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f. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
(1) General: The Instructions for C ontinued Airworthiness (ICA) should contain the information necessary for carrying out ongoing maintenance and inspections on NVIS equipment installed in the rotorcraft. Refer to Paragraph AC 29.1529, AC 29 Appendix A, and RTCA DO-275, Section 5.0, for detailed instructions and procedures.
As a minimum, the following should be included:
(i) Appliance, System or Accessory Maintenance Manual, or Section.
(ii) Maintenance Instruct ions and Inspection Requirements.
(iii) Airworthiness Limitations.
(iv) Illustrated Parts Breakdown .
The ICA’s should cover (as a minimum) aircraft transparencies (windscreen, windows, etc), NVIS lighting, NVG, and any additional aircraft equipment that support NVIS operations.
NOTE 8: We recommend the operator have a storage location or compartment on the aircraft to protect the continued airworthiness of the NVGs. However, you are prohibited from storing the NVGs in a location that could cause damage to the aircraft or aircraft component, hinder crashworthiness, or result in loss of the intended function of a component.
(2) Modifications
(i) Post-TC or STC Approved Modifications.
Any subsequent aircraft modifications (internal or external), including operational equipment (FLIR, emergency medical service (EMS) equipment, etc.) involving a light emitting or reflecting device should be re-assessed against the original requirements for the NVIS certification.
(ii) Multiple Type Certificate (TC) or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Approvals.
If the approval is granted for multiple aircraft, installation and production procedures should be provided to ensure all aircraft comply with the type design. This information should be provided in the initial certification data package, so that the FAA knows it is intended for multiple approvals. The production procedures should be sufficiently detailed to detect minor differences between the different aircraft. It is expected that post-production tests will include the ground and flight tests described above for each aircraft.
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(iii) Supplementary Type Certif icate verbiage: The following STC verbiage was developed to help with f(2)(i) and f(2)(ii) above:
“Any deviation from the cockpit or cabin configuration specified in this STC Type Design may affect the compatibility of the Night Vision Imagining System (NVIS) and may require a re-evaluation for NVG compatibility. Once the aircraft is modified with this STC any future modifications to the aircraft may also affect the compatibility of the NVIS and may require a re-evaluation for NVG compatibility.
g. NVG to NVG Helmet Interface. Th is paragraph provides guidance on NVG to helmet mounts. TSO-C164 establishes the certification standards for NVGs used for civil operations. The NVG to Helmet interface should meet the standards found in RTCA DO-275, section 2.4.4.1. through 2.4.4.3, which are summarized below
(1) Mount. The NVG assembly should be used with a helmet designed for NVG use. The mount should have a quick detach mechanism. The NVG assembly or mount and NVG assembly that allows the pilot to detach the NVGs from the helmet or head mount quickly using only one hand. The mounting system should permit onehanded (either hand with equal facility) operation of adjustments. The NVG battery pack is often attached to the back of the helmet acting as a counterweight. The attachment should be secure and strong enough to keep the battery pack in place but meet any breakaway requirements. If the NVG system does not have an external battery pack used as counterweight, the counterweight should be securely attached and meet any breakaway requirements.
If you are considering using a NVG heads trap, check to ensure it provides the stability and comfort required for extended wear. Additionally, the NVG mount should meet the characteristics discussed in the previous and following paragraph.
(2) Mount and NVG Interface. All m ount and NVG interfaces should operate without damage or degradation of performance. If the NVG assembly has both a stowed position (away from operator’s forward field of vision) and an operating position, then the NVG assembly should lock in place for each position. If the NVG assembly has a stowed position, then the image intensifier tubes should not be powered when the NVG assembly is in the stowed position, unless it otherwise can be demonstrated that normal performance can be maintained. In addition, when the NVG assembly is restored to its operating position from the stowed position, then the NVG assembly should maintain its original positional adjustments prior to stowage.
(3) Automatic Breakaway. Unless safe loads during a crash is demonstrated, an automatic breakaway system should be incorporated as part of the mount.
Automatic breakaway should not occur during normal flight maneuvers. See RTCA/DO-275, section 2.4.4. for more information.
