20020409035729I

(.23) Notified by o'Hare city operations of the following incident: an American airlines Fokker-100, N1411G, flight 1949, blew four main landing gear tires during landing on runway 09R at approximately 08:53 am on the 9 April 02. The aircraft landed on runway 09R the dump lifters and thrust reversers did not deploy, the brakes were applied and all four main landing gear tires blew. Passengers and crew aboard the aircraft were deplaned through the forward entry door via mobile stairs and bussed to the terminal no injuries were reported. When inspector raupp, oliver and hill arrived on the scene the PIC terry burlingame (201427826) and f/o john caturia (474605767) were not at the aircraft. The damaged aircraft and logbook were inspected. During our initial investigation, we discovered that the anti-skid system had been placarded on (04-09-02) per MEL (32-2, 4-138D0-C) on logbook page number (7051072). Photographs were taken of the logbook placard, aircraft's final location on runway 09R, and condition of the left and right landing gear tires. After completing our aircraft inspection we observed tire debris and two sets of tire skid marks aligned with the aircraft at M-3 and "f" taxiway markers. Runway 9R was closed at approximately 08:53 am, the aircraft was towed and 9R reopened at approximately 11:48 am on 9 apr. 02. Inspector raupp, oliver, and hill went to aala operations to get statements from the PIC and f/o both declined and stated they would include their statements in the aviation safety action program (asap) report. Inspector raupp contacted robert talmadge poi for aala to request crew history and captains report and all available information concerning this incident. The information requested from aala was received on 15 April 2002 along with an operational synopsis from aala t.j. ahern vice president safety, security and environmental which stated flight 1949 departed msp with the anti-skid placarded inoperative. The captain was flying. The flight landed at ord on runway 09R. The touchdown was normal and in the touchdown zone. The lift dumpers and thrust reversers did not deploy. The brakes were applied in accordance with the F100 operating manual. The brakes appeared to lock up and a skid developed. The aircraft came to a stop near the M6 intersection on runway 09R. Investigation revealed all four tires were deflated. Passengers were deplaned normally through the forward entry door via mobile stairs and bussed to the aala terminal. After reviewing the aala synopsis a follow-up investigation was performed to obtain information on status of the discrepancies noted in the aala synopsis. Contacted aala maintenance manager laudicina who provided copies of logbook pages (7081073 thru 7081075) which identified discrepancies, completed corrective actions and required ops checks for the anti-skid, blown tires/wheels, with one exception, there was no discrepancy on the thrust reversers failure to deploy. At that time maintenance manager laudicina ran a maintenance history on this aircraft to determine if a thrust reverser problem had been reported since this incident occurred. No discrepancy was found which identified a problem with the operation of the thrust reversers. In conclusion this investigation identified some critical issues which clearly have been left unanswered. It appears from our investigation that this aircraft could have touched down long on runway 09R based on the tire markings on the runway, the crew was aware that the anti-skid system was inop. Based on the placarding and the logbook entry but failed to apply the correct braking procedure for an aircraft with an inop. Anti-skid system. The dump lifter system was never activated based on the fact that no faults were identified when system was ops checked. The thrust reverser system was never activated on landing roll based on the fact that no discrepance was ever identified to maintenance or in the maintenance history. Each of the above issues are critical to determining if an aircraft system problem exist or an aircrew training problem exist. After examining the incident scene and gathering all available date each of the issues above could not be fully addressed because the crew declined to give statements to the investigating asi's by evoking the aviation safety action program (asap). Many of the holes in this investigation could have easily been filled had all the information been available to the investigating ASI. This investigation is closed. No further action is required by this ASI.