AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 36 in-flight lightning protection of all types of fixed/rotary wing and powered lift aircraft of conventional, composite, and mixed construction and their electrical and fuel systems.
The handbook contains chapters on the natural phenomenon of lightning, the interaction between the aircraft and the electrically charged atmosphere, the mechanism of the lightning strike, and the interaction with the airframe, wiring, and fuel system. Further chapters cover details of designing for optimum protection; the physics behind the voltages, currents, and electromagnetic fields developed by the strike; and shielding techniques and damage analysis. The handbook ends with discussion of test and analytical techniques for determining the adequacy of a given protection scheme. On March 5, 1990, FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-136, “Protection of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems Against the Indirect Effects of Lightning,” was issued.
Appendix 3 of that document contains an updated quantification of the severe natural lightning environment. Additionally, an AIR-100 policy letter, dated August 25, 1993, addressing multiple burst lightning strikes, should be considered. It is recommended that for new designs and applications after March 5, 1990, this revised definition of the lightning be used.
(D) Certification Plan . The following subjects are not intended to provide a complete list of the items that should be included in the certification plan, but rather highlight some of the areas that should receive consideration. The certification plan should address the total protection that is required to allow the FADEC to continue to operate properly when the rotorcraft experiences a worst-case lightning strike encounter.
( 1 ) Determination of Lightning Strike Attachments . Determine the locations on the rotorcraft where lightning strike attachment is likely to occur and the portions of the airframe through which currents may flow between attachments. The main and tail rotors are recognized as likely attachment points; however, consideration should be given to all possible attachment points. The swept stroke phenomenon may not exist for all lightning strike encounters due to the fact that the rotorcraft may be airborne with little or no airspeed.
( 2 ) Establish the Lightning Environment . Establish the components of the total lightning event to be considered. These are the currents and voltages that are described in the definition of the environment.
( 3 ) Full-Level, Complete Vehicle Testing . In accordance with traditional FAA/AUTHORITY Policy, the demonstration that the FADEC installed in a complete type design rotorcraft will continue to operate properly when exposed to a worst-case lightning strike is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with § 29.1309(a). Because of the difficulties involved in utilizing this type of an approach, it is generally not used.
( 4 ) Analytical Processes . A description should be given in the certification plan of the analytical process and/or certification tests to be utilized to demonstrate protection effectiveness. Typically, the certification plan will include a combination of analysis and tests. (Analytical techniques are most often utilized to
Page F - 37 predict the levels of lightning-induced transients in interconnecting wiring.) In most cases, successful analyses are based upon well-defined geometrical or electrical parameters such as structural dimensions and materials resistivity. When electrical characteristics of structural materials are not well established, development tests are often utilized to obtain this data which is subsequently utilized in an analysis. In more complex structures and/or electrical/electronic system installations, it is sometimes difficult or impossible to define the problem in terms that can be analyzed. In these cases, development or verification testing is often relied upon. The purpose of the certification plan is to show how developmental tests, analyses, and verification tests are combined to demonstrate protection design adequacy. In certain cases, previously verified designs can be incorporated and their adequacy confirmed by reference to previous verifications. Such reference should also be incorporated in the certification plan.
( i ) The verification testing should be conducted on a system that simulates as closely as possible the installed configuration. As few items as possible of actual hardware should be simulated.
( i i ) The use of various analytical processes usually requires that the system component tolerance is established. The SAE AE4L Committee Report No. AE4L-81-2 is the recommended reference to be used for the testing accomplished to determine these tolerances. The testing which is performed to determine the tolerance level of the control computer should include a consideration for the occurrence of a non-recoverable digital upset. One method to provide this consideration is to have the unit powered and the processor operating normally under software control (usually this should be the exact software for which approval is sought) when the test is performed. If strike testing is used, then several shots should be made to develop enough data to provide a reasonable confidence level. It is an acceptable procedure for the engine manufacturer, while he is obtaining his type certificate, to accomplish this bench testing to determine the level of tolerance of the FADEC system components to lightning encounter indirect effects. This approach has the advantages that the bench tests are not necessarily required to be repeated when the engine is installed in a different airframe. This recommendation is not meant to add a requirement to the engine manufacturer but to propose a more efficient method of certification. If this tolerance was not determined by the engine manufacturer, the applicant installing the FADEC in a rotorcraft would be expected to furnish this data.
