ERA24LA012

The pilot performed a visual approach to the runway in calm wind conditions with the flaps extended halfway (approach flaps). Flight track information indicated that the airplane was fast crossing the runway displaced threshold, and touched down with about 4,000 ft of runway remaining at a speed about 135 knots (kts), which was 19 kts above the highest published approach speed for the airplane’s gross weight at the time of landing. The pilot reported that, after touchdown, he moved the power levers into the ground fine position to help slow the airplane, but he did not feel the “normal deceleration.” He applied the brakes and then “stood on the brakes,” adding that he did not feel the tires sliding, then applied maximum reverse thrust in an attempt to bring the airplane to a stop on the runway. The airplane rolled past the departure end of the runway, onto a displaced threshold, and then into the engineered material arresting system past the departure end of the runway. During the runway excursion, the nose landing gear wheel assembly separated and the right engine was displaced from its normal position. Postaccident examination revealed that one tire on each main landing gear exhibited flat-spotting through the tread, consistent with a sliding tire. Although the pilot commanded the propeller blade angle to move less than the flight idle low pitch stop setting during the landing roll, the propeller blades could not move to this position until the airplane slowed to about 100 kts or less, which did not occur until the airplane was more than 3,400 ft down the 5,000-ft-long runway. At speeds above 100 kts, the propeller was governed by the constant speed unit, which will not allow the pilot to command ground fine or reverse thrust settings. Thus, there were no systems failures or malfunctions that prevented movement of the propeller blades to ground fine or reverse. The application of full reverse thrust when the airplane was likely greater than 100 kts indicated airspeed likely further increased the required stopping distance by adding engine power and thrust in the forward direction. The added forward thrust, combined with the flat-spotting of several tires during the landing roll, likely cumulatively increased the required landing roll distance, resulting in insufficient runway remaining to avoid a runway overrun.

The airplane was equipped with avionics that could record and retain flight and engine data; however, a secure digital (SD) card was not in the appropriate slot of any of the avionics. Therefore, flight and engine data were not available for the accident flight. The airplane was also equipped with five-blade, constant speed, full feathering and reversing propellers. The Flight Manual Supplement associated with the propeller installation specified that there was no change to the constant speed propeller governor or constant speed unit (CSU), and the performance was equal to or better than the baseline airplane. According to the propeller manufacturer, with the propeller levers full forward, the propeller would still be controlled by the governor to about 100 kts indicated airspeed (KIAS). According to the airplane Pilot’s Operating Handbook and Federal Aviation Administration Approved Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM), as part of the normal landing checklist, the propeller levers were to be placed full forward. After touchdown, the power levers were to be lifted and moved aft into the ground fine position, which would provide optimum deceleration by taking advantage of the maximum available propeller drag. The systems description of the POH/AFM indicated that at touchdown, with activation of the low pitch stop solenoid by the right squat switch, propeller blade angle can only move from the flight idle low pitch stop setting to the ground idle low pitch stop setting when the propeller is no longer controlled by the governor or CSU and when there is movement of the power lever from Flight Idle to Ground Fine. The pilot indicated that the airplane’s landing weight was 10,836 lbs. The POH/AFM published Vref speeds at 11,000 pounds for a 3° approach with flaps down and up were 93 kts and 116 kts, respectively. There was no landing distance chart for the approach flaps setting. A review of over 90 days of an electronic flight log, which included the accident flight, revealed no comments regarding propeller blade angle below flight idle. Excluding the accident flight, the accident pilot was listed as flight crew on 28 of the 29 flights. He later stated that he had not experienced any landing sequence anomaly associated with the ground fine propeller setting during any of the previous landings. Runway 21L was about 6,000 ft long and equipped with a displaced threshold, making about 5,000 ft of landing distance available. EMAS was installed past the departure end of the runway. On October 18, 2023, about 1511 eastern daylight time, a Beech 300, N93GA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Atlanta, Georgia. The airline transport pilot and one passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The pilot reported that, during the approach for landing, the airplane’s speed was 162 knots (kts) at 500 ft above ground level, which was above the speed for full flapextension. The pilot then chose to perform a normal half-flaps landing. He later reported that he was following a jet on final approach and was flying a slightly high approach path with partial flaps, anticipating a potential go-around. He stated that the airplane touched down “slightly long,” but he felt he had plenty of runway on which to stop. Review of flight track information revealed that the airplane crossed the runway displaced threshold at a calibrated airspeed of 150 knots (kts), which was 30 kts faster than the conservative no-flaps landing approach speed reported by the pilot (120 kts) and 34 kts faster than the published no-flap approach speed for the airplane’s weight. The airplane touched down about 1,000 ft past the displaced threshold at 135 kts calibrated airspeed. The pilot reported that, after touchdown, he moved each power lever to the ground fine position, but he did not hear the normal propeller pitch sound change nor detect deceleration. He applied the brakes, then “stood on the toe brakes” and applied maximum reverse. He later stated that it was not normal to select reverse when landing in the accident airplane. Review of flight track and aircraft performance data indicated that the airplane did not slow to 100 kts calibrated airspeed until slightly more than 3,400 ft down the runway, with only about 1,600 ft of runway remaining. The pilot was unable to stop the airplane before rolling past the departure end of the runway onto the displaced threshold and then into an engineered material arresting system (EMAS) at a groundspeed about 40 kts. The airplane came to rest in the EMAS in a nose-low attitude. Aviation surface observation reports taken about 18 minutes before the accident and 42 minutes after the accident reported in part, calm wind, and a variable wind at 5 knots, respectively. A one-minute wind report taken at the time of the accident reported wind from 330° magnetic at 1 knot. Postaccident examination of the airplane, which was not equipped with a brake antiskid system, revealed that all main landing gear tires were deflated, and the outer tire on each main landing gear exhibited flat-spotting through the tread. The nose landing gear wheel and tire assembly with fork and axle assembly and attached lower knee was separated from the nose landing gear and found in proximity to the main wreckage. The right engine assembly was displaced down with structural damage behind/at the firewall noted.