ERA22FA368

The non-instrument-rated pilot was in cruise flight when he advised the air traffic controller that he was looking at his cockpit weather radar display and requested a deviation between what he described as a gap between radar echoes. The airplane subsequently transitioned through echoes consistent with areas of light, moderate, heavy, and then extreme precipitation before track data depicted a steep, descending right turn that continued until contact with the airplane was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. The damage to the airplane and the distribution of the wreckage, which was spread over a distance of 0.8 miles, were consistent with an in-flight break-up. Examination of the wreckage revealed fracture surfaces consistent with overstress failure, and no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation of the airplane. The extent of the pilot’s preflight weather planning activities could not be determined, as there was no record of him obtaining weather information from an access-controlled source. Based on his communications with air traffic control, the pilot was aware of the convective activity along his route of flight and was likely using his cockpit Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) weather display for tactical weather avoidance decisions, and not accounting for the latencies inherent to the processes used to create and deliver this imagery to an inflight display.

On August 11, 2022, about 1805 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA32-301, N720RP, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Metz, West Virginia. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to the pilot’s employer, the pilot and the passengers were congregants of the same church, and the flight was a planned day trip to conduct church business in Indiana. The accident occurred on the return flight. Automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) data and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control information revealed that the airplane departed Deck Airport (9D4), Myerstown, Pennsylvania, about 0735 the morning of the accident, and landed at Daviess County Airport (DCY), Washington, Indiana. The airplane subsequently departed DCY on the accident flight at 1543. About 1752, the airplane was in cruise flight at an altitude about 9,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and flying on an easterly heading approximately parallel to and south of a band of light/moderate to extreme precipitation that extended across Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. The pilot contacted the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center controller and indicated that, based on his cockpit NEXRAD display, he was considering a 30-degree left turn to deviate around an area of precipitation. The controller replied, “I’m showing some slight gaps in that, but the whole line off your left-hand side is moderate to heavy with pockets of extreme. So, there may be some slight gaps. I’m just not real sure if they are in fact gaps from your point of view. But whatever you think looks good. Just let me know if you need anything.” The pilot acknowledged. (See Figure 1.) Figure 1 – Airplane track and ATC communications superimposed over NEXRAD images. At 1801:09, the pilot announced a 20-degree left deviation. The controller responded that his display indicated more extreme precipitation just off the airplane’s left wing, with a small gap about 5 miles ahead of the airplane. At 1801:31, the pilot replied, “Yep, that’s what we’re looking for.” There were no further communications from the pilot. At the time of the pilot’s final transmission, the airplane’s ground track had turned slightly north and the airplane had entered an area of light precipitation. The airplane continued the same track about 9,500 ft msl, and over the next 6 miles, transitioned through areas of echoes consistent with light, moderate, heavy, and finally, extreme precipitation. About 1803, the track data depicted a steep, descending, right turn that continued until data was lost. (See Figure 2.) Figure 2. – Airplane track and ATC communications superimposed over NEXRAD images. A search of the FAA contract Automated Flight Service Station provider, Leidos, indicated no contact with the accident pilot on the day of the accident, nor was there any record of the pilot accessingthird-party vendors using the Leidos Flight Service system. A search of ForeFlight indicated no account registered for the accident pilot in their system; however, there was another customer account associated with the accident airplane. Review of National Weather Service (NWS) forecast products revealed a chance of isolated thunderstorms, with a 10 to 20% probability of occurrence over the area around the accident. The NWS had issued several advisories prior to the accident in the form of a center weather advisory and Convective SIGMETs were included for the accident site and surrounding areas. It could not be determined what, if any, weather information the pilot reviewed before or during the flight other than the NEXRAD weather display information that he discussed with the controller while inflight. The FAA Flight Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B) is a free service that automatically broadcasts a wide range of weather products with national and regional focus to equipped aircraft. The FIS-B broadcasts include METARs, PIREPs, NOTAMs, inflight weather advisories, and