(iii ) For complete airframe verification testing, a minimum level of at least 1KA peak and a current rise time of 2KA/microsecond are recommended. It is often difficult to obtain valid results at lower levels due to poor signal-to-noise ratios. When complete vehicle testing is accomplished at some lower level, or through some alternate test technique such as low level swept CW testing, consideration should be given to nonlinear airframe response, diffusion effects, and alterations in current paths caused by arcing and flashover.
AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 38 ( i v ) As with any analytical method, it is prudent to include a margin of safety to account for the uncertainties involved in the analytical and testing processes.
A level of 6 dB is recommended for those analyses that are confirmed by the use of reduced level, full-scale vehicle testing. This safety margin is the difference between the airframe installed system responses and the system component tolerance, not an adjustment to the quantification of the atmospheric environment. (The airframe system response to the worst-case lightning event should be at least 6 dB less than the FADEC system computer and components tolerance level. Number of dB is defined as 20 LOG10 (V1/V2) and 20 LOG10 (I1/I2) where V1 and I1 are the determined tolerance levels of the system components and V2 and I2 are the extrapolated airframe response.)
( v ) When an analysis has no associated full-scale vehicle testing to confirm the analysis, the analysis should be very rigorous. Additionally, it should be expected in this situation that this analysis indicates a very large margin of protection.
Many factors must be considered in determining what constitutes an acceptably large margin. The specific additional margin required should be based on an assessment of the inherent uncertainty of a given analysis. Approximately an additional 25 dB of protection has been deemed acceptable for a reasonably rigorous analysis performed on an airframe for which the response characteristics are known.
( 5 ) Pass/Fail Criteria . The certification plan should address a pass/fail criteria for the testing and analysis to be performed. The following items should be satisfied to assure acceptable system performance:
( i ) No immediate crew action must be required.
( i i ) Automatic control of the engine cannot be lost for any appreciable period of time. The engine must not be allowed to be out of control for a period of time that will result in a hazard in a worst-case flight condition. Obviously, any rapid, uncontrolled divergence is not acceptable.
(iii ) No crew action should be required to reset the system. This is not to imply that the system cannot be designed with a manual reset, but the manual reset cannot be used to show compliance to recover from a digital upset.
( i v ) The resumption of engine control after an upset must be reasonably within the range that existed before the upset.
( v ) No critical data can be lost.
( v i ) After the system recovers, if the performance of the system has been degraded in a noncritical manner which would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the pilot to cope with adverse operating conditions, then the crew must be alerted to this system degradation.
Page F - 39 (E) System Installation Considerations . In most cases, the installation of the system components is a constituent part of the lightning protection. This is particularly true in the use of shielding techniques. If these installation features are required for adequate lightning protection, consideration should be given to ensure that their effectiveness is not derogate in service. Information should be made available to the parties who service and operate the rotorcraft to allow them to take actions necessary to ensure the continued effectiveness of the system lightning protection.
(iv) Lightning Protection .
(A) Background . During the original design and development of rotorcraft and the development of regulations concerning these aircraft, little attention was given to protection from the meteorological phenomenon of lightning. This was, in part, because the early aircraft were constructed mostly of metal and had little, if any, dependence on advanced technology systems. Contemporary design transport category rotorcraft are utilizing the same advanced technology systems and materials as transport category airplanes. Because of this fact, a specific requirement has been added by Amendment 29-24 for the consideration of lightning strike protection of required systems, equipment, and installations. The addition of paragraph (h) to § 29.1309 further defines the consideration required for the foreseeable operating condition of a lightning strike encounter on the rotorcraft.
(B) Procedures .
( 1 ) Section 29.1309(h) requires, when showing compliance with § 29.1309(a) and (b), that the effects of lightning strikes on the rotorcraft be considered.
