What happened
The FAA’s narrative, in sentence case. The FAA writes it in capitals and removes private details.
(-23) Narrative for the burn wire incident involving N478UE on 10-10-99: Sunday, October 10, 1999, flight 7206 departed the gate in Roanoke, Virginia, (roa) at 1952. After taxiing the aircraft for approx. ten feet, the captain and the first officer noticed a light burning odor, but no smoke. The flight crew stopped the aircraft and deplaned the passengers. The flight crew then contacted atlantic coast airlines' (aca) maintenance control. Aca maintenance control then contacted piedmont aviation and requested help from one of the licensed A&P mehcnaics employed by piedmont aviation. The aca maintenance controller instructed the flight crew to run the engines for the purpose of helping the on-call mehcanic troubleshoot the discrepancy. During the troubleshotting process, the flight crew and on-call maintenance both agreed that the burning odor occurred when the left engine was running. According to the flight crew, this troubleshotting session lasted about three hours. This information was presented to aca maintenance control. The aca maintenance controller speculated that the problem was a leaking diaphragm seal in the engine. At this point the aca maintenance controller d etermined that a mechanic from aca would be sent to Roanoke for additional inspection. Monday, October 11, 1999. The same flight crew meet with the aca mechanic and started the troubleshotting process again. According to the flight crew, four hours were dedicated to searching for the cause of the odor. At this point the aca mechanic and the aca maintenance controller still believed that the diaphragm seal was the cause of the odor. The aca maintenance controller decided that the aircraft should be ferried back to dulles, Virginia (iad). At the request of aca maintenance control the flight crew ran the engines again to determine if the electrical odor was overwhelming or unsafe. The flight crew agreed that the odor was not overwhelming, and that a brief ferry flight from roa to iad would not be unsafe. During the ferry flight, the flight crew reported that the smell was continuous but not increasing. When the aircraft arrived at dulles, aca maintenance personnel opened the aircraft and located the burnt wire suspected of causing the odor. The damaged wire ran from the left engine start generator contact, through the leading edge of the left wing, through the fuselage, thro ugh the forward pressure bulkhead into the electronic equipment area where it connected to the start contact. The investigation of the incident revealed an incorrectly installed splice in the wire leading from the left engine start contactor to the left generator contactor. The splice caused a short between the sheielding of the wire, which is normally grounded, to the center conductor. The heat produced by the short cuased damage along the entire length of the wire. It also damaged adjacent wires in the wire bundle and a plastic guard located in the left wing leading edge. A review of the circuit schematic revealed no circuit protection for this type of problem. privacy data omitted
As the FAA filed it
(-23) NARRATIVE FOR THE BURN WIRE INCIDENT INVOLVING N478UE ON 10-10-99: SUNDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1999, FLIGHT 7206 DEPARTED THE GATE IN ROANOKE, VIRGINIA, (ROA) AT 1952. AFTER TAXIING THE AIRCRAFT FOR APPROX. TEN FEET, THE CAPTAIN AND THE FIRST OFFICER NOTICED A LIGHT BURNING ODOR, BUT NO SMOKE. THE FLIGHT CREW STOPPED THE AIRCRAFT AND DEPLANED THE PASSENGERS. THE FLIGHT CREW THEN CONTACTED ATLANTIC COAST AIRLINES' (ACA) MAINTENANCE CONTROL. ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROL THEN CONTACTED PIEDMONT AVIATION AND REQUESTED HELP FROM ONE OF THE LICENSED A&P MEHCNAICS EMPLOYED BY PIEDMONT AVIATION. THE ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER INSTRUCTED THE FLIGHT CREW TO RUN THE ENGINES FOR THE PURPOSE OF HELPING THE ON-CALL MEHCANIC TROUBLESHOOT THE DISCREPANCY. DURING THE TROUBLESHOTTING PROCESS, THE FLIGHT CREW AND ON-CALL MAINTENANCE BOTH AGREED THAT THE BURNING ODOR OCCURRED WHEN THE LEFT ENGINE WAS RUNNING. ACCORDING TO THE FLIGHT CREW, THIS TROUBLESHOTTING SESSION LASTED ABOUT THREE HOURS. THIS INFORMATION WAS PRESENTED TO ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROL. THE ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER SPECULATED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A LEAKING DIAPHRAGM SEAL IN THE ENGINE. AT THIS POINT THE ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER D ETERMINED THAT A MECHANIC FROM ACA WOULD BE SENT TO ROANOKE FOR ADDITIONAL INSPECTION. MONDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1999. THE SAME FLIGHT CREW MEET WITH THE ACA MECHANIC AND STARTED THE TROUBLESHOTTING PROCESS AGAIN. ACCORDING TO THE FLIGHT CREW, FOUR HOURS WERE DEDICATED TO SEARCHING FOR THE CAUSE OF THE ODOR. AT THIS POINT THE ACA MECHANIC AND THE ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER STILL BELIEVED THAT THE DIAPHRAGM SEAL WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ODOR. THE ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROLLER DECIDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE FERRIED BACK TO DULLES, VIRGINIA (IAD). AT THE REQUEST OF ACA MAINTENANCE CONTROL THE FLIGHT CREW RAN THE ENGINES AGAIN TO DETERMINE IF THE ELECTRICAL ODOR WAS OVERWHELMING OR UNSAFE. THE FLIGHT CREW AGREED THAT THE ODOR WAS NOT OVERWHELMING, AND THAT A BRIEF FERRY FLIGHT FROM ROA TO IAD WOULD NOT BE UNSAFE. DURING THE FERRY FLIGHT, THE FLIGHT CREW REPORTED THAT THE SMELL WAS CONTINUOUS BUT NOT INCREASING. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AT DULLES, ACA MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL OPENED THE AIRCRAFT AND LOCATED THE BURNT WIRE SUSPECTED OF CAUSING THE ODOR. THE DAMAGED WIRE RAN FROM THE LEFT ENGINE START GENERATOR CONTACT, THROUGH THE LEADING EDGE OF THE LEFT WING, THROUGH THE FUSELAGE, THRO UGH THE FORWARD PRESSURE BULKHEAD INTO THE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AREA WHERE IT CONNECTED TO THE START CONTACT. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT REVEALED AN INCORRECTLY INSTALLED SPLICE IN THE WIRE LEADING FROM THE LEFT ENGINE START CONTACTOR TO THE LEFT GENERATOR CONTACTOR. THE SPLICE CAUSED A SHORT BETWEEN THE SHEIELDING OF THE WIRE, WHICH IS NORMALLY GROUNDED, TO THE CENTER CONDUCTOR. THE HEAT PRODUCED BY THE SHORT CUASED DAMAGE ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE WIRE. IT ALSO DAMAGED ADJACENT WIRES IN THE WIRE BUNDLE AND A PLASTIC GUARD LOCATED IN THE LEFT WING LEADING EDGE. A REVIEW OF THE CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC REVEALED NO CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THIS TYPE OF PROBLEM. ^PRIVACY DATA OMITTED^
Other reports on N478UE · 7
Matched to the same aircraft by N-number and date.