You can find an NVIS Evaluation Check List at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/rotorcraft/nvis
CHAPTER 3
AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS
TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
MISCELLANEOUS GUIDANCE (MG)
AC 29 MG 17. (reserved for future use) Page MG 17 - 1
CHAPTER 3
AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS
TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
MISCELLANEOUS GUIDANCE (MG)
AC 29 MG 18 HELICOPTER TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM (HTAWS)
a. Background
(1) General. Approximately 60% of helicopter accidents in recent years have been attributed to Helicopter Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) incidents, resulting in hull loss and fatalities. The original Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) was first introduced on helicopters in 1997. The GPWS is a computer-based system that provides the flight crew with alert (both aural and visual) of pending collision of the aircraft with the terrain, considering such items as crew recognition and reaction times.
(2) The helicopter GPWS has since been upgraded to “HTAWS” that incorporates a terrain and obstacle database with GPS vertical and horizontal position to provide enhanced terrain and obstacle awareness. The enhanced awareness is achieved by employing a look-ahead function that provides cautions, warnings, and terrain and obstacle display(s).
(3) TSO-C151b . Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C151b, Terrain Awareness and Warning System, prescribes the minimum performance standards that a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) must meet to be identified with the TSO- C151b Class A or Class B marking. The requirements contained in TSO-151b were developed for airplanes and many of the operational modes are not appropriate for helicopter installation. The recommended changes to the TSO requirements for a system to be installed in a helicopter are presented in paragraph s of this guidance.
These additional performance considerations should be complied with for helicopter installations.
Note: The issuance of a Technical Standard Order Authorization (TSOA) against TSO/JTSO- C151b (or further amendments) does not constitute an installation approval.
b. Purpose. This guidance material describes an acceptable means for obtaining FAA/AUTHORITY airworthiness approval for the installation of a Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS). This information provides guidance for the design and installation for an HTAWS for helicopters. The guidance provided is specific to installations of these systems on helicopters certificated under FAR/JAR 29. It describes the airworthiness considerations for such installations as they apply to the unique features of the HTAWS and the interface of the HTAWS with other systems on the helicopter. The HTAWS certification should address the complete process, from source and integrity of the database to the required sensors and their effect on operational credit for the installation. There are five basic aspects for certification for Page MG 18 - 1
AC 29-2C, Chg 2 4/25/06 HTAWS that are discussed throughout this document: equipment qualification, installation, credit validation, testing considerations, and Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).
c. Related Regulations and Documents
(1) Regulations. FAR/JAR:
§ 29.1301 Function and installation § 29.1303 Flight and navigation instruments § 29.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations § 29.1321 Arrangement and visibility § 29.1322 Warning, caution, and advisory lights § 29.1351 Electrical systems and equipment—General § 29.1357 Circuit protective devices § 29.1381 Instrument lights § 29.1459 Flight recorders § 29.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness § 29.1541 Markings and placards—General § 29.1581 Flight manual—General § 29.1585 Operating procedures
(2) Advisory Circulars (AC), Orders, and Technical Standard Orders TSO/JTSO TSO-C92c, Ground Proximity Warning/Glide slope Deviation Alerting Equipment:
Technical Standards Authorization, Part 37.201 TSO C-151b, Terrain Awareness and Warning System
(3) Industry documents. The Radi o Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) documents listed below are available from RTCA, Inc., 1140 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 1020, Washington, D.C. 20036-4001; DO-160D, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.
DO-161A, Minimum Performance Standards - Airborne Ground Proximity Warning Equipment.
DO-200A, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data.
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754, Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems.
d. Definitions
(1) Alerts: A visual or aural stimulus presented either to attract attention or to convey information regarding system status or condition, or both.
HTAWS Alerts:
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Aural Alert: A discrete sound, tone, or verbal statement used to annunciate a condition, situation, or event.
Visual Alert: The use of projected or displayed information to present a condition, situation, or event to the flight crew.
Caution Alert: An alert requiring flight crew awareness. Subsequent corrective action will normally be necessary.
Warning Alert: An alert for a detected terrain or obstacle threat that requires immediate flight crew attention and decision.
(2) Class (A) HTAWS Equipment: This class of equipment provides Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA), and a display capability, as defined in paragraphs e and j.
(3) Class (B) HTAWS Equipment: This class of equipment provides FLTA, as defined in paragraph e and j.
(4) Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT): An accident or incident in which the aircraft, under the flight crew's control, is inadvertently flown into terrain, obstacles, or water.
(5) Failure: The inability of the equipment or any subpart of that equipment to perform its intended function within previously specified limits.