( i ) The first step in demonstrating compliance is to perform a fault/failure analysis (F/FA) to identify those functions for which the loss of function or malfunction may result in a catastrophe to the rotorcraft. An F/FA should be conducted on each system whose failure to function properly would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the rotorcraft. These systems should be designed and installed to ensure that they can perform their intended function during and after exposure to lightning.
( i i ) Additionally, evaluation must be performed to identify each system whose failure to function properly would reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. These systems should be designed and installed to ensure that they can perform their intended function after exposure to lightning.
(iii ) The lightning strike models to be used for system justification should be as described in SAE AE4L Committee Report AE4L-87-3, Rev. B, dated January 1989 (or later version). The recommended reference for performing such analysis is Society of Automotive Engineers, Aerospace Recommended Practice 926A.
AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 40 ( 2 ) Detailed means of compliance should be agreed with the authorities taking into account the effects on the rotorcraft and minimum considerations are as follows:
( i ) Any combination of analysis and testing should be agreed with the authority.
( i i ) For test results, an extrapolation of the threat current parameters of more than a factor of 200 is not recommended for full scale low level pulse testing, due to the difficulty of obtaining valid results with poor signal-to-noise ratios.
(iii ) For a proven analysis technique, a safety factor of at least 2 will be necessary.
( 3 ) Flight and engine controls are examples of “critical” functions and with these critical functions defined, an analysis and/or testing should be performed to show compliance with § 29.1309(a); i.e., equipment, systems, and installations performing those identified functions should be designed and installed to ensure that they continue to perform their intended functions considering the conditions of the rotorcraft experiencing a worst-case lightning strike encounter. Section 29.610 contains some methods which may be utilized for less complex mechanical systems; however, a great deal of difficulty will be experienced in trying to use these criteria to demonstrate that a very complex avionic system complies with § 29.1309(a). These avionic systems thus identified usually only require protection from indirect effects of lightning. If it is determined such is the case, then a method as outlined in paragraph AC 29.1309b(8)(iii), Lightning Strike Protection of Full Authority Digital Engine Controls, is recommended. This method may be readily adapted to other avionic systems performing critical functions. Also, this identifies an acceptable quantification of the expected airborne environment. The next step involves expanding the F/FA to determine if the malfunctioning of several “essential” systems in relation to other systems would result in a hazard to a Category B rotorcraft or preclude the continued safe flight and landing of a Category A rotorcraft. If groups of functions are so identified, sufficient lightning protection should be provided to prevent a hazardous malfunction situation on Category B rotorcraft or provide those conditions which prevent continued safe flight and landing on a Category A rotorcraft are extremely improbable.
In performing this part of the analysis, attention should be given to the fact that many of the required equipment, systems, and installations may fail simultaneously with other required equipment, systems, and installations and result in a reduction of the capability of the rotorcraft but still not result in a catastrophe. An example of required equipment for which the simultaneous failure of all the required equipment is catastrophic is a failure which results in a total loss of attitude display for IFR certified rotorcraft operating in instrument meteorological conditions. Note that the analysis which is utilized to demonstrate that these failures are extremely improbable should have the encounter with a worst-case lightning strike as a given event; i.e., probability is unity. Additionally, for a Category A rotorcraft, an autorotation is not considered continued safe flight and landing.
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(9) High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) .
(i) Explanation . A regulatory project is active to add requirements for the protection of aircraft electrical and electronic systems from the effects of the HIRF environment. This effort is the result of technological advances in airframe and electronic systems design and a concurrent increase in the levels of radiated power in the aircraft environment. These changes have raised vulnerability to the electromagnetic environment of the electrical and electronic systems which perform critical and essential functions. In current type certification programs involving advanced electrical and electronic systems the FAA/AUTHORITY has adopted special conditions to provide an adequate level of safety.
(A) The special conditions are directed toward the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions. The applicant may demonstrate that these systems are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment, or as an alternative a laboratory test may be conducted, as discussed in the “Discussion” associated with each special condition. The laboratory tests would be conducted at a peak electromagnetic strength of 100 or 200 volts per meter, as appropriate, in a frequency range of 10 kHz to 18 GHz.
