AC 29-2C

Change 2Historical

Advisory circular · Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft

A newer version is currentThis is a historical version. AC 29-2C CHG 9 is the version in force, approved June 23, 2023.
Approved
April 25, 2006
Last reviewed
December 4, 2008
Family
AC 29-2 · 13 versions
Revision
C, change 2
14 CFR parts
29

Guidance, not mandatory unless a rule or AD requires it. DRS record last changed November 22, 2025.

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COMPARE

FIGURE AC 29 MG 15-2. Flow chart for application of HUMS specific software with a ground base that uses COTS software for operational software.

( 1 ) COTS . This type of software can only be accepted by subjective considerations, such as service history, independent verification means, and design of the system to limit access to the operational COTS software to make changes. The independent means of verification activity is required due to the use of COTS software.

(2) HUMS Specific Software . This software should be developed to the integrity level required by the system criticality assessment using RTCA/DO-178 as the

HUMS GROUND APPLICATION FOR SOFTWARE WITH COTS

Ground COTS Hardware Final HUMS Ground Application DO178B Software Level Ground COTS Software Independent Verification Means DO178B Software Level for HUMS Application (If applicable) Criticality Category Determination through a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 1309 Integrity Requirements Software – DO178B Level Determination HUMS Results Data Out-Put Independent Verification Means HUMS Results Data Out-Put

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Page MG 15 - 12 standard. This system determined level should be a result of the end-to-end criticality assessment and, in general, the same as the airborne software. Use of mitigating actions is dependent on constraints stated in paragraph f(1)(ii).

(E) Data Processing . Data processing equipment and software should have the capacity to process the amount of data required. It should not introduce errors or provide out of specification accuracy for any parameter. The speed of processing should not be limited, by the hardware or software, to an unacceptable rate. The acceptability of speed will depend on the amount of data to be processed and the specified performance for HUMS data processing. The speed should be reasonable to accomplish data processing in a reasonable time for the particular HUMS application.

Hazardous/Severe Major or Major criticality applications that contain COTS should be part of a dedicated system or demonstrate adequate protection for the higher level processing from anything else processed on the same equipment. Subject to a favorable comparison to the required independent verification means, Minor criticality applications need not be part of a dedicated system.

(F) Display and Peripheral Equipment . The display, for most cases, may be a part of the processing equipment or closely interface with it. It must be compatible with other parts of the system and provide a clear usable presentation.

(G) Data Communications . Network applications, modem interfaces, and other system sharing and transmission features may be utilized for integrity levels associated with Major and Minor criticality categories, provided that the independent verification means covers the use of these features. Integrity levels associated with Hazardous/Severe Major criticality categories may utilize these features only if sufficient protection can be shown to assure that this level of integrity is maintained throughout any foreseeable failure/malfunction or mistake in any associated application, in addition to required independent verification means.

g. Credit Validation . HUMS applications for which credits are sought must be validated. For each application, evidence shall be provided that the physics involved is understood and therefore that the monitoring technique/algorithm/parameter, rejection criteria, and associated intervention actions are well chosen. The designer of the component/equipment to be monitored is the most logical choice for this determination.

However, in some cases the source can be from any organization as long as the validation criteria herein can be satisfied. If changes are proposed to an approved system, re-evaluation is required to ensure existing credit(s) are not invalidated. The degree of effort will vary and depend on the application type, the credit sought, and the consequences of failure or any other malfunction. The validation process would generally need to include the following:

• Description of application and associated credit.

• Understanding of the physics involved.

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• Validation methodology.

• Introduction to service.

• Continued airworthiness (synthesis).

NOTE: Early notification to the regulatory Authority of the credit type and the proposed method for validation is recommended.

(1) Description of Application and Associated Credit .

(i) There are many types of HUMS credits with different levels of criticality. Some may be the introduction of new maintenance practices, in place of the established maintenance practices, and others may be the introduction of additional safeguards for safety where all standard practices are retained.

