ERA24FA292

The student pilot initiated a solo flight to a nearby airport, likely to practice pattern work. Her flight instructor, who characterized her as an outstanding student, was not aware that she was flying that day, and he stated that this lack of coordination was contrary to what he had taught her. Flight track data showed that the pilot entered the traffic pattern on the downwind leg and proceeded to line up on final approach for the 3,799-ft-long runway. About halfway down the runway length, the airplane climbed and immediately turned left to enter the crosswind leg. A witness observed the airplane and reported that he thought that the airplane would not clear the trees in its direct flight path. He also stated that the airplane’s engine was running without hesitation; however, the airplane was “struggling.” The airplane collided with the top of a tree near stall speed (based on the groundspeeds reported in the flight track data), with flaps retracted, then collided with and came to rest against the base of another tree. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Although the student pilot had an instructor endorsement for solo flight, the accident flight was only her second solo flight. Based on the available evidence, had she established an appropriate climb airspeed and altitude on the upwind leg of the traffic pattern before turning crosswind, the accident likely would not have occurred.

According to the Cessna 172N Pilots Operating Handbook, the flaps retracted stall speed at the most rearward center of gravity was 42 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) at 0° bank and 45 KIAS at 30° bank. At the most forward center of gravity, the flaps retracted stall speed was 47 KIAS at 0° bank and 51 KIAS at 30° bank. These speeds assumed an airplane weight of 2,300 lbs (maximum gross weight). On July 4, 2024, about 1010 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172N airplane, N739GV, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lock Haven, Pennsylvania. The student pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. According to flight track data provided by the FAA, the airplane departed from runway 27 at Williamsport Regional Airport (IPT), Williamsport, Pennsylvania, at 0951. The airplane proceeded on a west-southwesterly ground track until it entered an extended left downwind leg for runway 9L at William T. Piper Memorial Airport (LHV), Lock Haven, Pennsylvania. The airplane continued in the left traffic pattern and lined up on final approach to runway 9L. About halfway down the 3,799-ft-long runway, after track data consistent with a touch-and-go landing or low approach, the airplane began a left, climbing turn. During the turn, the airplane’s ground speed slowly increased from 36 to 46 knots. The last recorded radar target showed the airplane on a north-northwesterly ground track at a groundspeed of 46 knots. The figure depicts the airplane’s ground track relative to LHV and the accident site. Figure - Radar track (red line) showing the approach to LHV and the accident location. A witness, who was standing in the Susquehanna River at the time, observed the airplane during the seconds before the accident. He stated that the airplane came toward him at an altitude of about 200 ft. He watched as the airplane made a left turn, and he thought that there was no way that the airplane would make it over the trees. About two seconds after the airplane crossed over the trees, he heard the sounds of an impact. He went to get his phone on the bank of the river and called 911. He also reported the airplane’s engine was “definitely running” and was not “missing,” but he believed that the airplane was “struggling.” An autopsy of the student pilot was performed by the Mount Nittany Medical Center, State College, Pennsylvania, at the request of the Clinton County Coroner. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was thermal injuries (burns), and the manner of death was accident. Postmortem toxicological testing by the FAA Forensic Sciences laboratory was negative for drugs and ethanol. The calculated density altitude at LHV at the time of the accident was about 1,845 ft. The student pilot’s initial solo flight occurred on June 16, 2024, after 21.7 hours of dual instruction. At that time, she logged 0.5 hours of solo flight. The accident flight was her second solo flight,and her pilot logbook included an endorsement from her flight instructor to perform takeoffs and landings at LHV. The student pilot’s flight instructor reported that she was attentive, knowledgeable, and had become an “outstanding” student. He said that her progress during ground and flight training was exceptional. She had no problems that held her back from making solo flights. She had no problems with traffic pattern work, and they had flown at LHV previously. The student pilot had been accepted to an aviation school to eventually become a professional pilot, and the flight instructor expressed that she may have had some anxiety about attaining her private pilot certificate before that program began. He was not aware that she was planning to fly the day of the accident and he did not receive any communication from her regarding the flight. He stated that they had discussed the need to coordinate before flying many times previously. The airplane was registered to the Quarter to Two Flying Club. The club rules for visual flight rules flights included, “Student pilots will not operate aircraft without specific permission from their flight instructor.” The airplane initially contacted the top of a tree before colliding with another tree about 165 ft farther to the west. The wreckage came to rest upright, oriented on a westerly heading at the base of the