(B) A definition of the HIRF environment is included in FAA Notice 8110.71, dated 2 April 1998 [Subject: Guidance for the Certification of Aircraft operating in High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Environments]. SAE chartered a HIRF committee, SAE-4R, to define the HIRF environment for VFR and IFR aircraft, to prepare a Users Manual, and to submit a proposed advisory circular to the FAA/AUTHORITY. This committee has currently completed its task, except for the Users Manual. The referenced FAA Notice has been updated several times to reflect the latest SAE-4R recommended electromagnetic fields.
(C) If the laboratory test alternativ e is selected the 100 volts/meter level is considered appropriate for a function that is critical during IFR operations and the 200 volts/meter level is considered appropriate for a function that is critical during VFR operations. This is because the minimum en route altitude for IFR flight is 1,000 feet or 500 feet (FAA or ICAO), and rotorcraft operating VFR can and do operate regularly at lower altitudes. The attitude system is an example of a system performing a critical function during IFR operation. A full authority digital engine control (FADEC) system is an example of a critical function during VFR and IFR operation.
(D) JAA has issued a HIRF Interim Policy Paper to be used as JAA special conditions. This Interim Policy Paper was drafted by the Aviation Authority members of EUROCAE WG 33. The JAA Interim Policy requires full aircraft testing for systems performing Level A control functions and laboratory testing for Level A display, Level B, and Level C systems. The Interim JAA HIRF environment is the January 1992
AC 29-2C, Chg 1 2/12/03 Page F - 42 environment used in INT/POL/25/2, with exceptions in the 2-4GHz and 6-8GHz bands.
JAA guidance material for acceptable means of compliance is AMJ.1317.
(ii) Procedures . It is recommended that the applicant present a plan to the cognizant FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) for approval, outlining how the compliance with the HIRF requirements will be attained. This plan should also propose a pass/fail criteria for the operation of critical systems in the HIRF environment.
(A) A preliminary hazard analysis should be performed by the applicant for approval by the cognizant FAA ACO to identify electrical and/or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical functions” means those whose failure would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the rotorcraft.
(B) The systems performing critical functions that are identified by the preliminary hazard analysis are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions; however, the HIRF requirements only apply to critical functions. If redundant systems are used, all systems should be subjected to test/analysis for the HIRF requirements.
(C) The latest revision of RTCA document DO-160/EUROCAE ED-12D, Section 20, is an appropriate reference for laboratory test procedures. In addition, a separate advisory circular and users guide on the subject of HIRF is being drafted for the FAA/AUTHORITY by the SAE AE4R Subcommittee.
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SUBPART F - EQUIPMENT
INSTRUMENTS: INSTALLATION
AC 29.1321. § 29.1321 (Amendment 29-21) ARRANGEMENT AND VISIBILITY.
a. Background . This section is the first in a series that concerns the installation of instruments. Specific requirements for individual instruments are addressed in other paragraphs. The instruments should be arranged in a manner so that the pilot may avail himself of the information displayed by the instruments without undue distraction.
Additionally, for instrument flight, the rule requires that the attitude, altitude, airspeed, and compass indicators be grouped in the so-called standard “T.” Instrument location and arrangement, with respect to the pilot’s seat, should be designed to accommodate pilots from 5’2” to 6’0” in height. Pilots within this range should be able to see and, where necessary, reach and operate all of the displays.
b. Procedures .
(1) For rotorcraft certified for VFR operation, the flight, navigation, and powerplant instruments should be placed such that the pilot and copilot, if a required crewmember, can easily see and read these instruments when seated normally.
Additionally, the instruments should be located so that the necessity for the pilot to turn his head is minimized. The instruments which are necessary for safe operation including the airspeed indicator, gyroscopic direction indicator, gyroscopic bank-and-pitch indicator, slip-skid indicator, altimeter, rate-of-climb indicator, rotor tachometers, and the indicator most representative of engine power should be installed immediately in front of the pilot.
(2) The other powerplant instrument s should be grouped together and visible to any appropriate crewmember. On multiengine rotorcraft, there should be no confusion regarding which engine an individual gauge represents. This is usually accomplished by mounting the engine gauges vertically in the center of the instrument panel. Identical gauges are placed next to each other and positioned from left to right in the same position and sequence as the corresponding engine location in the airframe.