regional composite NEXRAD imagery, which were recreated for the period surrounding the time of the accident. The FAA website supporting FIS-B notes that the weather information provided are for advisory use for the sole purpose of assisting in long and near-term planning and decision making. In extreme scenarios, the NEXRAD radar data on the display can be up to 15 minutes older than the display’s age indication. This warning is also stated in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 00-24C, “Thunderstorms,” regarding the use of NEXRAD data in the cockpit. Unlike airborne weather avoidance radar, weather data linked from a ground weather surveillance radar system is not real-time information. The radar data displays recent rather than current weather conditions. As the current location of a thunderstorm cell may be different than the broadcast weather product, do not attempt to find a hole in a thunderstorm solely using data-linked weather. Pilots must avoid individual storms by visual sighting or by airborne weather radar. An L-3 (Goodrich) WX-500 Stormscope was installed in the airplane. According to its User’s Guide, “Never use your Stormscope system to attempt to penetrate a thunderstorm. The FAA Advisory Circular, “Thunderstorms,” and the Airman’s Information Manual (AIM) recommend that a pilot “avoid by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as severe or giving an intense radar echo.” The airplane was also equipped with Garmin GNS 430 and GNS 530 integrated GPS, navigation, and communication devices. According to the Garmin 400/500 Series Weather Data Link Pilot’s Guide, “Caution: NEXRAD weather data is to be used for long-range planning purposes only. Due to inherent delays and relative age of the data that can be experienced, NEXRAD weather data cannot be used for short-range avoidance of weather.” The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplanesingle-engine land. He did not hold an instrument rating. The pilot completed the requirements for operation under BasicMed on May 11, 2021. Examination of the pilot’s logbook revealed that the pilot began flying in 2005 and had accrued 387 total hours of flight experience, of which 232 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. Local emergency services personnel located the airplane’s fuselage in hilly, wooded terrain about 1 hour after the accident. The fuselage came to rest inverted with the engine and propeller still attached. The fuselage was crushed uniformly on its right side along its entire length. The wings and the tail section, which included the horizontal stabilizer, elevator, vertical stabilizer, and rudder, were separated from the fuselage and located by emergency personnel and search and rescue volunteers over the following days. The fuselage came to rest in the immediate vicinity of the final flight track, and the wreckage was distributed generally south of the fuselage over about 0.8 miles. The left wing was about 100 yards to the west of the fuselage, and the right wing was about 400 yards southwest. Both wings were separated at their respective roots. The fracture surfaces displayed at each wing and their corresponding wing root at the fuselage were consistent with overstress fracture. Several pieces of aircraft sheet metal were found along the wreckage path, with pieces associated with the tail section located the furthest from the main wreckage. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit through several breaks and cuts consistent with recovery operations, to the flight control surfaces recovered in the debris field. An engine data monitor was removed from the instrument panel and retained for further examination. The right side of the engine was impact damaged. The right rocker box covers (Nos. 1, 3, and 5) were molded around the rocker arms by impact, preventing movement. Once the valve covers were removed, the engine was rotated by hand at the propeller and compression was confirmed on all cylinders using the thumb method. The Nos. 1, 3, and 5 cylinders displayed cracks to the rocker box flange surface or the area between the valves within the cylinder head due to impact. The cooling fins were also damaged on these cylinders. The right magneto was impact-separated from the engine accessory case, but produced spark at all leads when rotated using an electric drill. The left magneto, which was electronic, could not be tested for spark, but remained securely mounted to the accessory case. All spark plugs were found installed to their respective cylinders. The plugs were removed, and the electrodes were undamaged. The vacuum pump remained attached to the accessory case. The pump was removed and disassembled; the rotor and vanes were intact, and the pump spun freely. The propeller governor was securely attached to the engine and removed for examination. The oil screen was present and free of any debris.The governor drive spun freely by hand and oil exited the unit during hand operation. The oil filter was removed, cut open, and inspected. The filter element contained no debris and was unremarkable. The fuel servo was found secured to the engine with both the throttle and mixture cables attached. The servo was removed and disassembled. The inlet screen was free and clear of debris. Both diaphragms were unremarkable. The fuel manifold was securely attached to the top of the engine with no damage noted. The diaphragm was unremarkable. All six injector nozzles were removed and were unobstructed.