FTW98LA004

NTSB accident investigation · North American Harvard MK IV · Midland, TX · October 4, 1997

Accident · No injuriesLimited investigationFinal report
Date
October 3, 1997, 19:16 local (Oct 4, 1997, 00:16 UTC)
Place
Midland, TX
Injuries
4 uninjured
Phase of flight
Landing
Aircraft
N13595North American Harvard MK IVN3195GNorth American SNJ-5
Weather
Visual (VMC) · Day
Status
Completed · report November 10, 1998
Report
Approved by Office Director
Case key
20443

From the NTSB’s public API. By law, NTSB reports can’t be used as evidence in lawsuits over the accident.

On this page

Probable cause

the failure of the pilots of both airplanes to maintain clearance from each other. A factor was their failure to follow procedures/directives.

the failure of the pilots of both airplanes to maintain clearance from each other. A factor was their failure to follow procedures/directives.

Sequence of events

NTSB’s coding before 2008: each occurrence and phase of flight, and the causes and factors under it. The codes are defined in NTSB’s coding manual.

Collision between aircraft (other than midair)Landing - roll
Clearance - not maintainedPilot in commandCause
Clearance - not maintainedPilot of other aircraftCause
Procedures/directives - not followedPilot in commandFactor
Procedures/directives - not followedPilot of other aircraftFactor
Collision between aircraft (other than midair)Landing - roll
Clearance - not maintainedPilot in commandCause
Clearance - not maintainedPilot of other aircraftCause
Procedures/directives - not followedPilot in commandFactor
Procedures/directives - not followedPilot of other aircraftFactor

Analysis

During the landing roll of a formation flight of four North American T-6 airplanes, the lead aircraft, N13595, intended to clear the runway to the left at taxiway Mike instead of at the end of the runway. The pilot of the lead aircraft reported that he looked back to the left to check for the location of the #2 aircraft, N3195G. 'Number-two appeared to be one hundred and fifty yards back and slowing (it appeared number-two's tail was down in three point attitude).' As he proceeded to turn left to exit the runway, he looked back again and 'saw number-two was too close and coming fast.' He applied full power and made a right turn to the right side of the runway. The pilot of the #2 aircraft, reported that when the lead aircraft disappeared from his view, he 'went hard on the brakes' and headed towards the left edge of the runway. The right wing of aircraft #2 struck the vertical stabilizer of the lead aircraft. According to the Confederate Air Force, they teach in their Formation Flight Safety Seminars that during formation/staggered landings, the formation is to exit at the end of the runway. They also teach that there will be no passing of aircraft during the landing.

During the landing roll of a formation flight of four North American T-6 airplanes, the lead aircraft, N13595, intended to clear the runway to the left at taxiway Mike instead of at the end of the runway. The pilot of the lead aircraft reported that he looked back to the left to check for the location of the #2 aircraft, N3195G. 'Number-two appeared to be one hundred and fifty yards back and slowing (it appeared number-two's tail was down in three point attitude).' As he proceeded to turn left to exit the runway, he looked back again and 'saw number-two was too close and coming fast.' He applied full power and made a right turn to the right side of the runway. The pilot of the #2 aircraft, reported that when the lead aircraft disappeared from his view, he 'went hard on the brakes' and headed towards the left edge of the runway. The right wing of aircraft #2 struck the vertical stabilizer of the lead aircraft. According to the Confederate Air Force, they teach in their Formation Flight Safety Seminars that during formation/staggered landings, the formation is to exit at the end of the runway. They also teach that there will be no passing of aircraft during the landing.

Factual narrative

See narrative for FTW-98-LA-004A.

On October 3, 1997, at 1916 central daylight time, a North American Harvard MK IV, N13595, lead airplane in a formation flight of four, collided with a North American SNJ-5, N3195G, number two in the formation, during landing roll on runway 34L at the Midland International Airport, Midland, Texas. Both aircraft were registered to the American Airpower Heritage Flying Museum, dba the Confederate Air Force. The North American SNJ-5 was being operated by the Confederate Air Force's Southern Minnesota Wing, of St. Paul, Minnesota, and the North American Harvard MK IV was being operated by the Confederate Air Force's Golden Gate Wing, of Oakland, California. Both aircraft were substantially damaged, and the pilot and passenger of each aircraft were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the Title 14 CFR Part 91 local formation flight. The formation flight of four North American "T-6" airplanes were on a photo mission that originated from the Midland International Airport, about 46 minutes before the accident.

The pilot of the lead aircraft, N13595, reported in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report that the flight had returned to the Midland International Airport for landing. During the landing roll on runway 34L, he intended to clear the runway to the left at taxiway Mike. He looked back to the left and turned the aircraft to the left slightly to check for the location of aircraft #2, N3195G. "Number-two appeared to be one hundred and fifty yards back and slowing (it appeared number-two's tail was down in three point attitude)." The pilot stated that the radio was congested, "but I thought I heard number-two was clear or is clear." As he proceeded to turn left to exit the runway, he looked back to reconfirm the position of aircraft #2 and "saw number-two was too close and coming fast." He added full power and made a right turn to the right side of the runway. The right wing of aircraft #2, N3195G, struck the vertical stabilizer of the lead aircraft, N13595.