(ii) It is important to fully ev aluate and describe the proposed credit and the worst effect on the rotorcraft should the application fail or malfunction. This evaluation is needed to determine the system criticality, the system installation integrity requirements, and the depth and scope of the credit validation effort.

(2) Understanding the Physics Involved .

(i) The mechanisms of failure and/or degradations associated with the requested credit should be understood. This includes how a failure occurs and/or at what rate the degradation progresses and a determination of the point where intervention action is necessary. For some complex applications, this may include supporting information from validated analytical tools such as finite element analysis and fracture mechanics.

(ii) These understandings should be used to determine the four important characteristics of a HUMS application.

(A) The technique to be used.

(B) The appropriate alert limit s, including trending where appropriate.

(C) The appropriate intervention action.

(D) How often to monitor to give optimum opportunity for the intervention action to be effective.

(iii) This should also recognize the different characteristics of the failure/degradation and determine when trending or a step function is most appropriate.

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(3) Validation Methodology . All HUMS applications should have their validation process based on suitably representative physical data. This process may use direct or indirect evidence, or a combination of the two, depending upon the credit type and the criticality on the aircraft of any HUMS failure or malfunction.

(i) Direct Evidence .

(A) When the HUMS application is classified as Hazardous/Severe Major, then direct evidence must be gathered. Examples of where this might be the most appropriate method include maintenance tasks such as vibration checks for imbalance/misalignment of high energy rotating equipment, fatigue life counting, or going "on-condition" for flight critical assemblies.

(B) Direct evidence is required fo r establishing that the HUMS application is sensitive to and obeys predicted response rules for the damage type, giving consistent alerts. This evidence may be gathered from several sources as follows:

( 1 ) Actual service experience on HUMS equipped aircraft,

( 2 ) "Seeded tests" (where the wear, defec t, or deterioration is introduced, allowed to develop, and the technique response verified), and

( 3 ) On- aircraft trials, investigati ng cause and effect (for example, introducing degrees of imbalance and calibrating the techniques response).

(C) Tests should be representative of the aircraft for which the credit is being sought and of test conditions representing the flight regime that would prevail when data is normally gathered (e.g., cruise). It should be established that the evidence gathered from on-aircraft ground trials or rig based seeded tests is valid in flight.

(ii) Indirect Evidence .

(A) When the HUMS application is cla ssified as "Major" or lower, indirect evidence may be gathered. Criteria for this approach includes a criticality determination of Major or lower and either or both; application to "on-condition" maintenance actions, and/or lowering the probability of undetected failures. Monitoring of a high number of potential failure modes can collectively determine the probability of undetected failures.

Here, it may not be practicable to generate direct evidence for each failure.

(B) Proven analytical methods may be combined with sound engineering judgment to provide calculated/derived criteria; tests can be performed to validate these criteria. Model based analytical methods for predicting damage progression (e.g., finite element analysis and fracture mechanics) may allow for a validation by claiming analogy with 'direct' evidence generated for other aircraft types or equipment. However, to more

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Page MG 15 - 15 fully validate this analogous data set, a degree of direct evidence for the actual equipment being monitored is still likely to be necessary to prove similarity of application. This might be achieved by performing an appropriate number of seeded defect tests and, in effect, "sampling" the range of failure types contained.

NOTE: For both direct and indirect evidence, the whole system must be validated endto-end.

(4) Controlled Introduction to Service .

(i) For some credit applications, full validation and implementation may be possible during the development period. However, for many HUMS techniques, a plan for a controlled introduction to service may be necessary to fully validate the credit.

(ii) There must be provisions in t he certification process to instruct the continued airworthiness effort to ensure compliance with the aforementioned plan.