(3) An evaluation should determine that vibration of the instrument panel does not exceed the tolerances of the instruments. The instrument manufacturer will usually provide data that indicate the level of vibration for which the instrument has been qualified. The flight test evaluation of the rotorcraft should explore and determine that the vibration of the instrument panel does not affect the readability of the instruments.
To meet these two criteria, it has been necessary in some installations to “shock mount” or otherwise isolate the instrument panel.
(4) The flight test evaluation should al so determine that the flags or malfunction indicators of the instruments should be readily visible in all combinations of lighting for approved kinds of operations.
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(5) For IFR-certified rotorcraft, ther e is an additional requirement that the airspeed, altimeter, attitude, and compass instrument be located in a standard “T” configuration in front of the pilot. This configuration is:
airspeed - attitude - altitude
compass
(AC 29 Appendix B further addresses IFR panel arrangement.)
(6) Geometric variation from a perfect “T” has been permitted. Each installation should be evaluated for suitability based on criteria such as panel size, ease of scan, and readability of the individual elements in the overall presentation. Advisory Circular 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems, provides additional guidance for “glass cockpit” installation.
AC 29.1322. § 29.1322 (Amendment 29-12) WARNING, CAUTION, AND ADVISORY LIGHTS.
a. Explanation .
(1) Cockpit devices are color coded to symbolically represent various functions and varying levels of importance for flight crew operation. From early times, an attempt has been made to take full advantage of associations developed early in life as a result of continuous exposure to our daily environment.
(2) Military design specifications were the first to reference color-coding in cockpit design requirements. In the mid-1940s, the CAA initiated the first color-coding requirements for civil cockpit design. Color-coding standards for cockpit visual signals soon followed. MIL-STD-411, May 31, 1957, identified three separate categories of light signals:
(i) Warning Light - indicates the existence of a hazardous condition which may require immediate corrective action.
(ii) Caution Light - serves to alert the operator to an impending dangerous condition requiring attention but not essential equipment, or attracts attention for routine purposes.
(iii) Advisory Light - indicates safe or normal configuration, condition of performance, or operation of essential equipment, or attracts attention for routine purposes.
(3) Examples of warning and caution si gnals were included in later versions of the military standard, and a few of those are shown below:
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Warning Signals Caution Signals
Cabin Pressure Failure Trim Failure Fire Fuel Low Fuel System Failure Generator Inoperative Landing Gear Unsafe Defrosting Failure
(4) Specific color designation for civ il advisory lights was first addressed in Amendment 3 to the Rotorcraft Certification Rules (Parts 27 and 29) on January 19, 1968, with adoption of new §§ 27.1322 and 29.1322.
(5) In subsequent revision (Amendment 29-12), green lights were redesignated and additional colors introduced for flexibility in the requirement.
(6) Green signifies a safe operating c ondition and more specifically has come to signify landing gear extended and locked. Extensive use of green annunciators throughout the cockpit should generally be avoided due to possible confusion with the special use of green for landing gear. If green annunciators are physically and functionally removed from the landing gear operation, they may be found acceptable for a variety of “safe operating” applications. One such application is “all green for approach,” used in autopilot, flight director, and other navigation system displays.
(7) Other colors may be utilized as advisory lights in accordance with § 29.1322(d). Red and amber must not be used as advisory lights due to the possibility of introducing confusion into the cockpit. Obviously, yellow and pink annunciators should be avoided due to their similarity to amber and red. White and blue have been successfully utilized as advisory segments in past civil designs.
(8) The primary test for designation of color is:
(i) Red - Is immediate action required:
(ii) Amber - Is pilot acti on (other than immediate) required?
(iii) Green - Is safe operation indi cated, and is the indication sufficiently distinct to prevent confusion with the landing gear down indication?
(iv) Other advisory lights - Is the meaning clear and distinct enough to prevent confusion with other annunciators? Do the colors which are utilized differ sufficiently from the colors specified in paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3) above?
(9) Annunciator lights should be visible dur ing bright daylight conditions. This should include visibility in direct sunlight unless lights are located in such a manner that direct sunlight cannot impinge on them.
