ERA24FA120

The non-instrument-rated private pilot and two passengers departed on the cross-county flight under visual flight rules (VFR) during a period of heavy snow, as reported by witnesses of the accident flight. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain while maneuvering in the vicinity of the airport several minutes after takeoff. A postimpact fire consumed and destroyed most of the airplane, precluding determination of control position settings and instrument readings. Weather observations and satellite imagery indicated that instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the departure airport and its vicinity at the time of the accident, with surface visibilities ranging from 3/4 to 2 statute miles and ceilings around 1,200 ft above ground level (agl). Before the flight, the pilot received a weather briefing from ForeFlight that included an AIRMET warning of IMC in effect at the time of the accident for the departure airport and enroute. Witness accounts described even lower ceilings and visibilities than indicated in official weather reports, with one characterizing the snowfall as “very hard and windy” during the flight’s run-up and for 20 minutes afterward. Another witness stated that the airplane was only aloft for about 3 to 5 minutes; in that time, the airplane was maneuvering in the vicinity of the airport and departure runway. The airplane’s track was not captured by ADS-B data, and no onboard devices that capture digital data were recovered; therefore, the investigation could not determine how the airplane was maneuvering and whether the final impact was due to pilot spatial disorientation. A survey of the accident site revealed a linear debris path terminating in wreckage that was upright and relatively intact, suggesting that the airplane impacted the ground with relatively little energy, consistent with low-speed, controlled flight into terrain. While the airplane was exposed to the potential for airframe icing after removal from the hangar and through the end of the flight, the more imminent and pressing challenge the pilot faced would have been navigating and maintaining aircraft orientation under VFR given the restriction to visibility imposed by the period of heavy snow reported by witnesses. The postimpact fire precluded determination of whether airframe icing contributed to the accident. The pilot’s logbook was not available during the investigation. A flight instructor with whom the pilot had been working to obtain an instrument rating estimated that the pilot had logged 20 hours of instrument flight “under the hood.” Postaccident toxicology testing of specimens obtained from the pilot indicated he had used the sedating antihistamine diphenhydramine, which might have adversely affected his performance or increased his susceptibility to spatial disorientation. However, the diphenhydramine results in his postmortem tissues cannot be used to determine the details of his diphenhydramine use or whether he wassignificantly impaired by diphenhydramine effects at the time of the accident. The pilot’s decision to attempt a VFR flight in IMC with inadequate training and experience was inappropriate regardless of whether he was impaired and attributing that decision to diphenhydramine effects would be implausible.

On February 24, 2024, around 1140 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-32-300, N8963N, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Jackson, Ohio. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The non-instrument-rated private pilot and two passengers departed runway 01 at James A Rhodes Airport (JRO), Jackson, Ohio, at 1136 for a VFR cross-country flight to Haines City, Florida, to pick up a vehicle. According to two witnesses who observed the flight, the airplane departed during a period of heavy snowfall. A witness living on the airport property about three quarters down the length of the field, who was also a flight instructor, reported that the takeoff appeared normal. However, “it was snowing very hard and windy”; due to the restricted visibility and “icy” conditions and at the time; he told his wife to note the time, as he did not feel that the flight would have a good outcome. He stated that the airplane was in the clouds when it reached the end of the 5,201 ft-long runway. He further stated he could barely see the windsock at the time due to heavy snowfall and estimated the visibility to be about 1/2 mile. The second witness, who was outside of his residence about 1/2 mile west of the runway at JRO, reported that the airplane turned left after takeoff and flew so low over his property that, if not for the snow, he could have read the registration number. The airplane continued in a left circle back toward the runway until he could no longer see it because of the snow. Shortly thereafter, he heard the airplane impact the ground. He estimated that the airplane was in the air for a total of 3 to 5 minutes. The airplane came to rest about 1/2 mile from the departure end of runway 01. The wreckage path was on a heading of 270°, and the main wreckage came to rest on a heading of 110°. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that the fuselage and cockpit were mostly consumed by postimpact fire. All flight control surfaces were present in the wreckage. All seats except for the front right seat, which remained attached, were separated from their mounts on the cabin floor due to impact forces. All non-metal seat material, and lap belt and shoulder harness webbing, were consumed by the fire. The instrument panel was fragmented and burned, and no instrument readings were obtained. The throttle, propeller, and mixture controls were reduced to their metal control cable components, and no position settings could be determined. The manual flap selector was found set to the full flap extended position, which was verified at the flap torque tube and control rod on the left side. Both wings displayed compression damage along the leading edges and were separated at the wing roots due to impact forces. Aileron control continuity was confirmed from the control surfaces through overload separations in the control cables to near the aileron drivechain at the control column, where it was separated in overload. The aileron drive chain was fully intact. The vertical stabilizer and stabilator remained attached to the empennage and displayed little deformation except for the right outboard portion of the stabilator, which was bent upward. Rudder and stabilator continuity were confirmed from control surfaces to the forward cabin area. Examination of the engine revealed “Normal Condition” spark plugs when compared to the Champion Aviation Check-a-Plug chart. Borescope examination of the cylinders revealed no anomalies to the cylinder walls, piston faces, or intake and exhaust valves. Crankshaft continuity was confirmed through multiple 360º rotations by rotating the vacuum pump drive and the crankshaft flange. Thumb compression and suction were achieved on all cylinders. All propeller blades exhibited chordwise scoring and leading-edge abrasion. One blade exhibited aft bending, and a second blade exhibited torsional twisting. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s track was not captured by ADS-B data, and no onboard devices that capture digital data were recovered. The reported weather conditions at JRO at 1135 included overcast clouds at 1,200 ft, 1 3/4 miles visibility in light snow, and gusting wind. Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-16 visible data revealed cloudy conditions at the departure airport and enroute. Weather radar imagery depicted bands of light precipitation moving from northwest to southeast across the region. The pilot generated and received a weather briefing from ForeFlight after 0700 that contained forecast for instrument flight rules surface visibilities, likely light snow, and G-AIRMETs Sierra and Zulu. According to the pilot’s flight instructor, the accident pilot had accrued about 20 hours of “flying under the hood” and was working on his instrument rating. The Montgomery County Coroner’s Office performed the pilot’s autopsy. The pilot’s cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries, and the autopsy did not identify significant natural disease. Postmortem toxicological testing of spleen tissue by the Montgomery County Coroner’s Office detected diphenhydramine at 423 ng/g. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Forensic Sciences Laboratory also performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. Diphenhydramine and tadalafil were detected in liver and muscle tissue. Ranitidine was detected in liver tissue; testing of muscle tissue for ranitidine was inconclusive. No blood was available for testing. Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine medication widely available over the counter in multiple sleep aids and cold and allergy products. Diphenhydramine can cause cognitive and psychomotor slowing and drowsiness, and often carries a warning about driving and operating machinery. Diphenhydramine can affect thevestibular system and it is possible that the drug might increase susceptibility to spatial disorientation. The FAA states that pilots should not fly within 60 hours of using diphenhydramine, to allow time for it to be cleared from circulation. Diphenhydramine may undergo significant postmortem redistribution. Tadalafil is a prescription medication commonly used to treat erectile dysfunction, as a sexual enhancement aid, and to treat symptoms of an enlarged prostate. It is also sometimes used to treat other conditions, including pulmonary hypertension. Tadalafil is not typically impairing, although the FAA states that pilots who use it on an as-needed basis should wait 24 hours after use before flying, and that otherwise-qualified pilots who use it daily should undergo a 7-day ground trial before flying, to monitor for side effects. Ranitidine is a stomach acid suppression medication that was available by prescription and over the counter in the United States until 2020, when the US Food and Drug Administration requested manufacturers withdraw all ranitidine products from the market due to concerns about a contaminant that increases cancer risk. Ranitidine is not generally considered impairing.