tree, and most of it was consumed in a postimpact fire. The accident site was about 1/2 mile northeast of LHV. All structural components of the airplane were accounted for at the accident site. Several fragments of tree limbs with diameters up to about 6 inches, and with smooth, angular cuts, were observed within the impact area. One of the cuts displayed dark-colored paint transfer, consistent in color with the paint from the propeller blades. Flight control continuity could not be established due to the extent of thermal and impact damage. The rudder control cables remained attached to the rudder pedal torque tubes and were fractured in a manner consistent with overload, about 18 inches aft of the rudder pedal torque tube attachment points. Portions of the elevator and rudder control cables sustained multiple breaks and became thermally fused to the airframe structure near the main landing gear bulkhead. The elevator push/pull rod below the cockpit floorboard remained connected at each end. It was thermally damaged, with the up-elevator ear bent upward. The up-elevator control cable clevis end remained attached to the cockpit bellcrank; however, the cable was not attached. The down-elevator cable remained attached to the cockpit bellcrank. The aileron balance control cable remained attached at each aileron wing bellcrank and was fracture-separated near the left-wing root. The right aileron bellcrank was thermally separated from the wing. The left aileron wing bellcrank remained attached to the wing structure. The aileron direct control cables remained attached to the aileron wing bellcranks.They were fracture-separated and sustained thermal damage near the forward section of the cockpit. The aileron control cables remained attached to the control chains, which remained wrapped around the control column sprockets. The aileron control cable drum in the cockpit was consumed by fire. The elevator trim actuator in the empennage was measured to be in the neutral position. The flap actuator was thermally damaged and was found in the flaps fully retracted (up) position. The complete right elevator and the outboard elevator attachment portion of the horizontal stabilizer were found suspended in a tree, about 30 ft from the main wreckage. The horizontal stabilizer portion exhibited tree impact signatures. The empennage was also thermally separated from the fuselage. The left horizontal and vertical stabilizer were intact. What appeared to be the entire right wing spar was observed supported between tree forks near the base of the impacted tree and thermally molded to the shape of the tree with all wing ribs and skin burned away. Portions of the left wing were observed thermally damaged within the main wreckage. The left wing was with the main wreckage and sustained thermal damage that consumed a large portion of the wing structure. The fuel finger screens in the wings were observed thermally damaged without debris. The fuel caps were thermally damaged but appeared to be in place. The engine came to rest on its right side and remained partially attached to the airframe through the tubular mount. The engine crankcase was discolored, consistent with exposure to the post-impact fire. The rear-mounted engine accessories were destroyed by fire. After cutting the engine exhaust tubes, the muffler was observed to be unobstructed. After removing the engine from the firewall and suspending it from a lift, it was partially disassembled to facilitate examination. The engine crankshaft was then rotated by turning a tool inserted into the vacuum pump drive pad, and continuity of the crankshaft to the rear gears and to the valvetrain was confirmed. Compression and suction were observed on all four cylinders. The interiors of the cylinders were examined using a lighted borescope and no anomalies were noted. The carburetor remained attached to the engine. The throttle cable remained attached to the carburetor throttle control arm and was bent near the cable rod end. The arm was positioned at the full throttle stop. The mixture control cable remained attached to the carburetor mixture control arm, which was observed in a mid-range position. After the carburetor was removed and partially disassembled, liquid with an odor consistent with aviation gasoline drained from the carburetor fuel inlet hose when the carburetor was tilted. The carburetor bowl was about 1/3 full of blue liquid. No water was observed. No damage to the brass floats or other internal components was observed. The carburetor fuel inlet screen was unobstructed. Both magnetos remained attachedto the engine and were damaged by fire. No spark was produced when the magneto drives were rotated by hand. The distributor block covers of both magnetos were removed and the distributor blocks were observed to be destroyed by fire. The spark plug electrodes exhibited dark gray coloration and normal wear condition when compared to a Champion Check-a-Plug chart. The engine came to rest on its right side and The Nos. 1 and 3 bottom spark plug electrodes were oil-soaked. The engine ignition harness was destroyed by fire. The oil dipstick indicated about 5 quarts of oil. No debris was observed in the oil suction screen. The oil filter element was charred, but no metallic debris was observed between the oil filter media pleats. The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. The propeller spinner remained attached to the propeller and was crushed and twisted opposite the direction of rotation, consistent with rotation of the propeller at impact. About 8 inches from its tip, one propeller blade was bent aft about 30°. The other propeller blade was twisted toward the propeller face about 2/3 of its span and exhibited leading edge paint abrasion.