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(10) If dimming capability is provided, all annunciators, including master warning and caution, may be dimmable so long as the annunciation is clearly discernible for night operation at the lower lighting level. Undimmed annunciations have been found unacceptable for night operation due to disruption of cockpit vision at the high intensity. The dimming circuit should automatically revert to the high intensity setting when power is removed. Automatic dimming/brightening through the use of a photo cell is also acceptable, as are circuits which enable a dimming switch through a position light or other cockpit lighting controls.
(11) The use of flashing lights should be minimized. If a flashing feature is used, it should be controllable through pilot action so that flashing annunciation does not persist indefinitely. The indicator should be so designed that if it is energized and the flasher device fails, the light will illuminate and burn steadily.
(12) The activation of caution and wa rning lights should readily attract the attention of the appropriate crewmember while performing duties under both normal and high workload conditions.
b. Procedures .
(1) Red shall be reserved for annuncia tion of emergency conditions requiring immediate corrective action. Typical examples include fire, transmission oil pressure, engine failure, and battery overheat. The use of red for annunciators which do not require immediate action must be avoided. Use of red when it is not needed tends to lessen the impact of a red annunciator and the needed pilot association for immediate action. In evaluating cockpit annunciators for acceptability, the FAA/AUTHORITY should assure all annunciators which require immediate action are red and that only those requiring such action are red. If a master warning light is provided, it should be red, and should be powered by the same signal that powers any of the individual red warning signals. An aural warning may accompany visual warning signals to enhance pilot response. Care should be taken that any aural signal is sufficiently distinct from other aural warnings, such as low rotor RPM, to prevent confusion and to assure proper crew response. A means to deactivate and reset the master warning (visual and aural) is required. Resetting the master warning must not deactivate any individual warning signal.
(2) Amber shall be reserved for indi cating malfunction or failure conditions which do not require immediate crew action to assure safe flight. Typical examples include door unlatched, inverter failure, generator failure, fuel filter clogged, and parking brake engaged. Amber should generally be utilized for malfunction and failure conditions which do not require immediate action. The key word here is “require.”
Obviously, a pilot should perform corrective action for malfunction or failure conditions in a timely manner as soon as other cockpit priorities allow. The time increment associated with “immediate action” may vary with the system involved, the flight regime, and the aircraft; however, 15 seconds is a representative value in evaluating this term.
This by no means indicates that any red annunciator can be ignored for 15 seconds.
Page F - 47 For red annunciators, some type of immediate pilot response is expected. If immediate pilot action is not required, the FAA/AUTHORITY should recommend the use of an amber designation. If a master caution light is provided in addition to a master warning light, the master caution annunciator should be amber, and should be powered by the same signal that powers any of the individual amber caution signals. Reset considerations for the master caution are the same as those detailed above for the master warning.
c. Annunciator Panel Design
(1) Explanation .
(i) The annunciator panel design should be reviewed for the presence of failure modes that can cause illumination of multiple panel segments.
(ii) Many test circuits that are diode isolated are vulnerable to this condition. A typical sequence begins with the shorting of a test circuit diode. This failure is undetectable and goes unnoticed until an actual failure condition occurs which causes the associated panel segment to illuminate. At this time all panel segments connected to the test circuit will illuminate.
(iii) This configuration becomes a special problem when one or more of the panel segments are red. A red light calls for immediate action by the crew, and the crew does not have adequate information for immediate action when many false panel segments are illuminated.
(iv) If the design review indicate s a problem, a redesign of the panel to eliminate the condition is considered to be the best solution and is highly encouraged.
(2) Procedures .
(i) An alternative to panel redesign might be the following:
(A) Review the annunciator panel design and note which segments are red.
(B) Determine if cross reference in formation is available in the cockpit to allow elimination from consideration of any the red segments. (Example: Red low fuel pressure light and low fuel pressure gauge. Normal operation of the gauge would be a reason to assume the light did not cause the problem.)
(C) Where a cross reference is av ailable, further design review of that function is not necessary; however, it may be appropriate to include procedural information in the emergency procedures section of the rotorcraft flight manual.