(iii) During the implementation of this plan, data is accumulated by operational aircraft, and from this data, refinements and adjustments to the original criteria can be made. This period may also allow a proposed credit to be operated in parallel with alternative or standard procedures when it is necessary to gain additional in-service validation by way of back-to-back comparison

(iv) The plan should include procedures and provisions for this controlled period and should include clear goals by which progress and ultimately termination of this phase can be measured. The plan may include a multi-credit HUMS that will require a phased introduction of credits.

(5) Continued Airworthiness and Synthesis of Credit . Normal and established procedures will prevail for HUMS as for all other continued airworthiness matters.

Arrangements should be made to validate the performance of an approved credit throughout its service use. Provisions should be made to allow for the synthesis of the service experience with relevant engineering evidence from rejected components, development testing, seeded testing, etc. Any necessary or desired modifications to the HUMS application or the component/equipment being monitored must be re-evaluated.

h. Instructions for Continued Airwor thiness (ICA) and Other Requirements for Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS). This section addresses the ICA, operator's HUMS program, HUMS training, and Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) revision to incorporate HUMS.

(1) Instructions fo r Continued Airworthiness. The applicant for HUMS is required to provide ICA developed in accordance with FAR/JAR Part 29 and Appendix A. This section provides supplemental guidance with addressing aspects unique to

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Page MG 15 - 16 HUMS. The applicant may be an airframe manufacturer, HUMS equipment manufacturer, or an operator. The ICA should address HUMS integration with the aircraft. This section addresses both airborne and ground based systems and equipment.

(i) HUMS ICA Items . The applicant must address the following subjects in addition to FAR/JAR Part 29. These subjects should address both airborne and ground based systems and equipment unless specifically indicated otherwise.

(A) Control and operating instructi ons must be provided for each element of HUMS, and where applicable, include data acquisition, transfer processing, display, configuration management, and resulting actions.

(B) Acceptance and rejection criteria and associated actions must be defined.

(C) A procedure is required when the system becomes inoperative because data is missing.

(D) When required, there mu st be a procedure for collecting and transferring HUMS data when the aircraft is away from the main HUMS data processing base.

(E) Provide a procedure for independent verification as defined in paragraph f(3), if applicable.

(F) Provide a procedure for implementing mitigating actions, when mitigating actions are applied.

(G) Provide a procedure for im plementing controlled introduction to service instructions as defined in paragraph g(4), if applicable.

(H) Provide a training pr ogram on HUMS airborne and ground based systems and equipment.

(I) The airworthiness limitation section must be amended to address the following, if required:

( 1 ) Requirements for independent verification and associated procedures.

( 2 ) Requirements for mitigation actions and associated procedures.

( 3 ) Requirements for controlled introduction to service and associated procedures.

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(ii) Ground Based System and Equipment . A procedure must be defined to ensure the security of the ground-based system and equipment and the integrity of the HUMS data.

(2) Owner/Operator's HUMS Program .

(i) General . An owner/operator that installs and utilizes health and usage monitoring equipment on aircraft and intends to request maintenance credit will need a program. This program and revision to existing maintenance and/or inspection programs must be submitted to the aviation Authority for approval. This is due to the fact that maintenance credit may change existing maintenance inspection, overhaul requirements, and/or life limits.

(ii) HUMS Program Items . Regardless of the size and complexity of the health and usage monitoring equipment, the HUMS program must contain the following:

(A) A system must be provided for tracking the HUMS monitored component/system, including identification of component/system, recording requirement, tracking procedure, and other related activities.

(B) A system to assure that a maintenance credit must be maintained.

The historical HUMS data must be traceable when such components/assemblies are transferred between aircraft.

(C) A procedure for new or overhauled HUMS monitored components.

(D) A procedure to address i noperative HUMS in accordance with paragraph j(1)(i)(C).

(E) A means for implementing pr ocedures specified in paragraph j(1)(ii).

(F) A procedure for adjusting maintenance credits.

(G) An organization with clearly defined responsibilities to collect, analyze, and act upon the HUMS data.