(6) False Alert: A warning or caution that occurs when the design terrain or obstacle warning or caution threshold of the system is not exceeded.
(7) Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA): An HTAWS functional requirement to provide look-ahead terrain and obstacle protection along and below the aircraft’s lateral and vertical flight path.
(8) Hazard: A state or set of conditions that, together with other conditions in the environment, could result in an adverse safety impact.
(9) Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI): An incorrect depiction of the terrain or obstacle threat relative to the aircraft during an alert condition (excluding source data).
(10) Integrity: Attribute or reliability of a system or a component that can be relied upon to function as required by the criticality determined by the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA).
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AC 29-2C, Chg 2 4/25/06
(11) Low Altitude Mode: A reduced warning algorithm state that allows operation at less than en route altitudes with minimal alerts.
(12) Maneuver: An appropriate change in the flight path of the aircraft initiated by the flight crew in response to an HTAWS alert to include climbs, descents (inappropriate for most situations), and turning procedures.
(13) Nuisance Alert: An alert that occurs when there is no threat or is unnecessary for the intended operation.
(14) Obstacle: A human-made structure that is in the flight path of the aircraft.
( 15) Operational Credit: To give approv al for an HTAWS installation that adds to, replaces, or intervenes in the aircraft’s operating requirements or operational procedures based on the installation and operation of the HTAWS system.
(16) QFE : Corrected Barometric Altitude relative to field elevation.
(17) QNH: Corrected Barometric Altitude relative to sea level.
(18) Required Terrain Clearance (RTC): The minimum requirements for obstacle or terrain clearance as defined by United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) FAA Order 8260.3B and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM).
(19) Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS): A generic term used to describe an alerting system that provides the flight crew with sufficient information and time to detect potentially hazardous terrain or obstacle.
(20) Terrain Awareness Display (TAD): A display of the surrounding terrain and obstacle(s) relative to the aircraft.
(21) Terrain Database: Terrain and obstacle information stored within an HTAWS.
(22) Time-shared Display: A disp lay that shows terrain and obstacle information, plus additional information from other systems [e.g., an Electric Flight Instrument System/Navigation Display/Multi-Function Display (EFIS/ND/MFD)].
e. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
HTAWS is intended to provide flight crews with aural and visual alert aids aimed at preventing a CFIT accident by providing increased terrain and obstacle awareness.
Like airplane TAWS, as described in TSO-151b, HTAWS equipment may be divided into two classes of complexity which, in general, may relate to aircraft size or complexity.
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(1) Class (A) HTAWS equipment.
(i) Class (A) HTAWS equipment provides two principal alerting functions.
These are:
(A) Forward-Looking Terrain-Avoi dance (FLTA) function, which includes:
• Reduced required terrain clearance.
• Imminent terrain or obstacle impact.
(B) Basic Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) functions, which includes:
• Excessive rates of descent. (Optional)
• Excessive closure rate to terrain.
• Excessive altitude loss after takeoff.
• Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration.
• Excessive downward deviation from ILS glidepath.
(ii) Although the installation of a HTAWS is not currently required by operational rules for helicopters, to be consistent with TSO151b requirements the Class (A) HTAWS should include a display that meets the requirements of paragraph j. The terrain and obstacle display and threat alerting are made possible by the HTAWS’ acceptance of a variety of input parameters. These parameters are used in conjunction with a terrain, obstacle and airport database(s) that reside within the HTAWS computer.
The Class (A) HTAWS places an aircraft position symbol on a terrain and obstacle map and applies terrain display algorithms. Terrain and obstacle mapping information may be provided on either a weather radar (WX) display, Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) display, or other compatible display screens. The display of HTAWS information on an MFD that also serves other purposes should be displayed in a heading up or track up orientation, not in a North up orientation to avoid confusion. See paragraph l for prioritization of alerts.
(iii) Aircraft position information should be provided by a Global Positioning System (GPS or GPS-based equivalent) that meets the provisions specified in paragraph h (Position Source).
(iv) Class (A) HTAWS equipment may provide automatic autorotation detection when Excessive Descent Rate warning functions are included. A detected autorotation state should inhibit Excessive Rate Warnings and other warnings that may Page MG 18 - 5
AC 29-2C, Chg 2 4/25/06 distract a flight crew during an emergency procedure. Altitude advisories and gear (not extended) warning may be added during this autorotation state if desired. The altitude for the optional gear warning should be based on the specific helicopter autorotation rate of descent and gear extension time to insure gear down prior to the landing.
