlling the 30-second OEI limits is to free the crew from monitoring the engine instruments during critical phases of flight caused by the loss of an engine.

(2) Section 29.1305(a)(25) adds the r equirement for a device to record the usage and the amount of time spent at the 30-second OEI power level and the amount of time spent at the 2-minute OEI power level. The information recorded by this device is for the use of the ground crew to determine if maintenance actions/inspections are to be conducted.

b. Procedures . For the purpose of complying with FAR 29.1305(a)(24) and

29.1305(a)(25), the 2-minute OEI power level is considered to be achieved whenever one or more of the operating limitations applicable to the next lower OEI power rating are exceeded. The 30-second OEI power level is considered to be achieved whenever one or more of the operating limitations applicable to the 2-minute OEI power rating are exceeded.

(1) A review of the method to meet t he requirements of § 29.1305(a)(24) should be conducted by flight test personnel. A determination should be made as to whether

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Page F - 10 the method used to alert the crew of 30-second or 2-minute OEI power usage can be recognized and understood by the crew.

(2) To meet the requirements of Section 29.1305(a)(25), a device should be installed on the engine or the airframe to record the time and each usage of 30-second and 2-minute OEI power levels. The information on the time and usage of 30-second and 2-minute OEI power should be recoverable from the recording device by ground personnel. The device should not be capable of being reset in flight and should only be capable of being reset by ground personnel. Prior to each flight this device should be capable of being checked for proper operation and to determine if 30-second or 2-minute OEI power levels were used during the previous flight.

c. Integrated Display Systems . This advisory material is to provide guidance for compliance to Part 27 and Part 29 regulations as they apply to integrated display systems. The integration aspects of these systems require some additional issues to be addressed during certification. The term “must” in this advisory material is used in the sense of ensuring the applicability of these particular methods of compliance when the acceptable means of compliance described herein is used. This advisory material establishes an acceptable means, but not the only means of certifying an integrated display system.

(1) Definitions .

(i) Integrity . The term “integrity” for the purpose of this advisory material includes the hardware quality requirements, including reliability; as well as the software level requirements, as defined in DO178B.

(ii) Criticality . The term “criticality” refers to the five levels of criticality addressed in FAA Advisory Circulars AC 27-1B and AC 29-2C.

(2) Related documents .

(i) Federal Aviation Regulati ons (FARs) paragraphs 21.21, 29.1301,

29.1309, 29.1305, and 29.1322

(ii) Standards - Latest revisi on of RTCA/DO178 and RTCA/DO-160; SAE documents

(iii) ARP4754 and ARP4761

(3) Background . A tendency to integrate functions/indications that have previously been independent is a result of technology advancement. Microprocessor driven systems have facilitated the ease of this integration. Integrated Instrument Display System (IIDS) or Engine Instrument and Caution Advisory System (EICAS) are examples of integrated display systems. IIDS, EICAS, or any other similar systems are defined as a combination of engine instruments ( previously independent indicators),

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Page F - 11 fuel quantity indication, and caution/warning parameters, as a minimum, presented by a common display driven by a common processor.

(4) Discussion. This design philosophy does not result in the traditional requirement for individual display independence for failure/malfunction considerations.

This loss of independence means that a single failure could result in loss of most, if not all, instrument displays on the integrated display system. Redundancy of the integrated display system is often proposed to compensate for this lack of independence.

However, redundancy alone may not meet the integrity requirements since they are derived from the level of criticality associated with the loss or malfunction of instrument/parameter displays for flight operations that are dependent on these indications.

(5) Certification Approach . A two step procedure should be used to determine the adequate safety level for this type of system. The first step is to determine the level of criticality associated with the total loss/malfunction of these functions/indications or loss/malfunction of the critical parts of the display. This can be achieved through the use of a functional hazard assessment (FHA). This criticality assessment must be a product of failure/malfunction of the indication system and the flight operation that would represent the worst case for loss of this information. The second step is to determine that the design integrity of the system is at least equal to the assessed criticality level determined in step one.

(6) Functional Hazard Assessment. The operational classifications to be considered when assessing the criticality are Cat A, Cat B, and IFR. The need for critical information varies with each of these different operational categories. An example would be the demand for OEI parameter information in the single engine Cat A operation. Another example is the loss of fuel quantity indication and fuel low level indication simultaneously in IFR flight conditions. The FHA should address not only loss of one type of indication, but combined loss of engine parameter indication, including total loss of display information, caution/warning, fuel quantity indication, and any other included display in combination with a particular flight operation. There are techniques to lessen the consequences of the failure/malfunction requirements for integrity, such as providing back-up displays for the information deemed critical for a particular operational consideration.