(H) A procedure for implementi ng the training program specified in paragraph j(1)(i)(H).

(I) Where appropriate, a proc edure for implementing the controlled introduction to service plan. See section g(4), Controlled Introduction to Service.

(iii) Ground Based System and Equipment .

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(A) A procedure for troubles hooting and testing of the HUMS.

(B) A procedure for revising and using the operator’s Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for HUMS.

(iv) Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL)/Minimum Equipment List.

(A) The MMEL may need to be revised to include the HUMS equipment.

Once the MMEL contains the HUMS equipment, the operator can revise their MEL to include HUMS and submit the MEL to the aviation Authority for approval.

(B) The aviation Authority should coordinate with engineering in evaluating the revised MEL.

NOTE: Any MMEL allowance should be determined considering the criticality of the 'credit' effect resulting from the HUMS application(s). MMEL allowances should be substantiated based on a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA).

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AC Page MG 16 - 1 CHAPTER 3

AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS

TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

MISCELLANEOUS GUIDANCE (MG)

AC 29 MG 16. CERTIFICATION PR OCEDURE FOR ROTORCRAFT NIGHT VISION

IMAGING SYSTEMS (NVIS) LIGHTING EQUIPMENT

a. Background

(1) This guidance is designed to assist in the certification of NVIS internal and external aircraft lighting systems. It covers the two processes involved in NVIS lighting certification:

1. Installation and certification of the NVIS compatible lighting on the aircraft.

2. Certification of the NVIS lighting installation and cockpit compatibility with night vision goggles (NVGs).

Expanded guidance is found in RTCA/DO-275, Minimum Operational Standards for Night Vision Imaging Systems, dated 12 October 2001. Additionally, this guidance is meant for use with NVIS using night vision goggles and does not apply to other night or low visual environment enhancement devices (i.e., forward-looking infrared system (FLIR), enhanced vision system (EVS), etc.). Due to the fundamental effect NVGs have on visual perception and the inherent characteristics of NVIS technology, modifications to the aircraft to make it NVIS-compliant should always be considered a major alteration.

(2) The guidance in this MG is one method to show compliance with 14 CFR Part 29 regarding aircraft lighting modification for NVIS compatibility. The applicant should also be familiar with RTCA/DO-268, Concept of Operations: Night Vision Imaging System for Civil Operators, dated 27 March 2001.

NOTE 1: Aircraft that are intended for NVG operations must go through the NVIS certification process, whether modified or produced by the manufacturer. A night VFR approval does not constitute NVIS certification. In addition, some rotorcraft may not be suitable for NVIS certification due to factors such as cockpit obstructions, inability of pilots to move their heads while wearing NVGs, inability of the cockpit to accommodate a pilot wearing a helmet, etc.

NOTE 2: Certification scheduling should account for moon cycles and sky condition (lighting from starlight only, if possible). Type inspection authorization (TIA) flights should be accomplished in no-moon, clear sky conditions to avoid masking possible low illumination, incompatible lighting effects during the NVIS cockpit and NVG interface evaluations.

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AC 29-2C, Chg 2 4/25/06 Page MG 16 - 2 NOTE 3: Installation of a NVIS lighting system does not authorize the operator to use NVGs. The operator must coordinate with the FAA or Civil Aviation Authority oversight office to obtain operational authorization.

NOTE 4: Operational requirements for use of NVIS/NVG are found in FAA HBAT

04-02.

b. Revisions

(1) This revision focuses the gui dance on NVIS lighting and NVG and NVIS lighting cockpit compatibility. Information on NVG certification is found in TSO-C164.

Additional NVG and helmet interface information is also included in this MG.

(2) NVIS/cockpit evaluation guides/checklists can be found at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/rotorcraft/nvis/.

c. Definitions

(1) Cultural Lighting: Li ght emitted from cities, towns, residences, street lights, or other artificial sources. Cultural lighting may help or hinder the pilot’s external view through NVGs depending on intensity, reflection off cloud cover, landing zone topography, etc.

