CEN25LA074

During the takeoff roll, the airplane accelerated through the decision speed (V1) of 96 kts and rotation speed (Vr) of 103 kts but did not rotate, although the pilot applied full aft deflection of the control yoke. At an airspeed of 120 kts, the pilot performed a rejected takeoff with maximum braking and full reverse thrust. The airplane departed the end of the runway and continued into the grass beyond the runway, pivoting to the left before coming to a stop. The crew and passengers exited the airplane and were met by airport personnel. The pilot provided conflicting statements as to whether the airplane accelerated normally during the takeoff roll or more slowly than expected. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of any pre-accident flight control or engine anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Weather around the time of the accident included light snow. The pilot stated that she performed a standard preflight inspection of the airplane and noted only liquid on the wings. However, airport surveillance video showed accumulated snow on the wings as the pilot and copilot walked to the airplane, and snow was falling while the passengers loaded the airplane. Airport personnel brushed snow from the wings three times over a span of about 11 minutes, but contamination was still visible on the wings when the airplane began taxiing, and the ramp pavement was wet. After the airplane taxied from the ramp, the snowfall rate appeared to increase, and about 20 minutes passed from the last time snow was brushed from the wings to when the airplane started its takeoff roll. The pilot reported the airplane’s takeoff weight was about 15,700 lbs, which was also the maximum takeoff weight for the airplane. Using weights and seating positions provided by a passenger, the airplane’s takeoff weight was about 16,502 lbs, and the center of gravity was near the forward limit. Thus, the airplane’s takeoff weight was likely outside of the operating envelope. The airplane’s overweight condition and contaminated wings would have negatively affected its takeoff performance, and likely resulted in the airplane not rotating at the pilot’s calculated rotation speed. The wet runway surface also likely increased the airplane’s stopping distance during the pilot’s rejected takeoff above the decision speed. The airplane required two flight crewmembers and was not certified for single-pilot operations. The pilot, who was acting as pilot-in-command (PIC), required a second-in-command (SIC) to exercise the privileges of her certificate and was not qualified to act as a single-pilot PIC in the airplane. Additionally, the copilot did not meet the requirements to act as SIC or PIC. Thus, neither pilot possessed the proper pilot ratings and qualifications for the flight.

FAA AC 120-62 (Takeoff Safety Training Aid) states, “V1 is the maximum speed by which a rejected takeoff must be initiated to assure that a safe stop can be completed within the remaining runway, or runway and stopway.” The airplane was managed by Metroplex Flight Services (MFS), Fort Worth, Texas. According to MFS, the airplane was being operated by one of the passengers under a lease agreement. The lessee/passenger was the owner of another airplane managed by MFS; however, his airplane was unavailable for the flight due to maintenance. MFS stated that, upon request, they will assist with trip and service coordination, but the ultimate responsibility is with the lessee. According to the lease agreement, the lessee “shall select and hire its own flight crew provided that the pilots shall be professionally trained and qualified, shall be familiar with and licensed to operate the aircraft, and shall have current medical certificates, and recurrent training.” However, according to the lessee/passenger, MFS handled arranging pilots, maintenance, hangars, and billing. He stated that when arranging a flight, MFS would arrange the pilots, and he would show up at the scheduled time. Additionally, the lessee/passenger stated that MFS would only ask for the number of passengers and would not ask for the passengers’ weights or the weight of baggage. The airplane required two crewmembers and was not certified for single-pilot operations. According to the pilot, she used the standard average passenger weight within the ForeFlight application for weight and balance calculations. According to ForeFlight’s website, standard weights are 205, 184, and 87 lbs for male, female, and child passengers, respectively. Including the flight crew, there were five males, four females, and one child on board. Using the ForeFlight standard weights, the total weight for all occupants was 1,848 lbs. The pilot stated that about 130 lbs of luggage was loaded into the rear baggage compartment, and 110 lbs of luggage was loaded into the nose compartment. She stated that the weight of the bags was determined by the “heaviness” of each bag. No statements made by the flight crew or passengers indicated that a scale was used to determine the weight of the bags or passengers. After the accident, a passenger provided weights and seating positions to the investigation. According to the passenger, in addition to the pilot-reported baggage in the nose and rear compartments, there was luggage inside the airplane cabin totaling about 100 lbs. The passenger also stated three dogs were on board, weighing about 240 lbs combined. The passenger’s reported weight of the pilots, passengers, dogs and baggage totaled 2,154 lbs. The pilot’s calculated payload was 1,285 lbs. The pilot stated that there was 5,000 lbs of fuel on board. According to the airplane manufacturer, the airplane’s maximum takeoff weight is 15,900 lbs, and its maximum ramp weight is 16,100 lbs. Based on all available information,the airplane’s ramp weight was about 16,702 lbs. According to the airplane manufacturer, a standard weight of 200 lbs of fuel burn for taxi should be used for planning purposes. Thus, the investigation estimated the takeoff weight was about 16,502 lbs, and the arm about 296.5 inches. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no evidence of any pre-accident anomalies with the flight controls or engines that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was equipped with two Garmin GTN 750 avionics units capable of recording data. The NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division downloaded these data, which revealed that the airplane achieved an indicated airspeed of 120 kts and a ground speed of 138 kts before the pilot aborted the takeoff (see figure 3). Figure 3. Indicated airspeeds during the accident takeoff roll and rejected takeoff. The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild A-100A cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The device arrived at the NTSB in good condition. The NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division removed the magnetic tape and downloaded its contents normally according to manufacturer procedures. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, each about 30 minutes in duration. None of the recorded audio was pertinent to the investigation, for reasons that could not be determined. The audio was consistent with the CVR being either non-functioning at the time of the accident or overwritten by subsequent events. On December 27, 2024, about 1309 mountain standard time, a Cessna 560 airplane, N753MB, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Stevens Field Airport (PSO), Pagosa Springs, Colorado. The pilot, copilot, 8 passengers, and 3 dogs were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that she was conducting a takeoff on runway 1 with the intended destination of Tulsa Riverside Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma. The pilot initially stated that during the takeoff roll, the airplane accelerated normally to the decision speed (V1) of 96 kts and rotation speed (Vr) of 103 kts, but was unable to rotate with full aft deflection of the control yoke. The pilot later stated that the airplane did not feel like it had enough power and did not seem to accelerate at the correct rate based on the calculated performance data. At an airspeed of 120 kts, the pilot performed a rejected takeoff with maximum braking and full reverse thrust. The airplane departed the end of runway 1 and continued into the grass beyond the runway. The airplane pivoted to the left and came to a stop in the grass. The crew and passengers exited the airplane and were met by airport personnel. Postaccident examination of the airplane by a certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic revealed substantial damage to both wings. According to passengers, when they arrived at the airport, the flight crew loaded the airplane with baggage. All exterior luggagecompartments were filled. A stroller was loaded into the airplane’s lavatory, and a car seat was placed in an empty passenger seat. Additionally, all passengers had a personal bag that was with them at their seats. One passenger stated that the fixed-base operator (FBO) personnel assisted in brushing snow from the wings with a handheld brush because the FBO did not have de-ice capabilities. After snow was cleared from the wings, the airplane taxied out to the runway, sat about 15–17 minutes, then began its takeoff roll. The passenger stated that the takeoff roll seemed longer than normal. He looked forward into the cockpit and saw the pilot pulling on the yoke to lift off and felt the nose start to rise; the pilot then aborted the takeoff. According to the pilot, she only noticed liquid water and no icing or other contamination on the airplane during the preflight inspection. The copilot reported that the airplane had some accumulated dry snow on the wings that was swept off, and, after all the passengers were loaded, the pilot conducted a tactile check of the wings before closing the cabin door. An airport surveillance camera captured the airplane’s arrival, loading, and departure from the ramp. In the video, snow can be seen accumulating on the wings as the pilot and copilot were walking to the airplane. Snow was falling while the passengers were boarding the airplane. Airport personnel brushed snow from the wings three separate times over about 11 minutes, as shown in figure 1. There was no video evidence of the pilot performing a tactile check of the right wing (which was the only wing visible in the video) after the final snow removal from the wings. As the airplane taxied from the ramp, wing contamination was visible and the paved airport surfaces appeared to be wet (figure 2). After the airplane taxied from the ramp, the snowfall rate appeared to increase. In the video, about 20 minutes pass from the last time snow was brushed from the wings to when the airplane started its takeoff roll. Figure 1. Snow being removed from wings by airport personnel (Source: PSO airport surveillance video). Figure 2. Wing contamination visible as airplane taxied from ramp for departure (Source: PSO airport surveillance video). Photographs taken after the accident show accumulated snow on the wings of the airplane. The investigation was unable to obtain the weather conditions at the time of the accident as reported by the PSO automated weather observation system. However, according to an airport employee, at the time of the accident the wind was variable at 4 kts with 1 mile visibility and light snow. The clouds were scattered at 700 ft above ground level (agl) and overcast at 1200 ft agl. The pilot held a CE-500 type rating, which was valid for several models of Cessna Citation airplanes, including the Cessna 560. The type rating included a limitation that, to act as PIC, an SIC was required. That is, the pilot was not qualified to act as a single-pilot PICin the CE-500. According to the pilot, she had never flown with the accident copilot before this trip. The pilot stated that she assumed the copilot had proper training due to his employment at a simulator school. The copilot held no type ratings. The copilot stated that he did not meet the requirements to act as SIC under 14 CFR Part 61.55(b) during the accident flight. Additionally, the copilot stated that the airplane management company did not verify that he was qualified to act as SIC in the airplane, and the pilot was aware that the copilot had no flight experience in the airplane type. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 135-17 (Pilot Guide – Small Aircraft Ground Deicing) states, “Test data indicate that ice, snow, or frost formations having thickness and surface roughness similar to medium or course sandpaper on the leading edge and upper surfaces of a wing can reduce wing lift by as much as 30 percent and increase drag by 40 percent.”