The pilot of the lead aircraft, further reported in the Operator/Owner Safety Recommendation section of the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, that this accident could have been prevented by rolling to the end of the runway to exit, and to keep the spacing between the other aircraft "at all costs."

A review of the Midland International air traffic control tower voice tape by the NTSB investigator-in-charge revealed that there was a radio transmission from an unidentified person requesting a "wind check." The air traffic controller replied, " wind zero six zero at four." Another unidentified person stated about the time the formation flight was landing, "land long....(unintelligible)."

The pilot of the #2 aircraft, N3195G, reported in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report that the lead aircraft, N13595, had landed well down the runway on the right half, and he landed the #2 aircraft on the left half of the runway prior to the runway 10/28 intersection. "When lead's tail came down, I selected power to idle and my tail came down about 2-3 seconds later." During the landing roll he could "see about the right 2/3ds of lead's airplane by looking out the right side of my airplane," and the spacing and position "looked good." At one point the lead aircraft disappeared from his view and he "went hard on the brakes" and headed towards the left edge of the runway. When the lead aircraft came back into his view, the aircraft was centered on the left half of the runway facing about 60 degrees right of runway heading. "I could hear lead apply a whole bunch of power as he moved to my right, and my right wing then struck his tail." Both aircraft were taxied from the runway to parking.

The pilot of the #2 aircraft further reported in the Operator/Owner Safety Recommendation section of the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report that this accident could have been prevented "through adherence to standard operating procedures."

Examination of both aircraft by the FAA inspector revealed that the lead aircraft, N13595, had its vertical stabilizer and rudder sheared off at the empennage, and its left wing tip sustained damage. The #2 aircraft, N3195G, sustained damage to the right wing's leading edge and lower surface including the aileron.

According to the Confederate Air Force, they teach in their Formation Flight Safety Seminars, that during formation/staggered landings, the formation is to exit at the end of the runway. The only exception is when the landing is on a long runway, and the early exit is briefed. They also teach that there will be no passing of aircraft during the landing. If a pilot determines that he is going to pass an aircraft, he is to execute a go-around.

Aircraft · 2

Registration
N13595
Reported as
North American Harvard MK IV (HARVARD MK)
Category
Airplane
Serial number
CCF-4-97
Airframe hours
8,526
Engine
P&W R-1340-AN1, 600 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Part 91
Operator
Confederate Air Force, doing business as Southern Minnesota Wing
Registered owner
Amer Airpwr Heritage Fly Museu
Airworthiness certificate
Special, Experimental (Special)
Last inspection
Annual · May 3, 1997 · 40 hours before
Departed
MAF
Airport
MAF · Midland International, runway 34L, 9,501 × 150 ft, asphalt

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Registration
N3195G
Reported as
North American SNJ-5
Category
Airplane
Serial number
51697
Airframe hours
60,326
Engine
P&W R-1340-AN1, 600 horsepower, reciprocating
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Part 91
Operator
Confederate Air Force, doing business as Golden Gate Wing
Registered owner
Amer Airpwr Heritage Fly Museu
Airworthiness certificate
Standard, Normal
Departed
MAF
Airport
MAF · Midland International, runway 34L, 9,501 × 150 ft, asphalt

Matched to the registry by N-number and the event date; the registry’s history has gaps, so older matches can be wrong. Compare the reported make and model.

Flight crew · 2

As NTSB recorded them. NTSB leaves out names.

Role
Pilot, aircraft N13595
Age
48
Certificates
Private, Flight instructor, Airline transport, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--w/ waivers/lim
Seat
Front
Flight hours
9,655 total · 186 in this make and model · 3,296 as pilot in command · 157 in the last 90 days · 28 in the last 30 days
Role
Pilot, aircraft N3195G
Age
32
Certificates
Airline transport, Flight instructor, Commercial
Airplane ratings
Single-engine land, Multi-engine land
Instrument ratings
Airplane
Medical
Class 1, Valid Medical--no waivers/lim.
Seat
Front
Flight hours
3,874 total · 67 in this make and model · 3,534 as pilot in command · 124 in the last 90 days · 59 in the last 30 days · 1 in the last 24 hours

Weather

Conditions
Visual (VMC) · Day
Wind
60° at 9 knots
Visibility
10 statute miles
Lowest ceiling
11,000 ft broken
Temperature
73 °F, dew point 64 °F
Altimeter
29.00 inHg
Observed at
MAF

FAA reports on this event · 2

The FAA’s own accident and incident reports, matched to the aircraft by N-number and date.