(7) Summary . The loss of all integrated display information for certain types of flight operations may have the highest level of criticality associated with it. The same may be true for malfunctions that result in misleading indications. These failures/malfunctions must be addressed by the commensurate design integrity level.

Lesser levels of criticality must also be addressed by the appropriate design integrity levels.

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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 12 AC 29.1305C. § 29.1305 (Amendment 29- 40) POWERPLANT INSTRUMENTS.

a. Explanation . Amendment 29-40 added section 29.1305(a)(6) to require an oil pressure indicator for each pressure-lubricated gearbox. Paragraphs (a)(6) through

(a)(25), prior to this amendment, have been redesignated as paragraphs (a)(7) through

(a)(26).

b. Procedures . In addition to providing an oil pressure indicator for each pressure-lubricated gearbox, the guidance material of the previous AC 29.1305 paragraphs continues to apply.

AC 29.1307. § 29.1307 (Amendment 29-12) MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT.

a. Explanation . This rule provides a listing of several items of required miscellaneous equipment. Each item seems to be self-explanatory except the one requiring a master switch arrangement for electrical circuits other than ignition. The purpose of a master switch arrangement is to allow rapid removal of all bus loads from sources of electrical power in an emergency situation.

b. Procedures . When reviewing possible solutions to the master switch arrangement requirement, the following considerations should be included.

(1) System separation . Since wiring from each electrical system will be brought in close proximity to each other, extra care should be taken to maintain some separation. As examples, common connectors, common grounds, and common wire routing should be avoided.

(2) Installation of switches . The single switch should be avoided since it introduces the possibility of a single failure turning off the entire electrical system. One solution that is commonly used provides a close grouping of the switches such that the pilot can easily reach all switches and turn them all off with one action. This solution requires a cockpit evaluation to ensure the installation will be suitable for different hand sizes. Another solution involves a gang bar that can be moved with a single motion to turn off all sources. This solution has been found to be acceptable in several instances.

Other solutions should be evaluated on their own merits, and the primary emphasis should be on maintaining some minimum system separation and conducting a cockpit evaluation by flight test personnel.

AC 29.1309. § 29.1309 (Amendment 29-40) EQUIPMENT, SYSTEMS, AND INSTALLATIONS.

a. Explanation .

(1) Applicability . Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) paragraph 29.1309 is intended as a general requirement that is applicable to any equipment or system as installed, in addition to specific systems requirements, except as indicated below.

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(i) General . If a specific Part 29 requirement exists which predefines systems safety aspects (e.g., redundancy level or criticality) for a specific type of equipment, system, or installation, then the specific Part 29 requirement will take precedence (reference paragraph AC 29.1301b(2)). This precedence does not preclude accomplishment of a system safety assessment, if necessary. For example, § 29.695 is a rule that predefines a required level of redundancy and an implied system reliability. However, a system safety assessment approach may still be required to show that the implied system reliability is met and to address assessment of the failure modes.

(ii) Section 29, Subparts B, C, and D. Section 29.1309 does not apply to Subparts B, C, and D for aspects such as the performance, flight characteristics, structural loads, and structural strength requirements, but it does apply to any equipment/system on which compliance with the requirements of Subparts B, C, and D is based (e.g., Health Usage Monitoring System certified for maintenance credit and Stability Augmentation System).

(iii) Section 29, Subpart E.

(A) Section 29.1309 does not apply to the uninstalled type-certificated engine. However, it does apply to the equipment/systems associated with the engine installation (e.g., electrical power generation, engine displays, transducers, etc.) on the rotorcraft (reference § 29.901).

(B) Section 29.1309 does not apply to the Rotor Drive Systems (reference § 29.917(b)).

(iv) Section 29, Subpart F.

(A) Section 29.1309 does not apply to stowed safety equipment such as life rafts, life preservers, and emergency floatation equipment. It also does not apply to safety belts, rotorcraft seats, and hand held fire extinguishers. However, it does apply to hazards to the rotorcraft, its occupants, and flight crew introduced by the installation/presence of this type of equipment/systems (e.g., Electromagnetic- Interference considerations, fire hazards, and inadvertent deployment of emergency floatation equipment) approved as part of the type design.

(B) Section 29.1309 does not apply to the functional aspects of aircraft non-safety related equipment such as entertainment systems, hoists, Forward Looking Infrared systems (FLIR), or emergency medical equipment such as defibrillators, etc.

However, it does apply to hazards to the rotorcraft, its occupants, and flight crew introduced by the installation/presence of this type of equipment/systems (e.g., Electromagnetic-Interference considerations, fire hazards, and failure of the electrical system fault protection scheme) approved as part of the type design.

