SEA96LA121

The passenger held a commercial pilot certificate, but did not have a current medical certificate. According to him, the non-certificated pilot/owner was attempting a touch-and-go landing, when they were both distracted by a call from the pilot of another aircraft which was on an instrument approach to the same airport. Neither the passenger nor the pilot/owner realized the gear was not down until the tail of the aircraft contacted the asphalt runway. The aircraft then slid to a stop on its belly. Although the pilot/owner claimed the passenger was the pilot-in-command, the passenger said he did not realize the pilot/owner did not hold a pilot certificate until advised of that situation after the accident; he said that he would not have flown with the pilot/owner had he been aware of this fact. The aircraft had not been certificated as airworthy, per annual inspection, within the previous 12 months.

On June 9, 1996, at approximately 2100 Pacific daylight time, N2145D, a Beech 35, sustained substantial damage in a wheels-up landing at Aurora State Airport, Aurora, Oregon. The aircraft was being operated under 14 CFR 91 on a local flight out of Aurora. The non-certificated pilot (who owned the aircraft but had not registered it to his name since purchasing it in approximately January 1994) and a pilot-rated passenger (who holds a commercial pilot certificate but did not hold a current medical certificate at the time of the accident) were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight plan had been filed.

In a telephone interview with an FAA inspector in the Hillsboro, Oregon, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), the pilot/owner stated that his passenger was acting as pilot-in-command and was flying the aircraft at the time of the accident. However, the passenger stated to investigators that he was not flying the aircraft at the time of the accident, and that he had been unaware that the pilot/owner of the aircraft did not hold a pilot certificate. He said that he would not have flown with the pilot/owner if he had known the pilot/owner did not have a license. The passenger also stated that he did not touch the aircraft controls "except to save my life when I realize[d] the gear was retracted on touchdown." The pilot/owner indicated on his accident report that he occupied the left seat, with the pilot-rated passenger in the right seat of the aircraft.

Both occupants stated to the FAA inspector that while in the traffic pattern, their attention was diverted while searching for another aircraft which called inbound to Aurora on an instrument approach and reported being at their altitude. The passenger stated that the gear was initially down and that the pilot/owner raised the gear during the search for the other aircraft. The pilot/owner stated that he thought the passenger "cycled the landing gear twice" before the accident. The passenger, who also is a Bonanza owner and has logged about 2,500 hours of pilot time, said that as the pilot/owner began the landing flare he could tell by the speed and pitch attitude that the gear had not been extended. He said that when the tail touched, he reached forward and pulled back on the yoke in order to cushion the contact with the runway. The aircraft then slid to a stop on the runway on its belly. According to the passenger, he did not realize the pilot/owner did not hold a pilot certificate until he was advised of that situation after the accident. No problems were found in the aircraft's gear extension system, and neither occupant claimed that there had been any malfunction.

According to copies of the aircraft logbook, the aircraft's last annual inspection, dated April 15, 1996 at 3,452.0 tachometer hours, was signed off as: "This aircraft has been inspected IAW an annual inspection and a list of discrepancies dated 1-2-96 has been provided to the aircraft owner." The logbook entry indicated that per FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 62-08-03, cracks were found but no further action was taken. This AD mandates inspection of certain type control wheels for cracks every 100 hours in service or 12 calendar months, and specifies that if cracks are found, the control wheels are to be replaced before further flight. Although a subsequent aircraft logbook entry, dated May 24, 1996 at 3,455 tachometer hours, indicated that a "loaner dual control yoke" had been installed by Flightcraft, Inc. of Portland, Oregon, no further evidence was provided to indicate that the aircraft had been signed off as airworthy, based on annual inspection, within the 12 months prior to the accident.