(v) Class (A) HTAWS equipment should provide a Low Altitude Mode to allow VFR operations at less than en route altitudes with minimal nuisance alerts.
(2) Class (B) HTAWS equipment.
(i) Class (B) HTAWS equipment provides two principal alerting functions.
These are:
• Imminent terrain or obstacle impact
• Excessive altitude loss after takeoff
(ii) Class (B) HTAWS does not require a display. If a display is installed with a Class (B) HTAWS, it should meet the provisions of paragraph j (Display Presentation).
(iii) Class (B) HTAWS equipment is required to interface with an approved GPS (or GPS-based equivalent) for horizontal position information that meets the provisions specified in paragraph h (Position Source).
(iv) Class (B) HTAWS does not require an interface to a radar altimeter.
(v) Class (B) HTAWS equipment should provide a Low Altitude Mode to allow VFR operations at less than en route altitudes with minimal alerts.
f. Airworthiness Considerations
(1) The scope of the applicant’s program should be directed toward airworthiness approval through the Type Certification (TC), Amended Type Certification (ATC), or Supplemental Type Certification (STC) processes. The significant differences between the airplane (TAWS) and helicopter (HTAWS) systems and the lack of specific TSO requirements for the helicopter system necessitate greater engineering and flight test involvement than normally provided during the field approval process. The applicant must identify if the changes made to the helicopter during installation of the HTAWS constitute a significant (engineering) change. However, the installation of the HTAWS alone should not require application of the Changed Product Rule, § 21.101.
(2) The remainder of this document de scribes in detail specific airworthiness considerations that applicants should consider as part of the certification process.
g. Certification Requirements:
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(1) General. For first time approvals, the manufacturer or applicant should provide detailed systems description and design features that can be verified by certification engineers and project pilots. Flight-testing should concentrate on the adequacy of the interface, basic functionality of the system, location and visibility of the display, adequacy of the visual and aural alerts, day and night lighting, ease of use, understanding of the terrain and obstacle display, and potential interference with other installed equipment. In general, each mode of operation of the system should be evaluated in flight.
(2) System Safety Assessment. The applicant should perform a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and System Safety Assessment (SSA) to establish the HTAWS criticality and hazards associated with the proposed installation. The reliability level of the system must be commensurate with the assessed criticality, and compliance with this criticality level must be demonstrated during certification. These assessments should consider the probability of such failures as: unannunciated failures, false caution or warning alerts due to undetected (or latent) failures, failure of the system to provide the required alerting functions due to undetected (or latent) failures, effects of HTAWS failures on other aircraft systems, nuisance alerts, etc.
(3) Software Qualification. The so ftware for the HTAWS should be developed in accordance with RTCA DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, or an FAA/AUTHORITY-accepted equivalent. The most significant aspects of the enhanced features are the terrain and obstacle database stored in the HTAWS computer and the algorithms used by the HTAWS computer.
Coupled with this are the evasive maneuvers that will be employed to avoid terrain and obstacle. Regardless of the findings of the above System Safety Assessment, software for the HTAWS should be developed as a minimum to DO-178B level C. The software level will be commensurate with the failure condition category determined during the safety assessment process. This analysis should include unannunciated failure or malfunction (false warning) of the HTAWS aural or visual warnings.
(4) Environmental Qualification. Sinc e the TSO is not an installation approval, the HTAWS installation should be shown to be suitable to its airborne environment. A desirable way to qualify the system component is to obtain approval to the appropriate TSO; however, if the TSO environmental considerations do not adequately represent the actual installation environment, the differences must be considered and evaluated.
If the equipment is not TSO-approved, it should be shown through testing that it complies with the requirements of SAE Document AS-8034, for the display and latest revision of RTCA Document DO-160, and other appropriate standards at the time of qualification of the equipment. This will include testing in accordance with the appropriate categories of the latest revision of RTCA Document DO-160, JEDEC Publication No. 64D (Protection from Ionizing Radiation).