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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 14 (C) Section 29.1309 does not apply to the lighting characteristics (e.g., light intensity, color, and coverage) of the position lights, anti-collision lights, and riding lights. However, it does apply to hazards to the rotorcraft, its occupants, and flight crew introduced by the installation/presence of this type of equipment/systems (e.g., Electromagnetic-Interference considerations, fire hazards, and pilot visibility impairment due to glare) approved as part of the type design.

(2) Background .

(i) This AC paragraph (i.e., paragraph AC 29.1309) is not intended to change the existing reliability requirements of the current §§ 29.1309(b) and (c).

Neither is this AC paragraph (i.e., AC 29.1309) intended to impose an overly rigorous safety assessment process for those installations involving equipment/systems that are not considered to be complex and/or do not perform functions whose failure/malfunction result in higher level Failure Condition Categories.

(ii) However, AC 29.1309 does pr ovide guidance that describes a method of showing compliance that utilizes the latest system safety assessment techniques available in the aerospace industry. The safety assessment process described in this AC can be easily adopted and applied with various degrees to equipment/systems, and installations ranging from simple systems that perform functions whose failure/malfunction have no safety impact, to the most critical and most complex systems.

b. Procedures .

(1) Definitions of Probability Classifications .

(i) FREQUENT . (This is the lower part of the range 10-5 or greater previously applied to the term “PROBABLE”.) Frequent events may be expected to occur often during the operational life of each rotorcraft that are based on a probability on the order of 10-3 or greater.

(ii) REASONABLY PROBABLE . (This is the upper part of the range 10-5 or greater previously applied to the term “PROBABLE”.) Reasonably probable events may be expected to occur several times during the operational life of each rotorcraft that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-3 to 10-5.

(iii) REMOTE . (The term “REMOTE” is not related to the structural use of the term.) (This is the lower part of the range 10-9 to 10-5 previously applied to the term “IMPROBABLE”.) Remote events are expected to occur a few times during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type, but may occur several times during the total operational life of a number of rotorcraft of a particular type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-5 to 10-7.

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(iv) EXTREMELY REMOTE . (The term “REMOTE” is not related to the structural use of the term.) (This is the upper part of the range 10-9 to 10-5 previously applied to the term “IMPROBABLE”.) Extremely remote events are not expected to occur during the total operational life of a random single rotorcraft of a particular type, but may occur a few times during the total operational life of all rotorcraft of a particular type, that are based on a probability on the order of between 10-7 to 10-9.

(v) EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE . (Remains the same for both the three or the five classifications.) Extremely improbable events are so unlikely that they need not be considered to ever occur, unless engineering judgment would require their consideration. A probability on the order of 10-9 or less is assigned to this classification.

NOTE: The five probability terms defined in paragraph AC 29.1309.b(1) above are intended to relate to an identified failure condition resulting from or contributed to by the improper operation or loss of a function or functions. These terms do not define the reliability of specific components or systems.

(2) Definitions of Fa ilure Condition Classifications. Failure Conditions may be classified according to the severity of their effects into one of the following categories (reference Figure AC 29.1309-2).

(i) NO EFFECT . Failure Conditions that would have no effect on safety;

for example, Failure Conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the rotorcraft or increase crew workload, however, could result in an inconvenience to the occupants, excluding the flight crew.

(ii) MINOR . Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce rotorcraft safety, and which would involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes, or some physical discomfort to occupants.

(iii) MAJOR . Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew work load or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, physical distress to occupants, possibly including injuries, or physical discomfort to the flight crew.

(iv) HAZARDOUS/SEVERE-MAJOR . Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:

(A) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;

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AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 16 (B) Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew’s ability is impaired to where they could not be relied on to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or,

(C) Possible serious or fatal injury to a passenger or a cabin crew member, excluding the flight crew.

NOTE: Hazardous/Severe-Major failure conditions can include events that are manageable by the crew by use of proper procedures which, if not implemented correctly or in a timely manner, may result in a Catastrophic Event.

(v) CATASTROPHIC . Failure Conditions which would result in multiple fatalities to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the flight crew, or result in loss of rotorcraft.

(3) Safety Objective .

(i) The objective of § 29.1309 is to ensure an acceptable safety level for equipment and systems as installed on the rotorcraft. A logical and acceptable inverse relationship must exist between the Average Probability per Flight Hour and the severity of Failure Condition effects, as shown in Figure AC 29.1309-1, such that:

(A) Failure Conditions with No Effe ct on safety may be more frequent than Reasonably Probable.

(B) Minor Failure Conditions may be Reasonably Probable.

(C) Major Failure Conditions must be no more frequent than Remote.

(D) Hazardous/Severe-Major Failure Conditions must be no more frequent than Extremely Remote.

(E) Catastrophic Failure Condi tions must be Extremely Improbable.

(ii) The safety objectives associated with Failure Conditions are described in Figure AC 29.1309-2, and appear in Figure AC 29.1309-1, below.