(2) Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) . Integrates all elements (including the NVG, windshield, lighting system, etc.) required to successfully and safely operate an aircraft with the aid of NVGs.

(3) NVIS Lighting Component is any component intended for use with NVGs that emits or transmits light within the flight deck or other crew compartments, or that is attached to the aircraft exterior, and does not degrade NVG performance.

(4) NVIS Lighting System is an aircraft lighting system that has been modified or designed to incorporate NVIS lighting components. It provides adequate illumination, under day and night conditions, of instruments, displays, and controls for the unaided eye without degrading NVG performance. NVIS lighting systems must meet 14 CFR Part 29 lighting requirements.

(5) NVG Compatible. Aircraft internal and external lighting is NVG compatible if it does not adversely affect the NVG image.

(6) Aided flight is flight using NVGs to aid visual flight.

(7) Unaided flight is flight without NVGs or with the NVGs in a non-operational position.

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AC Page MG 16 - 3

(8) Transparencies: Windows, chin bubbles, overhead windows that the crew uses to look outside the aircraft.

d. Procedures

(1) General. One method to show compliance is outlined in this AC and includes evaluation of the NVIS lighting system and cockpit through both day, night ground, night aided, and night unaided flight evaluations.

(2) References:

(i) Regulatory

Section Section

29.1 29.1383

29.21 29.1385

29.141c 29.1387

29.561 29.1389

29.771 29.1391

29.773 29.1393

29.777 29.1395

29.779 29.1397

29.785 29.1399

29.803 29.1401

29.811 29.1413

29.812 29.1501

29.853 29.1523

29.1301 29.1525

29.1303 29.1529

29.1305 29.1541

29.1307 29.1543

29.1309 29.1545

29.1321 29.1549

29.1322 29.1553

29.1331a(3) 29.1555

29.1333 29.1557

29.1351 29.1561

29.1355 29.1581

29.1357 29.1583

29.1359 29.1585

29.1381

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(iii) Other References

Ref Document Title TSO-C4C Bank and Pitch Indicators TSO-C8D Vertical Speed Indicators TSO-C67 Radar Altimeters TSO-C164 Night Vision Goggles AC 25-11 Electronic Displays AC 20-152 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware AC 20-74 External Lighting AC 20-88 Instrument Markings and Limits RTCA DO-268 Concept of Operations, Night Vision Imaging Systems for Civil Operators RTCA DO-275 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for the Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment SAE ARP 4754 Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems SAE ARP 4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the System Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment

(3) Certification Basis. The NVIS design must comply with the aircraft certification basis. The use of NVIS is a new type of operation, which requires special considerations. The same aircraft design can be certified for other types of operation, such as Category A, Day visual flight rules (VFR), Night VFR, and instrument flight rules (IFR). The certification basis (reference 14 CFR § 29.1) of the aircraft must be appropriate for all certified types of operation, and may require adoption of later amendment levels of 14 CFR Part 27 or special conditions.

NOTE 5: NVIS operations in conjunction with Category A takeoffs and landings are beyond the scope of this section. Other special flying operations, such as agricultural or external loads, will require special considerations, and coordination with an operational specialist may be required to determine the scope of the certification evaluation.

(4) Additional NV IS equipment and components.

(i) Due to the limitations of NVGs , some additions to the crew station in the form of instruments or controls might be necessary to accomplish a successful NVG certification. Some examples of additional instruments (added to a night VFR only certified aircraft) are attitude indicator(s), vertical speed indicator(s), radar (radio) altimeter(s), generator or alternator of adequate capacity, and two-way radio communication equipment. For further detail on the need for these instruments, refer to RTCA DO-268.

( ii) NVG compatibility with the NVIS lighting and cockpit configuration will be assessed using NVGs meeting TSO-C164 requirements. NVG compatibility will also