(5) System Performance Validation. The applicant should demonstrate that the performance of the HTAWS, with regards to the position of the aircraft relative to the Page MG 18 - 7
AC 29-2C, Chg 2 4/25/06 terrain or obstacle, is adequate to preclude creation of a hazardously misleading situation. The integrity of the navigation source has a significant effect on acceptable performance of the system. The applicant should demonstrate that the performance of the HTAWS navigation source is suitable for each phase of flight (en route, terminal, approach, and low altitude mode) for which approval is sought. The HTAWS navigation source may be the same as the primary navigation system for the aircraft.
(6) Database Considerations. Since 6 arc-second terrain data currently are not available for all regions of the world, it may be years before a complete database is developed. It may be impossible to perform 100 percent verification of the accuracy of the terrain database. There currently are no specific FAA/AUTHORITY certification standards for airborne terrain and obstacle databases; therefore, the completeness and integrity of those available databases may vary significantly. To ensure no erroneous data could result in misleading information, the HTAWS system operating software should be developed in accordance with RTCA DO-178B, or an FAA/AUTHORITY accepted equivalent. The applicant should present and verify the process by which the database is developed and the methodology used to validate the database. The applicant should demonstrate that the accuracy and resolution of the database is suitable for the intended operation. The DO-200A, Standard for Processing Aeronautical Data or equivalent must be used as a guideline.
(7) Alerts. Alerts should be clear, concise, and unambiguous. If there is a failure mode where the display may be inoperative but the HTAWS is operative or vice versa, some type of annunciation of the failure mode should be provided to the flight crew; e.g. “HTAWS display inop”, “HTAWS inop”, etc. This annunciation should be clear, unambiguous, and distinguishable from other failures. The alerting system should be consistent with the basic alerting philosophy of the GPWS.
(8) Displays. The current state of th e art of HTAWS may make use of existing aircraft display systems such as the weather radar, or Multiple Function Display (MFD);
therefore, implementation of the HTAWS presentation requires the integration with existing display systems. The use of the HTAWS display must not unacceptably detract from the usability of existing functions. Refer to paragraph j for Display Presentation Considerations.
h. Position Source. HTAWS uses the estimated position, based on GPS, of the aircraft with reference to the terrain or obstacle to determine when an alert should be annunciated. The applicant should provide evidence that the HTAWS position source (horizontal and vertical) is suitable for each phase of flight (i.e., en route, terminal, low alt mode, and approach, for which approval is sought).
(1) Horizontal and Vertical Position Source.
(i) HTAWS that interface with previously approved navigation systems:
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(A) Class (A) equipment may use approved Area Navigation (RNAV), which should include GPS which complies with (D) below.
(B) Class (B) equipment is required to interface with an approved GPS for horizontal and vertical position, which complies with (D) below.
(C) Previously approved RNA V and GPS systems that are used for navigation are considered suitable for HTAWS horizontal and vertical position inputs, if they comply with (D) below.
(D) GPS equipment must meet the requirements of TSO-C129a and provide 95% horizontal and vertical position accuracy figure of merit (FOM or DOP) estimates, in accordance with ARINC-743A.
( E ) If a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is used as a position source, it should meet TSO C-145a and comply with the FOM requirements of (D) above.
(F) HTAWS functions that require a navigation source for operations should be automatically disabled when the source has degraded to a point where its accuracy can no longer support the HTAWS functions. An aural and visual annunciation of this loss of function is required except for specific failures where a visual annunciation has been demonstrated to be acceptable.
(ii) HTAWS equipment with internal GPS position source: Class (A) and Class (B) equipment that uses a GPS internal to the HTAWS for horizontal and vertical position information, must use a GPS that complies with (i)(D) above.
(iii) The HTAWS should be capable of detecting a positional error that exceeds 0.25 NM, which is considered unsuitable for the HTAWS, and the functions that require GPS for operations should be automatically disabled and an aural and visual annunciation provided. An exception to this requirement will be made for specific failures where visual annunciations have been demonstrated to be acceptable. The applicant should be able to demonstrate that the HTAWS, as installed on the helicopter, provides the required position information accuracy (latitude/longitude and altitude) for the HTAWS functions.
(2) Vertical Position Aiding. The following sources are considered suitable for use in aiding vertical position. They may be used in combination, if the appropriate accuracy is demonstrated. The applicant should be able to demonstrate that the HTAWS, as installed on the aircraft, provides the appropriate vertical information for the HTAWS functions. Where operations are reliant on the use of QFE, an adequate means of determining the altitude should be provided. Geometric altitude should be enabled if the system has the capability.
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